Read Online Losing Vietnam by Ira A. Hunt Jr. - Free Book Online Page B

operational analysis to the DAO and JGS. For the first time, this included data on the relative performance of the component forces (ARVN, RF, PF, PSDF) as well as on weapons captured and lost. By this point, we also were able to analyze the results of attacks by fire and booby traps. Many important factors, of immediate concern to the JGS, emerged from the April presentation. We kept the two periods of our initial assessment and added a third, which included data from 2 December 1973 through 31 March 1974. Subsequently, we organized our analytical outputs into twenty-six-week periods, extending from mid-June to mid-December and mid-December to mid-June, to provide equal intervals for comparative purposes, which roughly corresponded to the wet and dry seasons and thereby aligned analysis with seasonal variations in South Vietnam. The five periods for analysis were 28 January 1973–15 June 1973, 16 June 1973–15 December 1973, 16 December 1973–14 June 1974, 15 June 1974–14 December 1974, and 15 December 1974–19 April 1975. Several of the combat analyses obtained by utilizing the broadened data inputs are discussed subsequently.
    Aggressiveness
. The spirit of the offensive is measured by this factor, and the aggressiveness of the friendly ground attacks greatly improved from an anemic 15 percent in the second period to 43 percent in the third period. After the JGS directed the ARVN to take the initiative, in the third period there were more friendly-initiated contacts than enemy-initiated ones in MR-1 and MR-3. However, MR-2 was still badly lagging, initiating only one contact in five.
    Exchange Ratio
. This factor is a measure of friendly efficiency. On a countrywide basis, the ratio of enemy killed to friendly killed was a respectable 4.3 for 28 January 1973 to 31 March 1974. The exchange ratio for friendly-initiated attacks was 6.7, compared to 3.5 for enemy-initiated attacks, again indicating that aggressiveness paid off. This was true for the country as a whole but did not apply to MR-3, which had an unfavorable ratio (see table 5 ).
    Enemy Casualty Ratio
. This factor is a measure of friendly effectiveness, the ratio of enemy killed per friendly-initiated contact to those killed by enemy-initiated contact. It remained high from 28 January 1973 through 31 March 1974, 5.0/1.6, or three times as many. However, the average number of enemy killed per contact countrywide was 2.1 to 1, since the enemy initiated more attacks. The RVNAF in MR-4 was particularly effective when it initiated attacks, but this was due solely to the ARVN divisions.
    Major/Minor Violations
. Unquestionably, most of the incidents were of a small-unit nature. Minor violations outnumbered major violations during the total period by more than ten to one. The communists, recognizing the South’s superior firepower, were reluctant to mass their forces for major attacks; instead they kept hammering away with minor assaults upon South Vietnam’s far-flung outposts.
    Table 5. Exchange Ratio, Friendly Efficiency, Enemy KIA/Friendly KHA, 28 January 1973–31 March 1974

    Source
: Analysis, “Summary of Ceasefire Statistics,” June 1975, Headquarters, USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.
    Fatality Ratios
. The ratio for the total period was surprisingly constant for each military region, providing good verification of the data. However, the ratio increased noticeably in each succeeding period both for friendly- and enemy-initiated contacts and for attacks by fire. The tempo of combat was definitely increasing, and that could be the causative factor; however, there could also be a problem with medevacs or medical treatment.
    Attack by Fire
. The number of attacks by fire more than doubled in MR-4 between the first and third periods, accounting for 64 percent of the total, whereas the numbers in the other military regions remained almost constant. For the total period, the casualties per casualty-producing incident—which was