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Authors: Matthew M. Aid
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Japan,
the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, commanded by Major Lowell Jameson, “made one of the most important contributions to Air Force
Intelligence in its history.” Intercepts of MiG radio traffic confirmed the long-held suspicion that the Russians were controlling
the air defense of North Korea and Manchuria, not the Chinese or the North Koreans. 49 As a former air force Russian linguist stationed in the Far East recalled, “we were actually monitoring the Soviet Air Force
fighting the American Air Force and we were listening to the Soviet pilots being directed by Soviet ground control people
to fight the Americans. We were fighting our own little war with the Soviets.” 50
The decision was made to keep this revelation out of all widely circulated intelligence publications, such as the CIA’s National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), in order to prevent the leakage of this highly sensitive intelligence to right-wing members
of Congress, such as Senator Joseph McCarthy, who would no doubt have used (or misused) the information to drum up public
support for war with the USSR at a time when the U.S. government was trying to prevent that from happening. 51 While President Truman had made a bold decision to resist communist aggression in Korea, the war effort (or “police action,”
as he described it) was facing decreasing support from the public even as American paranoia about communist threats from abroad
and subversion within began to create great difficulties for the administration. Amid this poisonous atmosphere at home and
the fraught situation in the Far East, the U.S. military prepared for Armageddon.
General MacArthur’s Dismissal
On April 11, 1951, just as the U.S. Armed Forces reached a maximum state of readiness for nuclear war, without any prior public
warning President Truman fired General MacArthur from his post as commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Far East. 52
The president’s decision stunned the nation. As it turned out, the AFSA code breakers at Arlington Hall had a great deal to
do with Truman’s decision to fire America’s most popular military commander. Throughout 1950 and 1951, AFSA was intercepting
and decrypting the telegrams of the various foreign diplomats based in Tokyo. Among the most prominent targets being exploited
were the diplomatic cables of the ambassadors from Spain, Portugal, and Brazil. 53 Both MacArthur and Major General Charles Willoughby made the mistake of candidly disclosing their extreme political views
on Russia and China to these three ambassadors. Among the comments that MacArthur made was that he hoped the Soviets would
intervene militarily in Korea, which he believed would give the United States the excuse to destroy once and for all Mao Tse-tung’s
communist regime in Beijing. MacArthur also told the foreign ambassadors that he thought war with Russia was inevitable. 54
In mid-March 1951, Truman’s naval aide, Admiral Robert Dennison, handed him a batch of four decrypted messages sent the preceding
week by the Spanish ambassador in Tokyo, Francisco José del Castillo, summarizing his private conversations with MacArthur.
The late Ambassador Paul Nitze, who was then head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, said in an interview, “From
those communications, it was perfectly clear that what MacArthur had in mind was that either he would have a complete victory
in North Korea or, if the Chinese Communists got involved, then the war would be spread to the Chinese mainland as a whole
and the object of the game would then be the unseating of Mao Tse-tung and the restoration of Chiang Kai-shek. In the course
of doing that you had your nuclear weapons if you needed them. This would then enable one to do what was strategically important
and that was to defeat the Chinese Communists. That was clearly what was on MacArthur’s mind. Part of the reason he took these
excessive risks was to create a situation in which we would be involved in a war with the
the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, commanded by Major Lowell Jameson, “made one of the most important contributions to Air Force
Intelligence in its history.” Intercepts of MiG radio traffic confirmed the long-held suspicion that the Russians were controlling
the air defense of North Korea and Manchuria, not the Chinese or the North Koreans. 49 As a former air force Russian linguist stationed in the Far East recalled, “we were actually monitoring the Soviet Air Force
fighting the American Air Force and we were listening to the Soviet pilots being directed by Soviet ground control people
to fight the Americans. We were fighting our own little war with the Soviets.” 50
The decision was made to keep this revelation out of all widely circulated intelligence publications, such as the CIA’s National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), in order to prevent the leakage of this highly sensitive intelligence to right-wing members
of Congress, such as Senator Joseph McCarthy, who would no doubt have used (or misused) the information to drum up public
support for war with the USSR at a time when the U.S. government was trying to prevent that from happening. 51 While President Truman had made a bold decision to resist communist aggression in Korea, the war effort (or “police action,”
as he described it) was facing decreasing support from the public even as American paranoia about communist threats from abroad
and subversion within began to create great difficulties for the administration. Amid this poisonous atmosphere at home and
the fraught situation in the Far East, the U.S. military prepared for Armageddon.
General MacArthur’s Dismissal
On April 11, 1951, just as the U.S. Armed Forces reached a maximum state of readiness for nuclear war, without any prior public
warning President Truman fired General MacArthur from his post as commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Far East. 52
The president’s decision stunned the nation. As it turned out, the AFSA code breakers at Arlington Hall had a great deal to
do with Truman’s decision to fire America’s most popular military commander. Throughout 1950 and 1951, AFSA was intercepting
and decrypting the telegrams of the various foreign diplomats based in Tokyo. Among the most prominent targets being exploited
were the diplomatic cables of the ambassadors from Spain, Portugal, and Brazil. 53 Both MacArthur and Major General Charles Willoughby made the mistake of candidly disclosing their extreme political views
on Russia and China to these three ambassadors. Among the comments that MacArthur made was that he hoped the Soviets would
intervene militarily in Korea, which he believed would give the United States the excuse to destroy once and for all Mao Tse-tung’s
communist regime in Beijing. MacArthur also told the foreign ambassadors that he thought war with Russia was inevitable. 54
In mid-March 1951, Truman’s naval aide, Admiral Robert Dennison, handed him a batch of four decrypted messages sent the preceding
week by the Spanish ambassador in Tokyo, Francisco José del Castillo, summarizing his private conversations with MacArthur.
The late Ambassador Paul Nitze, who was then head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, said in an interview, “From
those communications, it was perfectly clear that what MacArthur had in mind was that either he would have a complete victory
in North Korea or, if the Chinese Communists got involved, then the war would be spread to the Chinese mainland as a whole
and the object of the game would then be the unseating of Mao Tse-tung and the restoration of Chiang Kai-shek. In the course
of doing that you had your nuclear weapons if you needed them. This would then enable one to do what was strategically important
and that was to defeat the Chinese Communists. That was clearly what was on MacArthur’s mind. Part of the reason he took these
excessive risks was to create a situation in which we would be involved in a war with the
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