boundaries were under the command and/or operational control of the respective military regional commanders. The military regions and the major ARVN units assigned are indicated on map 2 .
Map 2. South Vietnam Administrative Divisions. (Source: RVNAF, JGS, J-3, Saigon, South Vietnam.)
South Vietnam had forty-four provinces, each completely within a military regionâthat is, the regional boundaries were drawn to contain a province. Regional forces consisted of units generally assigned to protect areas within provincial boundaries, and popular forces were assigned to protect areas falling within district boundaries. Therefore, when analyzing the performance of the regional forces and popular forces it was essential to tabulate data for incidents occurring within provincial and district regions.
The North Vietnamese Army had several major commands, or fronts. Its B-5 front, in North Vietnam, was responsible for the demilitarized area. The three principal fronts in South Vietnam were the MRTT in the north, which included Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces; the B-3 front, which included the highland provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, Daclac, Phu Bon, and Quang Duc; and the COSVN, which had six military regions in the southern and eastern provinces (see map 3 ). Sometimes Viet Cong MR-5, which included the coastal provinces from Quang Nam in the north to Khanh Hoa in the south, was considered a separate front. Each of the North Vietnamese fronts acted independently but under the communist central command. Each front had its own obvious objectives. To understand the enemyâs conduct of the war, it was necessary to analyze it within these geographical areas.
Therefore, our analysis considered parameters for each district, province, and military region as well as for the country as a whole and for the enemy regions. We further subdivided results by ARVN, RF, PF, and PSDF categories. Consequently, the outputs were available for many levels of command.
The first statistical output defined was the initiation ratio, that is, the friendly-initiated contacts divided by the enemy-initiated contacts, which was a measure of aggressiveness. A ratio of 1 would mean that the RVNAF initiated as many ground contacts as the enemy did. Subsequently, we got into the habit of measuring friendly-initiated ground attacks as a percentage of total ground contacts, in which case a ratio of 0.50 would indicate equal aggressiveness.
Map 3. NVA/VC Military Regions. (Source: RVNAF, JGS, J-3, Saigon, South Vietnam.)
Other major statistical outputs were those I previously found the most valuable in measuring combat effectiveness.
The enemy casualty ratio, or friendly effectiveness, was measured both for friendly- and enemy-initiated attacks. The same applied for the friendly casualty ratio, or enemy effectiveness.
One should always approach the interpretation and use of data derived from initial field spot reports with caution. Unfortunately, errors can and do develop in reporting as a result of the confusion inherent in combat. Some reportingâsuch as date, time, location, type of incident, and the initiator of the incidentâshould be reliable. All data was initially manually reviewed and then machine checked for consistency and reasonableness. Other dataâsuch as friendly and enemy casualties and weapons gained and lostâwould not be as reliable. Should we, therefore, use the data and their ratios as if there was no uncertainty associated with them? Comparing spot report data of friendly killed over a monthly period with the actual data, we sought a relationship through linear regression analysis and obtained a very good linear fit. For the purposes of our analyses, this allowed us to assume that all the data such as weapons gained or lost by incident type had an ordinal relationship between actual data and reported data and consequently comparison of ratios by various time periods should also be valid.
I briefed both the JGS and
Map 2. South Vietnam Administrative Divisions. (Source: RVNAF, JGS, J-3, Saigon, South Vietnam.)
South Vietnam had forty-four provinces, each completely within a military regionâthat is, the regional boundaries were drawn to contain a province. Regional forces consisted of units generally assigned to protect areas within provincial boundaries, and popular forces were assigned to protect areas falling within district boundaries. Therefore, when analyzing the performance of the regional forces and popular forces it was essential to tabulate data for incidents occurring within provincial and district regions.
The North Vietnamese Army had several major commands, or fronts. Its B-5 front, in North Vietnam, was responsible for the demilitarized area. The three principal fronts in South Vietnam were the MRTT in the north, which included Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces; the B-3 front, which included the highland provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, Daclac, Phu Bon, and Quang Duc; and the COSVN, which had six military regions in the southern and eastern provinces (see map 3 ). Sometimes Viet Cong MR-5, which included the coastal provinces from Quang Nam in the north to Khanh Hoa in the south, was considered a separate front. Each of the North Vietnamese fronts acted independently but under the communist central command. Each front had its own obvious objectives. To understand the enemyâs conduct of the war, it was necessary to analyze it within these geographical areas.
Therefore, our analysis considered parameters for each district, province, and military region as well as for the country as a whole and for the enemy regions. We further subdivided results by ARVN, RF, PF, and PSDF categories. Consequently, the outputs were available for many levels of command.
The first statistical output defined was the initiation ratio, that is, the friendly-initiated contacts divided by the enemy-initiated contacts, which was a measure of aggressiveness. A ratio of 1 would mean that the RVNAF initiated as many ground contacts as the enemy did. Subsequently, we got into the habit of measuring friendly-initiated ground attacks as a percentage of total ground contacts, in which case a ratio of 0.50 would indicate equal aggressiveness.
Map 3. NVA/VC Military Regions. (Source: RVNAF, JGS, J-3, Saigon, South Vietnam.)
Other major statistical outputs were those I previously found the most valuable in measuring combat effectiveness.
The enemy casualty ratio, or friendly effectiveness, was measured both for friendly- and enemy-initiated attacks. The same applied for the friendly casualty ratio, or enemy effectiveness.
One should always approach the interpretation and use of data derived from initial field spot reports with caution. Unfortunately, errors can and do develop in reporting as a result of the confusion inherent in combat. Some reportingâsuch as date, time, location, type of incident, and the initiator of the incidentâshould be reliable. All data was initially manually reviewed and then machine checked for consistency and reasonableness. Other dataâsuch as friendly and enemy casualties and weapons gained and lostâwould not be as reliable. Should we, therefore, use the data and their ratios as if there was no uncertainty associated with them? Comparing spot report data of friendly killed over a monthly period with the actual data, we sought a relationship through linear regression analysis and obtained a very good linear fit. For the purposes of our analyses, this allowed us to assume that all the data such as weapons gained or lost by incident type had an ordinal relationship between actual data and reported data and consequently comparison of ratios by various time periods should also be valid.
I briefed both the JGS and
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