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Authors: Jeffrey Herf
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especially in a region where literacy averaged around 20 percent and was even lower among Muslims. In September 1939, the Foreign Ministry in Berlin established the Department of Radio Policy (RundfunkpolitischeAbteilung). Its purpose was both to monitor the radio broadcasts of other countries and to organize and shape the official message on the Nazi regime's shortwave radio broadcasts. By July 1940 it had fourteen divisions broadcasting in many languages in Europe and around the globe. One of its largest and most important divisions handled broadcasts in Arabic aimed at North Africa and the Middle East.80
In July 1939, Christian T. Steger, of the American Consulate in Jerusalem, sent Washington the first American assessment of Nazi Germany's Arabic shortwave radio broadcasts.81 He noted that the Nazi reports about European news were reasonably accurate. "Arabic news, on the other hand, is given without any apparent effort at subtlety or restraint. Offensive terms such as 'barbarous ,"savage,"deceitful,' etc., are freely applied to the British, while with regard to the Jews the epithets are even more venomous. Less regard also is shown for the truth; and news from extremist Arab sources is especially stressed."82 In these months just preceding Hitler's invasion of Poland, the Arabic broadcasts celebrated Germany's growing strength and vilified Great Britain. Steger wrote that when the broadcasts discussed events in Palestine, "practically all restraint is abandoned. Great Britain is pictured as continually discriminating in favor of her Jewish masters." German radio denounced the "insolent," "criminal," or "devilish Jews" who, it claimed, were carrying out "a campaign of indiscriminate murder under the eyes of the British, who supply the necessary arms." The broadcasts extolled Arab "martyrs;" quoted the Grand Mufti, and asserted that the British were suppressing the truth about events in Palestine. "It is intimated that only in Germany is the real truth about the Palestine situation available."83
Yet for the Italians and Germans, there were setbacks in the Middle East in 1939. England and France strengthened their military forces in the region, particularly in Egypt. In 1937, the British had stripped Haj Amin el-Husseini of his offices, and he fled to Lebanon to escape arrest. In 1939, he fled again, this time to Iraq, after the British were able to suppress the revolt in Palestine in 1939.84 In Egypt, the fear of war first deepened, rather than undermined, support for Britain. On May 17,1939, Britain bolstered its position among the Arabs when it issued the White Paper, which promised to stop Jewish immigration in five years, limit the purchase of land by Jews, and form a Palestinian state within ten years. Hitler's annexation of the Sudetenland aroused apprehension in Arab government circles because if the will of a national minority with a strong outside protector could be made to prevail in Europe, it was reasoned, then the same thing could come to pass in the Arab world, which had no shortage of aggrieved minorities. Hitler's own racial categorization and contempt for Arabs expressed in Mein Kampf, passages of which the British described in their BBC Arabic radio broadcasts, continued to cause mistrust and offense in the Middle East. Moreover, Germany's close ties with Italy were a mixed blessing. In the Mediterranean Mussolini sought to extend Italian influence, not Arab independence, and Italian aggression in Ethiopia in 1935-36 had left a residue of bitterness in North Africa.85 Ironically, the appeal of Nazi Germany in the region lay partly in the perception that it was less racist toward North Africans than the Italians.
Egypt and Mandate Palestine were linked to Britain by treaty obligations and cultural, educational, and commercial networks. German prospects in Saudi Arabia appeared more promising as it was the only formerly independent state not linked by treaty to England. Following a series of visits in
In July 1939, Christian T. Steger, of the American Consulate in Jerusalem, sent Washington the first American assessment of Nazi Germany's Arabic shortwave radio broadcasts.81 He noted that the Nazi reports about European news were reasonably accurate. "Arabic news, on the other hand, is given without any apparent effort at subtlety or restraint. Offensive terms such as 'barbarous ,"savage,"deceitful,' etc., are freely applied to the British, while with regard to the Jews the epithets are even more venomous. Less regard also is shown for the truth; and news from extremist Arab sources is especially stressed."82 In these months just preceding Hitler's invasion of Poland, the Arabic broadcasts celebrated Germany's growing strength and vilified Great Britain. Steger wrote that when the broadcasts discussed events in Palestine, "practically all restraint is abandoned. Great Britain is pictured as continually discriminating in favor of her Jewish masters." German radio denounced the "insolent," "criminal," or "devilish Jews" who, it claimed, were carrying out "a campaign of indiscriminate murder under the eyes of the British, who supply the necessary arms." The broadcasts extolled Arab "martyrs;" quoted the Grand Mufti, and asserted that the British were suppressing the truth about events in Palestine. "It is intimated that only in Germany is the real truth about the Palestine situation available."83
Yet for the Italians and Germans, there were setbacks in the Middle East in 1939. England and France strengthened their military forces in the region, particularly in Egypt. In 1937, the British had stripped Haj Amin el-Husseini of his offices, and he fled to Lebanon to escape arrest. In 1939, he fled again, this time to Iraq, after the British were able to suppress the revolt in Palestine in 1939.84 In Egypt, the fear of war first deepened, rather than undermined, support for Britain. On May 17,1939, Britain bolstered its position among the Arabs when it issued the White Paper, which promised to stop Jewish immigration in five years, limit the purchase of land by Jews, and form a Palestinian state within ten years. Hitler's annexation of the Sudetenland aroused apprehension in Arab government circles because if the will of a national minority with a strong outside protector could be made to prevail in Europe, it was reasoned, then the same thing could come to pass in the Arab world, which had no shortage of aggrieved minorities. Hitler's own racial categorization and contempt for Arabs expressed in Mein Kampf, passages of which the British described in their BBC Arabic radio broadcasts, continued to cause mistrust and offense in the Middle East. Moreover, Germany's close ties with Italy were a mixed blessing. In the Mediterranean Mussolini sought to extend Italian influence, not Arab independence, and Italian aggression in Ethiopia in 1935-36 had left a residue of bitterness in North Africa.85 Ironically, the appeal of Nazi Germany in the region lay partly in the perception that it was less racist toward North Africans than the Italians.
Egypt and Mandate Palestine were linked to Britain by treaty obligations and cultural, educational, and commercial networks. German prospects in Saudi Arabia appeared more promising as it was the only formerly independent state not linked by treaty to England. Following a series of visits in
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