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changing course to Kuantan and when Japanese aircraft first engaged him. The two issues need to be treated separately.
Commander Goodenough was not the only person who believed Phillips was entirely justified in assuming Palliser would know that the only possible course of action for Force Z was to divert to Kuantan on receipt of the signal that landings were taking place there. Had they intercepted a landing, Prince of Wales and Repulse could have wreaked carnage among the invasion barges and might quite literally have altered the course of the war. However, such an operation was only possible if Force Z could surprise the Japanese, surprise that could all too easily be lost if Force Z signalled its intention to proceed to Kuantan. Palliser cannot seriously have assumed that Phillips would telegraph his intentions to all and sundry, thereby giving up surprise, the one thing he had on his side.
One of the most compelling writers on the sinking of Force Z, Arthur Nicholson, argues in his book Hostages to Fortune that the absolute imperative in Admiralty standing orders against breaking radio silence might have strongly influenced Phillips: ‘W/T silence should not be broken to report a single enemy aircraft unless the Commanding Officer considers its presence is a first indication that there are enemy surface forces in the area, of which the Admiral is not already aware.’ 12
These instructions would certainly have influenced Phillips, though not necessarily as a result of a slavish obedience to orders. He knew of the bitter rivalries at the Admiralty, and that commanders who were perceived to fail were subject to witch-hunts. Captain Leach of Prince of Wales was nearly brought to a court martial for breaking off the action against Bismarck until other senior officers rallied round. Phillips would have known of the move by Churchill to court-martial Admiral James Somerville for lack of offensive spirit at the Battle of Spartivento in November 1940, when Somerville had actually handled the action well. As well as being aware of the vultures at the Admiralty, Phillips was also well aware of the major part played in the sinking of the Bismarck by an ill-advised signal to his base sent by the German Admiral which revealed Bismarck’ s position. However, while both these may have been contributory factors, they are unlikely to have been decisive. More likely is the simple fact that as far as Phillips was concerned there was nothing Singapore could do for him. He did not believe, and had no reason to believe, that it could offer fighter cover. Such vessels as he had left behind might have been useful as an anti-submarine screen on the approach to Singapore, where the Japanese might have been expected to concentrate their forces, but were little more than a liability in an action that Phillips quite reasonably believed would centre on bombing. Calling for reinforcements from Singapore would be little more than asking lambs to join the slaughter. What reason did Phillips have for signalling Singapore? Is it an accident that Tennant’s signal at 1158 giving his position and the message ‘Enemy aircraft bombing’ was to ‘Any British Man-of-War’, not to Singapore?
The facts are that Tom Phillips and Force Z were alone on the morning of 10 December. Sent on a wild-goose chase based on faulty intelligence, the reinforcements of surface vessels they could call on were a joke, and as far as they knew there was no air cover. They were the only effective naval force available from Singapore and their intelligence was that the RAF and their airfields were collapsing like dominoes in a row. Force Z should never have been sent in the first place, was hopelessly outclassed and should have been either called home or ordered in to hiding before honour and duty forced it to engage in a battle it could not win. The Phillips papers contain a story that suggests Phillips correctly predicted the scenario that saw him lose his life. Prior to
Commander Goodenough was not the only person who believed Phillips was entirely justified in assuming Palliser would know that the only possible course of action for Force Z was to divert to Kuantan on receipt of the signal that landings were taking place there. Had they intercepted a landing, Prince of Wales and Repulse could have wreaked carnage among the invasion barges and might quite literally have altered the course of the war. However, such an operation was only possible if Force Z could surprise the Japanese, surprise that could all too easily be lost if Force Z signalled its intention to proceed to Kuantan. Palliser cannot seriously have assumed that Phillips would telegraph his intentions to all and sundry, thereby giving up surprise, the one thing he had on his side.
One of the most compelling writers on the sinking of Force Z, Arthur Nicholson, argues in his book Hostages to Fortune that the absolute imperative in Admiralty standing orders against breaking radio silence might have strongly influenced Phillips: ‘W/T silence should not be broken to report a single enemy aircraft unless the Commanding Officer considers its presence is a first indication that there are enemy surface forces in the area, of which the Admiral is not already aware.’ 12
These instructions would certainly have influenced Phillips, though not necessarily as a result of a slavish obedience to orders. He knew of the bitter rivalries at the Admiralty, and that commanders who were perceived to fail were subject to witch-hunts. Captain Leach of Prince of Wales was nearly brought to a court martial for breaking off the action against Bismarck until other senior officers rallied round. Phillips would have known of the move by Churchill to court-martial Admiral James Somerville for lack of offensive spirit at the Battle of Spartivento in November 1940, when Somerville had actually handled the action well. As well as being aware of the vultures at the Admiralty, Phillips was also well aware of the major part played in the sinking of the Bismarck by an ill-advised signal to his base sent by the German Admiral which revealed Bismarck’ s position. However, while both these may have been contributory factors, they are unlikely to have been decisive. More likely is the simple fact that as far as Phillips was concerned there was nothing Singapore could do for him. He did not believe, and had no reason to believe, that it could offer fighter cover. Such vessels as he had left behind might have been useful as an anti-submarine screen on the approach to Singapore, where the Japanese might have been expected to concentrate their forces, but were little more than a liability in an action that Phillips quite reasonably believed would centre on bombing. Calling for reinforcements from Singapore would be little more than asking lambs to join the slaughter. What reason did Phillips have for signalling Singapore? Is it an accident that Tennant’s signal at 1158 giving his position and the message ‘Enemy aircraft bombing’ was to ‘Any British Man-of-War’, not to Singapore?
The facts are that Tom Phillips and Force Z were alone on the morning of 10 December. Sent on a wild-goose chase based on faulty intelligence, the reinforcements of surface vessels they could call on were a joke, and as far as they knew there was no air cover. They were the only effective naval force available from Singapore and their intelligence was that the RAF and their airfields were collapsing like dominoes in a row. Force Z should never have been sent in the first place, was hopelessly outclassed and should have been either called home or ordered in to hiding before honour and duty forced it to engage in a battle it could not win. The Phillips papers contain a story that suggests Phillips correctly predicted the scenario that saw him lose his life. Prior to
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