everything is compressed and sped up, historical consciousness characterized by great utopian visions, well-defined political ideologies, established bureaucratic procedures, and long-term social goals steadily gives way to a more therapeutic consciousness characterized by continually changing scenarios and expedient short-term strategic options. The EU is, as mentioned before, a post-modern political institution. Its world is one of ever changing contours and fleeting realities where only novelty itself is permanent and where duration has narrowed to an ever present now. If ancient dynasties were designed with the purpose of commemorating and ritualizing the past, and modern nation-states were charged with organizing an open-ended future, new political institutions such as the EU are designed to cope with a continually changing present.
So if the EU seems, at times, to represent many different faces depending on changing conditions and circumstances, it’s because its persona is continuously re-adjusting to the ever changing patterns of activity around it. Its chameleonlike ability to reinvent itself is its strong suit.
Unlike nation-states, then, the EU is perceived not as an agent of destiny but, rather, as a manager of momentary conflicts and competing agendas. In the new era, grand meta-narratives—the kind that motivated citizen loyalty in the nation-state era—are passé. In their place are numerous smaller stories, each reflecting the perspectives and aims of the different constituencies. Finding some common ground between the disparate players and forging an ongoing dialogue and periodic consensus that can move them together as a community, even as they retain their individual identities, becomes the mandate and mission of the European Union. “Unity in diversity” is the unofficial moniker of the new European Constitution.
The EU has continued to confound its critics and expand and deepen its political influence precisely because its organizational model has been more “process-oriented” over the past half century of its existence. The EU’s political success has been all the more impressive given the fact that its primary architects, the French, are known for their more conventional, hierarchical, and centralized way of exercising political control. Even though the old nation-state way of governing has attempted to put its stamp on EU governance at every step of the way—and continues to do so today—the new disaggregated technological, commercial, and social realities of a global era have forced the EU to manage more by process than by edict and statute.
“Multilevel governance” is the unexpected synthesis that has emerged out of the contest waged between the federalists and confederalists to define the community’s future. The continuous give-and-take between those favoring a more centralized approach and those preferring an intergovernmental approach resulted in countless compromises along the way that began to fundamentally alter the political dynamic in a manner neither side foresaw. For example, the introduction of the Subsidiarity Principle has become a mainstay of EU governance. The principle represented a compromise, of sorts, between the confederalists and the federalists. The principle, which has been incorporated into the new constitution, states that, whenever possible, governing decisions ought to be made as far down and as close as possible to the communities and constituents most affected by the decisions. The intergovernmentalists hoped that the Subsidiarity Principle would keep governing decisions tucked deep inside the nation-state container. The federalists hoped that the Subsidiarity Principle would free local regions from nation-state authority and give them greater license to bypass the state and work directly with Brussels. As mentioned earlier, a Committee of the Regions was established in 1994 to represent regional interests within the EU. The upshot of subsidiarity is
So if the EU seems, at times, to represent many different faces depending on changing conditions and circumstances, it’s because its persona is continuously re-adjusting to the ever changing patterns of activity around it. Its chameleonlike ability to reinvent itself is its strong suit.
Unlike nation-states, then, the EU is perceived not as an agent of destiny but, rather, as a manager of momentary conflicts and competing agendas. In the new era, grand meta-narratives—the kind that motivated citizen loyalty in the nation-state era—are passé. In their place are numerous smaller stories, each reflecting the perspectives and aims of the different constituencies. Finding some common ground between the disparate players and forging an ongoing dialogue and periodic consensus that can move them together as a community, even as they retain their individual identities, becomes the mandate and mission of the European Union. “Unity in diversity” is the unofficial moniker of the new European Constitution.
The EU has continued to confound its critics and expand and deepen its political influence precisely because its organizational model has been more “process-oriented” over the past half century of its existence. The EU’s political success has been all the more impressive given the fact that its primary architects, the French, are known for their more conventional, hierarchical, and centralized way of exercising political control. Even though the old nation-state way of governing has attempted to put its stamp on EU governance at every step of the way—and continues to do so today—the new disaggregated technological, commercial, and social realities of a global era have forced the EU to manage more by process than by edict and statute.
“Multilevel governance” is the unexpected synthesis that has emerged out of the contest waged between the federalists and confederalists to define the community’s future. The continuous give-and-take between those favoring a more centralized approach and those preferring an intergovernmental approach resulted in countless compromises along the way that began to fundamentally alter the political dynamic in a manner neither side foresaw. For example, the introduction of the Subsidiarity Principle has become a mainstay of EU governance. The principle represented a compromise, of sorts, between the confederalists and the federalists. The principle, which has been incorporated into the new constitution, states that, whenever possible, governing decisions ought to be made as far down and as close as possible to the communities and constituents most affected by the decisions. The intergovernmentalists hoped that the Subsidiarity Principle would keep governing decisions tucked deep inside the nation-state container. The federalists hoped that the Subsidiarity Principle would free local regions from nation-state authority and give them greater license to bypass the state and work directly with Brussels. As mentioned earlier, a Committee of the Regions was established in 1994 to represent regional interests within the EU. The upshot of subsidiarity is
Similar Books
