Read Online Who Stole the American Dream? by Hedrick Smith - Free Book Online
Authors: Hedrick Smith
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“Nader’s Raiders” vs. GM
A similar surge of middle-class power and civic activism, with similar impact on Washington, came from the consumer movement. Although less militant and less well organized than the greens, public interest consumerism took off in the mid-1960s and had strong policy influence into the late 1970s.
Elevenmajor new consumer organizations were formed in the 1960s, among them the Consumer Federation of America, Public Citizen, and Congress Watch. They attracted a strong following among well-educated yuppies, suburbanites, and upper-middle-class professionals who were wary of big business. With slogans calling for “Truth in Lending” and “Truth in Packaging,” consumer advocates demanded more aggressive action by federal watchdog agencies to protect the public from being unfairly exploited by unsafe products and unscrupulous lenders. Quality of life was key. People took U.S. economic growth for granted, and they wanted higher standards, better quality, and greater transparency from industry.
More than any other single person, Ralph Nader put middle-classconsumer activism on the political map. A public figure of no small ego, Nader knew how to work the press, the public, and politicians. His 1965 book,
Unsafe at Any Speed
, captured public attention with the charge that America’s Big Three carmakers were responsible for many automobile accidents because they were marketing cars that were mechanically and technically unsafe.
Nader’s network ranged widely. His Center for the Study of Responsive Law, whose staff proudly called themselves “Nader’s Raiders,” grew from just five people in 1967 to two hundred in 1971. In one decade, the center generated a score of popular books that exposed the failure of federal agencies to adequately protect the consuming public. Nader pressed for a more sharply adversarial relationship between government agencies and the business sectors they monitored. His Health Research Group kept tabs on the Food and Drug Administration’s oversight of the pharmaceutical industry. His Aviation Consumer Action Project critiqued the Federal Aviation Administration and the Civil Aeronautics Board. His Center for Auto Safety kept score on the National Transportation Safety Board and the Highway Safety Administration. His Congress Watch checked on where Capitol Hill was falling down on oversight. By the mid-1970s, the Nader network, funded by public donations and Nader’s speaking fees, employed seventy-five full-time lawyers, researchers, and lobbyists, plus a few hundred college interns.
Nader’s slashing personal attacks on industry and government agencies made him a celebrity consumer advocate with political impact. By 1974,
U.S. News & World Report
put Nader on its cover with Nixon and Henry Kissinger, ranking him fourth in its national survey headlined “Who Runs America.” Nader was seen by the public as more influential than the big-time corporate CEOs he was hounding. His favorite target was General Motors, and ironically, GM’s retaliatory harassment of Nader fueled his popular appeal and his political clout. In 1966,Nader filed a lawsuit charging GM with hiring a private detective to shadow him and trying to entrap him with sex lures. GM had to pay a cash settlement of $425,000, which Nader spent on more investigations of GM.
Nader had significant policy impact. His campaign against U.S. automakers led to congressional imposition of auto safety standards in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. That law was a political earthquake that broke congressional resistance and paved the way for expanded regulatory laws in other sectors, such as fair packaging and labeling, control of hazardous substances, meat inspection, and gas pipeline and mine safety. Occasionally, the Senate would pass a bill without a single negative vote.
Politicians had gotten the consumer message: If business did not voluntarily clean up its own act, a highly vocal
A similar surge of middle-class power and civic activism, with similar impact on Washington, came from the consumer movement. Although less militant and less well organized than the greens, public interest consumerism took off in the mid-1960s and had strong policy influence into the late 1970s.
Elevenmajor new consumer organizations were formed in the 1960s, among them the Consumer Federation of America, Public Citizen, and Congress Watch. They attracted a strong following among well-educated yuppies, suburbanites, and upper-middle-class professionals who were wary of big business. With slogans calling for “Truth in Lending” and “Truth in Packaging,” consumer advocates demanded more aggressive action by federal watchdog agencies to protect the public from being unfairly exploited by unsafe products and unscrupulous lenders. Quality of life was key. People took U.S. economic growth for granted, and they wanted higher standards, better quality, and greater transparency from industry.
More than any other single person, Ralph Nader put middle-classconsumer activism on the political map. A public figure of no small ego, Nader knew how to work the press, the public, and politicians. His 1965 book,
Unsafe at Any Speed
, captured public attention with the charge that America’s Big Three carmakers were responsible for many automobile accidents because they were marketing cars that were mechanically and technically unsafe.
Nader’s network ranged widely. His Center for the Study of Responsive Law, whose staff proudly called themselves “Nader’s Raiders,” grew from just five people in 1967 to two hundred in 1971. In one decade, the center generated a score of popular books that exposed the failure of federal agencies to adequately protect the consuming public. Nader pressed for a more sharply adversarial relationship between government agencies and the business sectors they monitored. His Health Research Group kept tabs on the Food and Drug Administration’s oversight of the pharmaceutical industry. His Aviation Consumer Action Project critiqued the Federal Aviation Administration and the Civil Aeronautics Board. His Center for Auto Safety kept score on the National Transportation Safety Board and the Highway Safety Administration. His Congress Watch checked on where Capitol Hill was falling down on oversight. By the mid-1970s, the Nader network, funded by public donations and Nader’s speaking fees, employed seventy-five full-time lawyers, researchers, and lobbyists, plus a few hundred college interns.
Nader’s slashing personal attacks on industry and government agencies made him a celebrity consumer advocate with political impact. By 1974,
U.S. News & World Report
put Nader on its cover with Nixon and Henry Kissinger, ranking him fourth in its national survey headlined “Who Runs America.” Nader was seen by the public as more influential than the big-time corporate CEOs he was hounding. His favorite target was General Motors, and ironically, GM’s retaliatory harassment of Nader fueled his popular appeal and his political clout. In 1966,Nader filed a lawsuit charging GM with hiring a private detective to shadow him and trying to entrap him with sex lures. GM had to pay a cash settlement of $425,000, which Nader spent on more investigations of GM.
Nader had significant policy impact. His campaign against U.S. automakers led to congressional imposition of auto safety standards in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. That law was a political earthquake that broke congressional resistance and paved the way for expanded regulatory laws in other sectors, such as fair packaging and labeling, control of hazardous substances, meat inspection, and gas pipeline and mine safety. Occasionally, the Senate would pass a bill without a single negative vote.
Politicians had gotten the consumer message: If business did not voluntarily clean up its own act, a highly vocal
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