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will be put at readiness so that they may be available in a matter of hours.’
    In short, Gibbons told the chief of staff that the government had agreed to provide weapons for Nationalist civilians in Northern Ireland. To avoid confusion the army asked for a clarification the following week. ‘The military assume that incursion would only be mounted in circumstances where there would be a complete breakdown of law and order in N. Ireland’, it was noted. Gibbons confirmed this. Thus, the directive was an order to prepare a contingency plan so that the army could respond ‘in a matter of hours’.
    During February, Minister for Defence Gibbons secured authorisation for Capt. Kelly to go to Germany to purchase the weapons, which consisted of 200 sub machine guns, 84 light machine guns, 50 general-purpose machine guns, 50 rifles, 200 grenades, 200 pistols and 250,000 rounds of ammunition.
    Upon his return he gave the details to Jim Gibbons. Initially it was planned to bring the guns from Belgium to Dublin port on a ship, the City of Dublin . In his capacity as Minister for Finance, Charlie instructed customs to clear the cargo without inspecting it, but the cargo had not been loaded because of a problem with the paperwork. British intelligence, which was aware of the scheme, had ensured the paperwork was not in order.
    Capt. Kelly went to the continent to have the cargo transferred to Trieste for shipment to Ireland, but while it was en route he had it off-loaded in Vienna so that it could be flown directly to Ireland on a chartered plane.
    Plans were made for the weapons to be flown to Dublin on Tuesday, 21 April 1970. But the special branch staked out the airport with the aim of seizing the cargo.
    Brian Lenihan, the Minister for Transport, tipped off Col Hefferon. Haughey was then informed, and he telephone Peter Berry, who immediately recognised his voice. ‘You know about the cargo that is coming into Dublin airport on Sunday?’ Charlie asked.
    â€˜Yes, minister.’
    â€˜Can it be let through on a guarantee that it will go direct to the north?’
    â€˜No.’
    â€˜I think that is a bad decision,’ Charlie said. ‘Does the man from Mayo [the Minister for Justice] know?’
    â€˜Yes.’
    â€˜What will happen to it when it arrives?’
    â€˜It will be grabbed,’ replied Berry.
    â€˜I had better have it called off,’ Charlie said and then hung up.
    â€˜I made notes there and then in my personal diary as to what Mr Haughey said,’ Berry later explained.
    â€˜All this could not have gone on for several months without the knowledge of the Taoiseach unless he was wilfully turning the blind eye,’ he concluded. He therefore decided the time had come to get in touch with President de Valera in order to force Lynch’s hand.
    Berry did not actually give de Valera any details, he just asked him what he should do about some information ‘of national concern’ when he was not sure the information would get to the Taoiseach by the normal channel. He was not actually looking for advice; he knew the president would tell him to go directly to Lynch. His real aim was simply to involve de Valera in the hope of getting some action from Lynch.
    â€˜By consulting the president, and telling the Taoiseach that I had consulted the president,’ Berry wrote, ‘I would be pushing the Taoiseach towards an enforcement of the rule of law.’
    Berry told the Taoiseach on the morning of 20 April 1970. Lynch immediately instructed him to have the whole matter investigated thoroughly and to report again the following morning, when Berry confirmed the involvement of Charlie and Blaney. Lynch decided to interview the two ministers the following day, but that was the day that Charlie went to hospital following his famous ‘riding accident’.
    â€˜I ultimately got the doctor’s permission and I decided to interview Deputy Haughey in hospital