Read Online Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World by Jeffrey Herf - Free Book Online
Authors: Jeffrey Herf
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would be prepared to support it." Husseini requested that the Germans take a public role in opposition to formation of a Jewish state. Doehle replied that a public German stance could have negative consequences for the Arabs.62 On July 20, State Secretary von Weizsacker turned down Husseini's request for a meeting with one of his representatives in Berlin as he wanted to avoid possibly antagonizing Britain.63 Nevertheless, in August, Husseini informed the Germans of his "joy and satisfaction" that the German government had rejected the Peel Commission recommendation of 1937, which recommended that Palestine be partitioned to create a Jewish as well as an Arab state.64
The change in German policy in summer 1937 did not immediately put a stop to Jewish immigration to Palestine. On January 14, 1938, Doehle again wrote to Berlin that continued German support for the Transfer Agreement risked turning "existing Arab sympathy" for Nazi Germany into antagonism. Indeed, Doehle sensed that "the hitherto pro-German stance of the Palestinian Arabs had begun to waver" because they had seen no active German support for their struggle against the Jews. "I fear that the hatred of the Arab population against England will soon develop into a hatred against the Europeans in general and that then the Arabs will not make an exception [to this hatred] of the Germans." In order to preserve the past pro-German stance he believed to exist among Palestinian Arabs, Doehle "urgently" called on the Foreign Ministry to end support for Jewish emigration to Palestine.65 With the beginning of the war, emigration slowed and then came to a stop by 1941. Nazi policy had gained Arab sympathies due in part to its pronounced anti-Zionism while exacerbating, in Hirszowicz's terms, "already existing anti-Semitism inside and outside Germany."
The Foreign Ministry was receiving other reports about Arab and Muslim opposition to establishment of a Jewish state. In July 1937, Grobba wrote from Baghdad that in addition to protest from political leaders, Imams in Iraqi mosques were calling opposition to a Jewish state a religious duty of Muslims.66 Grobba's memo was one of the first German diplomatic analyses to suggest that the Nazi regime would find common ground with a politics rooted in militant Islam.67 Although Hitler did not devote much time to Arabs and Muslims in his speeches, he did mention Palestine toward the end of his concluding speech at the Nuremberg Party Congress in 1938. In the midst of a discussion of the Czech crisis, he said that he had no intention of allowing a "second Palestine" to emerge in the heart of Germany. He would not leave the Germans in the Sudetenland like the Arabs, "defenseless and perhaps abandoned ."68 Grobba wrote to the Foreign Ministry on October 4, 1938, to report that Hitler's remarks had met with "enthusiastic applause" in the Arab world. The speech had been broadcast over loudspeakers and heard in coffeehouses, and it aroused enthusiasm and hope among Palestinians. Some Iraqi journalists spoke of "the great Hitler" whose ability to aid the Sudeten Germans only underscored the inability or refusal of their own government to come to the aid of the Palestinians. Grobba wrote that Hitler's diplomatic victory at the Munich conference and Germany's rise to power since 1933 aroused enthusiasm among those Arabs who hoped that "they too would find a leader who would unite them and bring them freedom."69
In December 1937, Baldur von Schirach, the leader of the Hitler Youth, while on a trip through the Middle East, invited the Iraqi government to send twenty young people to the Reichsparteitag in summer 1938 as guests of the Hitler Youth organization. The Iraqi government accepted the invitation, and a group of young people went to Nuremberg.70 Upon returning to Baghdad in October, some of the travelers published their reactions in the Iraqi press.71 The group learned about the Hitler Youth, visited a military museum, and saw Nazi
The change in German policy in summer 1937 did not immediately put a stop to Jewish immigration to Palestine. On January 14, 1938, Doehle again wrote to Berlin that continued German support for the Transfer Agreement risked turning "existing Arab sympathy" for Nazi Germany into antagonism. Indeed, Doehle sensed that "the hitherto pro-German stance of the Palestinian Arabs had begun to waver" because they had seen no active German support for their struggle against the Jews. "I fear that the hatred of the Arab population against England will soon develop into a hatred against the Europeans in general and that then the Arabs will not make an exception [to this hatred] of the Germans." In order to preserve the past pro-German stance he believed to exist among Palestinian Arabs, Doehle "urgently" called on the Foreign Ministry to end support for Jewish emigration to Palestine.65 With the beginning of the war, emigration slowed and then came to a stop by 1941. Nazi policy had gained Arab sympathies due in part to its pronounced anti-Zionism while exacerbating, in Hirszowicz's terms, "already existing anti-Semitism inside and outside Germany."
The Foreign Ministry was receiving other reports about Arab and Muslim opposition to establishment of a Jewish state. In July 1937, Grobba wrote from Baghdad that in addition to protest from political leaders, Imams in Iraqi mosques were calling opposition to a Jewish state a religious duty of Muslims.66 Grobba's memo was one of the first German diplomatic analyses to suggest that the Nazi regime would find common ground with a politics rooted in militant Islam.67 Although Hitler did not devote much time to Arabs and Muslims in his speeches, he did mention Palestine toward the end of his concluding speech at the Nuremberg Party Congress in 1938. In the midst of a discussion of the Czech crisis, he said that he had no intention of allowing a "second Palestine" to emerge in the heart of Germany. He would not leave the Germans in the Sudetenland like the Arabs, "defenseless and perhaps abandoned ."68 Grobba wrote to the Foreign Ministry on October 4, 1938, to report that Hitler's remarks had met with "enthusiastic applause" in the Arab world. The speech had been broadcast over loudspeakers and heard in coffeehouses, and it aroused enthusiasm and hope among Palestinians. Some Iraqi journalists spoke of "the great Hitler" whose ability to aid the Sudeten Germans only underscored the inability or refusal of their own government to come to the aid of the Palestinians. Grobba wrote that Hitler's diplomatic victory at the Munich conference and Germany's rise to power since 1933 aroused enthusiasm among those Arabs who hoped that "they too would find a leader who would unite them and bring them freedom."69
In December 1937, Baldur von Schirach, the leader of the Hitler Youth, while on a trip through the Middle East, invited the Iraqi government to send twenty young people to the Reichsparteitag in summer 1938 as guests of the Hitler Youth organization. The Iraqi government accepted the invitation, and a group of young people went to Nuremberg.70 Upon returning to Baghdad in October, some of the travelers published their reactions in the Iraqi press.71 The group learned about the Hitler Youth, visited a military museum, and saw Nazi
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