Read Online Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World by Jeffrey Herf - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Jeffrey Herf
Ads: Link
Party headquarters. One visitor was left with "a memory of ... a strong will, of art, science and scholarship, strength and organization which all taken together had created a strong people."72 Another was struck with the international character of the Nuremberg rally that brought together young people from Iraq, Italy, Spain, Romania, and Japan. The orderly masses patiently waiting to see "the Fiihrer," the searchlights, and flags were evidence to another visitor of "the great taste and refinement which has been developed" in Germany. Hitler delivered a "great speech, one that the world waited for with great impatience." The speech was "a flame from the German heart." Still another pilgrim recalled that after the Iraqi delegation sang the Iraqi national hymn, it received such "loud applause" that the group sang it again.73 The Iraqi Foreign Ministry sent thanks to the German government and to its Baghdad embassy for "the warm welcome and friendship" shown to the Iraqi delegation during its visit.74 The Nuremberg rallies were a spectacular presentation of the Third Reich's ex treme nationalism. Yet for these impressionable young Iraqis, these events instead were a moment of German and European recognition of Iraq. For them, the Nuremberg rally was not a festival celebrating the superiority of the Aryan master race over inferiors. Rather, the message they brought home was that Germans, especially the Hitler Youth, were friendly comrades in a common struggle. In their account, Nazi Germany was the vanguard of an admirable and strikingly inclusive nationalism.
As long as Hitler held out hope that Great Britain would give him free rein in pursuit of his policies of expansion on the European continent, especially for Lebensraum in the east, he limited appeals to the Arab Middle East.75 On the other hand, Nazi anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist policies found favor with Arab radicals led by the Grand Mufti as well as with anti-Zionist officials in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Although Arab affairs were a sideshow to the main events taking place within Europe, the meetings and contacts established by 1937-38 between German diplomats and Arab political figures in Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were, as Hirszowicz wrote, "a good beginning for German further activities."76 Yet the argument for a change in policy coming from the pro-Arab voices of Doehle in Jerusalem and Grobba in Baghdad in the summer of 1938 would become far more appealing as the British rejected Hitler's hopes for a German-British rapprochement that would leave Nazi Germany as the dominant power in Europe.77 Faced with the possibility that Britain and France would go to war rather than accept Hitler's plan of continental domination, the Germans began to move away from their previous policy of restraint toward the Arab countries. In June 1939, Hans Piekenbrock, the director of military intelligence in the Abwehr, wrote to its chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, that "through his middle man, the Grand Mufti has conveyed his sincere thanks for the support given to him so far. It was only as a result of the money we gave to him that it was possible to carry out the revolt in Palestine."78 The Germans sent arms shipments to Palestine by way of Iraq and Saudi Arabia with agreement of these governments. They sent money to finance the Palestine revolt and intensified contacts with anti-British military and circles close to King Farouk in Egypt. After the Munich conference of October 1938, the Nazi Party organization in Palestine aided Arab guerilla bands.79
In spring 1939 another development reflected this shift in policy. German Arabic-language shortwave radio broadcasts to North Africa and the Arab Middle East began. While it was all well and good to invite twenty young people to stare in awe at the light show in Nuremberg, the Foreign Ministry understood that shortwave radio was a far more cost-effective way to spread the word to millions of listeners around the globe,
As long as Hitler held out hope that Great Britain would give him free rein in pursuit of his policies of expansion on the European continent, especially for Lebensraum in the east, he limited appeals to the Arab Middle East.75 On the other hand, Nazi anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist policies found favor with Arab radicals led by the Grand Mufti as well as with anti-Zionist officials in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Although Arab affairs were a sideshow to the main events taking place within Europe, the meetings and contacts established by 1937-38 between German diplomats and Arab political figures in Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were, as Hirszowicz wrote, "a good beginning for German further activities."76 Yet the argument for a change in policy coming from the pro-Arab voices of Doehle in Jerusalem and Grobba in Baghdad in the summer of 1938 would become far more appealing as the British rejected Hitler's hopes for a German-British rapprochement that would leave Nazi Germany as the dominant power in Europe.77 Faced with the possibility that Britain and France would go to war rather than accept Hitler's plan of continental domination, the Germans began to move away from their previous policy of restraint toward the Arab countries. In June 1939, Hans Piekenbrock, the director of military intelligence in the Abwehr, wrote to its chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, that "through his middle man, the Grand Mufti has conveyed his sincere thanks for the support given to him so far. It was only as a result of the money we gave to him that it was possible to carry out the revolt in Palestine."78 The Germans sent arms shipments to Palestine by way of Iraq and Saudi Arabia with agreement of these governments. They sent money to finance the Palestine revolt and intensified contacts with anti-British military and circles close to King Farouk in Egypt. After the Munich conference of October 1938, the Nazi Party organization in Palestine aided Arab guerilla bands.79
In spring 1939 another development reflected this shift in policy. German Arabic-language shortwave radio broadcasts to North Africa and the Arab Middle East began. While it was all well and good to invite twenty young people to stare in awe at the light show in Nuremberg, the Foreign Ministry understood that shortwave radio was a far more cost-effective way to spread the word to millions of listeners around the globe,
Similar Books
