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Vildebeest bombers, as well as two Buffaloes. They saw nothing and were not seen by Force Z. Firstly, it argues for very badly trained aircrew if aircraft are sent out to attack an invasion force and cannot even spot a battleship, a battle-cruiser and three destroyers at the very place they are sent to. Secondly, it proves Phillips was right in thinking an invasion report for Kuantan would provoke air cover. He was undeniably correct because it did just that. The RAF did not cover itself in glory that day. Their aircraft abandoned Kuantan aerodrome which was followed by a near-mutiny from ground staff. Their errors, and the errors of those who took reports in Singapore, were compounded by a Blenheim bomber that took off from Kuantan that morning and reported that it had seen a battleship or aircraft carrier at 0649. As the result of radio failure, its report was not actually made until 1013. No one seems to have thought this might be Force Z. This may have been the solitary aircraft seen from Repulse at around 0630. The RAF had two opportunities to identify that Force Z was at Kuantan, and failed on both occasions.
The conclusion is inescapable. Regardless of any mistakes that may have been made by Phillips, British forces had several opportunities to identify the presence of Force Z at a danger point, from intercepted signals to sightings made or not made from their own aircraft, which identification must have provoked a combat air patrol. The link was not made and the patrol was not sent. Tom Phillips should not have needed to call for air cover; it should already have been sent.
All this relates to the three strongest charges against Phillips, all of which concern the failure to send signals. The first charge is that he failed to call for fighter cover, the second that he failed to tell Singapore he was diverting to Kuantan, and the third that he failed to notify Singapore when Force Z was attacked.
The first charge is the easiest both to dismiss and to explain. The saga of the perceived failure to call for fighter cover is in itself an interesting insight in to how history works, or sometimes fails to work. We now know that a handful of Brewster Buffalo fighters were available to Force Z when it was attacked. Armed with that knowledge, it is clear Phillips should have called for fighter cover. Yet Phillips had no reason to believe that cover was available, and every reason to believe it was not. Hindsight has meant that historians have lost sight of the view from the bridge of Prince of Wales. He knew RAF bases were falling like ninepins. He had been told categorically that fighters were not available and that information had not been rescinded in several subsequent signals. It had been suggested to him by signal from Palliser that if any air cover did become available it would be held back for the defence of Singapore. It is difficult to think of anything that might have led Phillips to believe the cover he had pleaded for was in fact available. Only an idiot asks for something they know is not there, and whatever else Tom Phillips might have been, he was not an idiot.
There is one key fact that no commentator has noted that validates Phillips’s decision not to send out a call for fighters. Captain Tennant of Repulse has been widely praised for his actions during the engagement, and for realizing that no signal had gone out from Prince of Wales telling Singapore Force Z was under attack. Yet when Tennant did signal, at 1158, he made no request for fighter cover, but for destroyers and, later, tugs. It was not just Phillips who believed no such cover was available. Nor was it even just Phillips and Tennant. Phillips was surrounded by experienced officers on the bridge of Prince of Wales. Never once since the sinking has there been any evidence that any of those officers believed air cover was available.
The second and third charges are basically that Phillips kept radio silence when he should have reported he was
The conclusion is inescapable. Regardless of any mistakes that may have been made by Phillips, British forces had several opportunities to identify the presence of Force Z at a danger point, from intercepted signals to sightings made or not made from their own aircraft, which identification must have provoked a combat air patrol. The link was not made and the patrol was not sent. Tom Phillips should not have needed to call for air cover; it should already have been sent.
All this relates to the three strongest charges against Phillips, all of which concern the failure to send signals. The first charge is that he failed to call for fighter cover, the second that he failed to tell Singapore he was diverting to Kuantan, and the third that he failed to notify Singapore when Force Z was attacked.
The first charge is the easiest both to dismiss and to explain. The saga of the perceived failure to call for fighter cover is in itself an interesting insight in to how history works, or sometimes fails to work. We now know that a handful of Brewster Buffalo fighters were available to Force Z when it was attacked. Armed with that knowledge, it is clear Phillips should have called for fighter cover. Yet Phillips had no reason to believe that cover was available, and every reason to believe it was not. Hindsight has meant that historians have lost sight of the view from the bridge of Prince of Wales. He knew RAF bases were falling like ninepins. He had been told categorically that fighters were not available and that information had not been rescinded in several subsequent signals. It had been suggested to him by signal from Palliser that if any air cover did become available it would be held back for the defence of Singapore. It is difficult to think of anything that might have led Phillips to believe the cover he had pleaded for was in fact available. Only an idiot asks for something they know is not there, and whatever else Tom Phillips might have been, he was not an idiot.
There is one key fact that no commentator has noted that validates Phillips’s decision not to send out a call for fighters. Captain Tennant of Repulse has been widely praised for his actions during the engagement, and for realizing that no signal had gone out from Prince of Wales telling Singapore Force Z was under attack. Yet when Tennant did signal, at 1158, he made no request for fighter cover, but for destroyers and, later, tugs. It was not just Phillips who believed no such cover was available. Nor was it even just Phillips and Tennant. Phillips was surrounded by experienced officers on the bridge of Prince of Wales. Never once since the sinking has there been any evidence that any of those officers believed air cover was available.
The second and third charges are basically that Phillips kept radio silence when he should have reported he was
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