Read Online Haughey's Forty Years of Controversy by T. Ryle Dwyer - Free Book Online
Authors: T. Ryle Dwyer
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led to the establishment of the Provisional IRA.
Despite Berryâs warning, Charlie turned to Capt. Kelly for advice and help in the coming weeks. âI had no hesitation in receiving assistance from Capt. Kelly in briefing me on the situation in the north of Ireland and letting me know who the different groups were and all that sort of thing,â Haughey explained.
Capt. Kellyâs suggested the three northern nationalists who were selected to administer the governmentâs financial contributions following the Bailieboro meeting. A bank account under their joint control was opened in Clones, and Haughey personally telephoned the secretary general of the Irish Red Cross to deposit £5,000 in the account.
Thereafter Haugheyâs personal secretary, Anthony Fagan, would transfer money to the Red Cross with instructions to forward it to the Clones account. The Irish Red Cross was used to launder the money.
Whenever Haughey wanted information or to pass on a message about the north, he would call on the captain. âGet Kelly to do it,â he would tell Fagan.
When money was needed, Capt. Kelly would go to Fagan, who would forward a note: âMinister, Kelly wants another £3,500 from the Bank a/c in the usual way. Is this OK please?â
Haughey would then simply write âOKâ on the note. A few times he did balk temporarily. âThis cannot go on for everâ, he grumbled. But each time he authorised the payments after discussing them with Capt. Kelly.
The minister to whom Capt. Kelly was closest was Neil Blaney, whom he met just about every week.
There were grounds for believing the conspiracy was much more serious than trying to import arms illegally. Capt. Kelly essentially suggested in his report of 23 August that in order to end partition the state should face the fact that âwar is the continuation of politics by other means.â In his report of the Bailieboro meeting he noted that the northern Republicans were looking for arms for defensive purposes âbut there is a definite feeling, in the last analysis, the defence forces will have to come to the rescue.â The Minister for Defence could authorise the importation of weapons, but no members of the government, not even the whole cabinet, had the right to involve the country in war. Taken to its logical conclusion, this amounted to a conspiracy to subvert the constitution by involving the country in war, contrary to Article 28 of the constitution, which stipulates that âthe state shall not participate in any war save with the assent of Dáil Ãireann.â
Kelly sent his reports to Hefferon and they were forwarded to Gibbons. Having been warned by Peter Berry, Lynch questioned Gibbons about Capt. Kellyâs activities. If Lynch did not know what was happening, it was because he chose to turn a blind eye. His behaviour, which amounted to disregarding his obligation to uphold and implement the constitution, was both reckless and irresponsible. Of course, he publicly avowed a policy of peaceful intent towards the north, but he seemed prepared to tolerate conflicting views on this vital issue within his cabinet. For instance, Blaney seemed intent on going to war over the north, even though Lynch had been emphasising that government wished to pursue peaceful means. Blaney delivered a speech in Letterkenny, Co. Donegal, on 8 December 1969, at celebration commemorating his twenty-one years in the Dáil. âThe ideal way of ending partition is by peaceful means, but no one has a right to assert that force is irrevocably out,â he said. âThe Fianna Fáil party has never taken a decision to rule out the use of force, if the circumstances in the six counties so demand.â
This was a carefully prepared speech that Blaney took the unusual step of reading, and circulating to the press. It was a challenge to Lynch, but the Taoiseach behaved as if there was no challenge at all.
âWhile Mr
Despite Berryâs warning, Charlie turned to Capt. Kelly for advice and help in the coming weeks. âI had no hesitation in receiving assistance from Capt. Kelly in briefing me on the situation in the north of Ireland and letting me know who the different groups were and all that sort of thing,â Haughey explained.
Capt. Kellyâs suggested the three northern nationalists who were selected to administer the governmentâs financial contributions following the Bailieboro meeting. A bank account under their joint control was opened in Clones, and Haughey personally telephoned the secretary general of the Irish Red Cross to deposit £5,000 in the account.
Thereafter Haugheyâs personal secretary, Anthony Fagan, would transfer money to the Red Cross with instructions to forward it to the Clones account. The Irish Red Cross was used to launder the money.
Whenever Haughey wanted information or to pass on a message about the north, he would call on the captain. âGet Kelly to do it,â he would tell Fagan.
When money was needed, Capt. Kelly would go to Fagan, who would forward a note: âMinister, Kelly wants another £3,500 from the Bank a/c in the usual way. Is this OK please?â
Haughey would then simply write âOKâ on the note. A few times he did balk temporarily. âThis cannot go on for everâ, he grumbled. But each time he authorised the payments after discussing them with Capt. Kelly.
The minister to whom Capt. Kelly was closest was Neil Blaney, whom he met just about every week.
There were grounds for believing the conspiracy was much more serious than trying to import arms illegally. Capt. Kelly essentially suggested in his report of 23 August that in order to end partition the state should face the fact that âwar is the continuation of politics by other means.â In his report of the Bailieboro meeting he noted that the northern Republicans were looking for arms for defensive purposes âbut there is a definite feeling, in the last analysis, the defence forces will have to come to the rescue.â The Minister for Defence could authorise the importation of weapons, but no members of the government, not even the whole cabinet, had the right to involve the country in war. Taken to its logical conclusion, this amounted to a conspiracy to subvert the constitution by involving the country in war, contrary to Article 28 of the constitution, which stipulates that âthe state shall not participate in any war save with the assent of Dáil Ãireann.â
Kelly sent his reports to Hefferon and they were forwarded to Gibbons. Having been warned by Peter Berry, Lynch questioned Gibbons about Capt. Kellyâs activities. If Lynch did not know what was happening, it was because he chose to turn a blind eye. His behaviour, which amounted to disregarding his obligation to uphold and implement the constitution, was both reckless and irresponsible. Of course, he publicly avowed a policy of peaceful intent towards the north, but he seemed prepared to tolerate conflicting views on this vital issue within his cabinet. For instance, Blaney seemed intent on going to war over the north, even though Lynch had been emphasising that government wished to pursue peaceful means. Blaney delivered a speech in Letterkenny, Co. Donegal, on 8 December 1969, at celebration commemorating his twenty-one years in the Dáil. âThe ideal way of ending partition is by peaceful means, but no one has a right to assert that force is irrevocably out,â he said. âThe Fianna Fáil party has never taken a decision to rule out the use of force, if the circumstances in the six counties so demand.â
This was a carefully prepared speech that Blaney took the unusual step of reading, and circulating to the press. It was a challenge to Lynch, but the Taoiseach behaved as if there was no challenge at all.
âWhile Mr
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