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radio chatter coming from any Soviet military airfields in Eastern Eu rope or the Soviet Far East. Alarm bells
sounded all over Washington. Soviet air force radio silence was regarded as one of the key indicators that the Soviets were
preparing for a military offensive. 59
This ominous silence convinced General Ridgway that the Russians were about to launch their much-anticipated air assault against
his forces in Korea and Japan. SIGINT showed that the enemy had 860 combat aircraft in Manchuria, 260 of which were modern
MiG-15 jet fighters. SIGINT also showed that 380 of the 860 combat aircraft were “controlled” by the Soviet air force, including
all of the MiG-15 jet fighters. And SIGINT confirmed that there had been a significant increase in radio traffic between Moscow
and the headquarters of the three Long Range Air Force (LRAF) air armies; that there had been an increase in operational flight-training
activities by LRAF TU-4 Bull nuclear-capable bombers in the Euro pean portion of the USSR; and that a new Soviet air defense
fighter interceptor command headquarters had just been established at Vladivostok and Dairen. 60 Fortunately, the Soviet air attack never took place.
The Lights Go Out
In the first week of July 1951, just as cease-fire truce talks were getting started at Kaesong, disaster struck the American
cryptologic effort in Korea yet again. In a massive shift in their communications and cipher security procedures, the North
Korean military stopped using virtually all of the codes and ciphers that the Americans had been successfully exploiting since
August 1950, and they replaced them with unbreakable one-time pad cipher systems on all of their high-level and even lower-level
radio circuits. Radio frequency changes were now made more often, radio call signs were encrypted, and unencrypted plaintext
radio traffic virtually disappeared from North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) radio circuits. Moreover, the North Koreans shifted
a significant portion of their operational communications traffic to landline circuits that blocked it from being intercepted.
This move by the North Koreans effectively killed off the sole remaining productive source of high-level COMINT that was then
available to American intelligence in the Far East, leaving AFSA and the service cryptologic organizations with only low-level
tactical voice communications left as a viable source of intelligence. Today, NSA officials believe that this move was prompted
by Soviet security advisers with the North Korean forces, who were alarmed at the shoddy communications security (COMSEC)
procedures utilized by the North Korean forces. 61
The Good, the Bad, and the Really Ugly
On the positive side for the COMINT community, during the first and most perilous year of the Korean War, AFSA and the military
COMINT units in the Far East were virtually the only source of timely and reliable intelligence for American field commanders
in Korea about North Korean military activities. But the agency’s cryptanalysts were never able to solve any of the high-level
ciphers used by the Chinese military in Korea, which meant that American commanders in the Far East never truly understood
their principal enemy’s intentions or capabilities.
A former NSA historian concluded, “There were successes, there were failures, but the failures tended to overshadow the successes.” 62 The net result was that SIGINT did not provide anywhere near the quantity or quality of high-level strategic intelligence
that it had during World War II. According to a declassified NSA study, there were numerous successes during the Korean War;
“to most intelligence consumers, however, the results still looked extremely thin, especially with the lack of COMINT from
[high-level] communications.” 63
CHAPTER 3
Fight for Survival
The Creation of the National Security Agency
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
—W. B. YEATS, "THE
sounded all over Washington. Soviet air force radio silence was regarded as one of the key indicators that the Soviets were
preparing for a military offensive. 59
This ominous silence convinced General Ridgway that the Russians were about to launch their much-anticipated air assault against
his forces in Korea and Japan. SIGINT showed that the enemy had 860 combat aircraft in Manchuria, 260 of which were modern
MiG-15 jet fighters. SIGINT also showed that 380 of the 860 combat aircraft were “controlled” by the Soviet air force, including
all of the MiG-15 jet fighters. And SIGINT confirmed that there had been a significant increase in radio traffic between Moscow
and the headquarters of the three Long Range Air Force (LRAF) air armies; that there had been an increase in operational flight-training
activities by LRAF TU-4 Bull nuclear-capable bombers in the Euro pean portion of the USSR; and that a new Soviet air defense
fighter interceptor command headquarters had just been established at Vladivostok and Dairen. 60 Fortunately, the Soviet air attack never took place.
The Lights Go Out
In the first week of July 1951, just as cease-fire truce talks were getting started at Kaesong, disaster struck the American
cryptologic effort in Korea yet again. In a massive shift in their communications and cipher security procedures, the North
Korean military stopped using virtually all of the codes and ciphers that the Americans had been successfully exploiting since
August 1950, and they replaced them with unbreakable one-time pad cipher systems on all of their high-level and even lower-level
radio circuits. Radio frequency changes were now made more often, radio call signs were encrypted, and unencrypted plaintext
radio traffic virtually disappeared from North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) radio circuits. Moreover, the North Koreans shifted
a significant portion of their operational communications traffic to landline circuits that blocked it from being intercepted.
This move by the North Koreans effectively killed off the sole remaining productive source of high-level COMINT that was then
available to American intelligence in the Far East, leaving AFSA and the service cryptologic organizations with only low-level
tactical voice communications left as a viable source of intelligence. Today, NSA officials believe that this move was prompted
by Soviet security advisers with the North Korean forces, who were alarmed at the shoddy communications security (COMSEC)
procedures utilized by the North Korean forces. 61
The Good, the Bad, and the Really Ugly
On the positive side for the COMINT community, during the first and most perilous year of the Korean War, AFSA and the military
COMINT units in the Far East were virtually the only source of timely and reliable intelligence for American field commanders
in Korea about North Korean military activities. But the agency’s cryptanalysts were never able to solve any of the high-level
ciphers used by the Chinese military in Korea, which meant that American commanders in the Far East never truly understood
their principal enemy’s intentions or capabilities.
A former NSA historian concluded, “There were successes, there were failures, but the failures tended to overshadow the successes.” 62 The net result was that SIGINT did not provide anywhere near the quantity or quality of high-level strategic intelligence
that it had during World War II. According to a declassified NSA study, there were numerous successes during the Korean War;
“to most intelligence consumers, however, the results still looked extremely thin, especially with the lack of COMINT from
[high-level] communications.” 63
CHAPTER 3
Fight for Survival
The Creation of the National Security Agency
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
—W. B. YEATS, "THE
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