Read Online Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse by Dr Martin Stephen - Free Book Online

seen above, one of the staunchest defenders of Phillips, Commander Michael Goodenough, blamed Palliser for the disaster and carried a campaign for blame thus to be apportioned to the writer of the official naval history of the war: ‘I am sure that Phillips’s attitude was that he believed his Chief of Staff would arrange the provision of a fighter defence. It seemed incredible to him that his Chief of Staff would not appreciate that he had gone to Kuantan in answer to the signal reporting the landing.’ 8
    Goodenough also referred to the ‘muddle’ in Singapore, a clear swipe at Palliser.
    It seems incredible to me too. Palliser died in 1956 and seems to have been almost totally silent on the loss of the two ships from which his career certainly did not suffer. In 1944, Palliser was made Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Supplies and Transport. He was made a Knight Commander of the Bath in 1945, and a full Admiral in 1947, retiring in 1948. He did write a letter of condolence to Lady Phillips, but among so many outpourings of emotion it seems cold, formal and clipped. Any criticism of Palliser has tended to be over his failure to second-guess Phillips and the decision to divert Force Z to Kuantan. This is unfortunate, as it puts a smoke screen over an area of equal culpability, which is why Palliser appeared to keep the voyage of Force Z as secret from the RAF as from the Japanese. Why did Palliser not ensure that FECB knew about Force Z? Why did he not plug in to them as a vital source of intelligence? Why did he not countermand his earlier signal saying fighter protection was not available? If he was at all troubled by the whereabouts of Force Z, why did he not send it a signal stating where he thought it was, leaving it to Phillips to break radio silence and reply if he deemed it necessary? In summary, Phillips’s Chief of Staff in Singapore signalled information to Force Z that was either misleading or plain wrong and failed to liaise either with the RAF or intelligence and intercept forces in Singapore. One is left wondering what he did actually do on the day Force Z died.
    There is also the mystery, reported on in only one book, of the two Buffaloes apparently sent out by Palliser:
    ‘At some point, perhaps after receiving the signals from the Tenedos , Palliser sent Phillips a signal informing him that he had two aircraft and asking for instructions on where to send them. Admiral Palliser received no reply, and sent the aircraft off based on what he thought Phillips would do; unfortunately, his guess was not correct, and the aircraft went to the wrong location.’ 9
    At the time of writing I am trying to track down this signal. Assuming it exists, it is clear that it carries no time, and it begs the question of where on earth Palliser felt Force Z was going if not to intercept the invasion he had told them about. I can find no comment from any survivor suggesting receipt of a signal from Palliser, which would surely have been a major talking point on the bridge and been received by Repulse as well. Perhaps the mysterious signal was not received by either ship or simply not reported in the frantic activity of the moment. As is discussed below, there were clear problems with Prince of Wales’ s signalling capacity once the engagement started: ‘Meanwhile (1240) Prince of Wales’ s radio had apparently gained power – or, more probably, Phillips was flashing messages to his destroyers to be relayed on.’ 10
    The same author points out that the first signal from Prince of Wales ‘had clearly been composed earlier and was delayed in transmission, either because of the necessity of passing it on to a destroyer, or because of atmospheric conditions.’ 11
    Historians have assumed too easily that Prince of Wales was able to send signals with immediate effect.
    What is interesting on two counts, is that the RAF did send aircraft to Kuantan early in the morning of the day of the sinkings – three Hudsons and six