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Chinese Communists.” 55
Given the overwhelming preponderance of evidence that MacArthur was deliberately ignoring orders from Washington, and with
the SIGINT intercepts indicating that he was secretly hoping for an all-out world war with the Soviets and the Chinese, Truman
fired him. In retrospect, it was almost certainly the right thing to do. But it had a catastrophic effect on Truman’sstanding
with the American people. His poll numbers sank like a stone in the months that followed. By mid-1951, his approval ratings
had plummeted to 23 percent, the lowest ever recorded by the Gallup Poll for a sitting American president.
General Ridgway’s Crisis
The man chosen by the Pentagon to replace General Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief, Far East, was General Matthew Ridgway,
who before moving into MacArthur’s office suite in the Dai Ichi Building in downtown Tokyo had commanded the Eighth U.S. Army
in Korea since December 1950. The hard-nosed former paratrooper took command at a moment when the intelligence picture in
the region was bleak— and would only become grimmer as the months went on.
Intelligence reporting convinced Ridgway that a storm was about to break on his forces. All intelligence, including that extracted
from POWs as early as February 1951, indicated that the Chinese and North Koreans were about to launch their massive Spring
“Fifth Phase” Offensive in Korea. SIGINT revealed that there had been two major conferences attended by all Chinese and North
Korean army and corps commanders, as well as Russian military advisers, to work out the details of the offensive. Additional
intelligence reports received in March indicated that D-day for the Chinese–North Korean offensive was expected to be some
time in April. Then on April 1, the North Koreans changed their codes, a sure sign that something dramatic was in the offing.
But thanks to the efforts of the U.S. Army code breakers in Korea, within a week the new North Korean ciphers were solved. 56
Over the next two weeks, the SIGINT analysts in Washington and Tokyo laid bare the plans for the upcoming Chinese–North Korean
offensive. Thanks in large part to SIGINT, Ridgway was able to discern weeks in advance that the brunt of the offensive would
come in the mountainous central portion of the front, and not along the flat west coast of Korea north of Seoul. SIGINT also
provided a fairly complete picture of the enemy forces committed, specifically four newly arrived Chinese armies plus two
North Korean corps. And most important, it provided relatively clear indications about when the offensive would start. SIGINT
also detailed the massive buildup of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean combat aircraft in Manchuria, plus attempts by the
North Koreans to repair their airfields. When the enemy offensive finally commenced on April 22, Ridgway knew virtually everything
about it except the exact time that it was due to begin. 57
By the middle of June, SIGINT intercepts of North Korean radio traffic would reveal that the Chinese–North Korean offensive,
which had sputtered to a halt earlier that month, had cost the communists a staggering 221,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties.
COMINT also provided hard evidence of the communists’ substantial logistical difficulties, which required that tens of thousands
of frontline PLA forces be employed behind the lines to keep supply lines open, and documented the severe food shortages being
experienced by Chinese forces at the front, which the Chinese commanders blamed for the collapse of the offensive. 58
The War Clouds Darken
The shocker came on April 25, three days after the Chinese–North Korean offensive in Korea began, when SIGINT revealed that
Soviet air force flight activity throughout the USSR and Eastern Eu rope had ceased completely. American and British radio
intercept operators around the world began cabling urgent reports to Washington and London stating that they were picking
up virtually no
Given the overwhelming preponderance of evidence that MacArthur was deliberately ignoring orders from Washington, and with
the SIGINT intercepts indicating that he was secretly hoping for an all-out world war with the Soviets and the Chinese, Truman
fired him. In retrospect, it was almost certainly the right thing to do. But it had a catastrophic effect on Truman’sstanding
with the American people. His poll numbers sank like a stone in the months that followed. By mid-1951, his approval ratings
had plummeted to 23 percent, the lowest ever recorded by the Gallup Poll for a sitting American president.
General Ridgway’s Crisis
The man chosen by the Pentagon to replace General Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief, Far East, was General Matthew Ridgway,
who before moving into MacArthur’s office suite in the Dai Ichi Building in downtown Tokyo had commanded the Eighth U.S. Army
in Korea since December 1950. The hard-nosed former paratrooper took command at a moment when the intelligence picture in
the region was bleak— and would only become grimmer as the months went on.
Intelligence reporting convinced Ridgway that a storm was about to break on his forces. All intelligence, including that extracted
from POWs as early as February 1951, indicated that the Chinese and North Koreans were about to launch their massive Spring
“Fifth Phase” Offensive in Korea. SIGINT revealed that there had been two major conferences attended by all Chinese and North
Korean army and corps commanders, as well as Russian military advisers, to work out the details of the offensive. Additional
intelligence reports received in March indicated that D-day for the Chinese–North Korean offensive was expected to be some
time in April. Then on April 1, the North Koreans changed their codes, a sure sign that something dramatic was in the offing.
But thanks to the efforts of the U.S. Army code breakers in Korea, within a week the new North Korean ciphers were solved. 56
Over the next two weeks, the SIGINT analysts in Washington and Tokyo laid bare the plans for the upcoming Chinese–North Korean
offensive. Thanks in large part to SIGINT, Ridgway was able to discern weeks in advance that the brunt of the offensive would
come in the mountainous central portion of the front, and not along the flat west coast of Korea north of Seoul. SIGINT also
provided a fairly complete picture of the enemy forces committed, specifically four newly arrived Chinese armies plus two
North Korean corps. And most important, it provided relatively clear indications about when the offensive would start. SIGINT
also detailed the massive buildup of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean combat aircraft in Manchuria, plus attempts by the
North Koreans to repair their airfields. When the enemy offensive finally commenced on April 22, Ridgway knew virtually everything
about it except the exact time that it was due to begin. 57
By the middle of June, SIGINT intercepts of North Korean radio traffic would reveal that the Chinese–North Korean offensive,
which had sputtered to a halt earlier that month, had cost the communists a staggering 221,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties.
COMINT also provided hard evidence of the communists’ substantial logistical difficulties, which required that tens of thousands
of frontline PLA forces be employed behind the lines to keep supply lines open, and documented the severe food shortages being
experienced by Chinese forces at the front, which the Chinese commanders blamed for the collapse of the offensive. 58
The War Clouds Darken
The shocker came on April 25, three days after the Chinese–North Korean offensive in Korea began, when SIGINT revealed that
Soviet air force flight activity throughout the USSR and Eastern Eu rope had ceased completely. American and British radio
intercept operators around the world began cabling urgent reports to Washington and London stating that they were picking
up virtually no
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