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the DAO concerning our requirements for data inputs to support our operational analysis, and both were extremely helpful in the collection and dissemination of data. Withthe data the JGS had collected since the cease-fire, we made an initial operational analysis and presented it to them in early December 1973. We divided the data into two periods: 28 January 1973–14 June 1973 and 15 June 1973–1 December 1973. These coincided roughly with the semiannual dry and wet seasons. Since the data prior to 2 December 1973 did not identify the generic type of friendly unit involved in an action—ARVN, RF, PF, or PSDF—all data was aggregated and treated only as RVNAF.
    Our initial emphasis was to determine the initiation ratio, a measure of friendly aggressiveness, which the Pentagon sought particularly. For 28 January to 14 June 1973, 90 percent of incidents, which included friendly and enemy ground attacks, enemy attacks by fire, sabotage, harassments, terrorism, et cetera, were enemy-initiated. From 15 June to 1 December 1973, 94 percent were enemy-initiated. Enemy-initiated ground attacks were more than four times greater than the friendly-initiated ground attacks. Obviously, the communists had the initiative and had no intentions of abiding by the cease-fire. After North Vietnam’s immediate attempts to grab land before and after the cease-fire, South Vietnam counterattacked to reclaim lost territory. Having effectively accomplished that task, they generally settled into a mode of static defense. Considering that the incessant bombardment of North Vietnamese propaganda about South Vietnam’s cease-fire violations was affecting American outlooks, the South Vietnamese limited their combat initiatives and couched them as “security operations.” The reality of the situation was that the North was aggressively reinforcing its troops in South Vietnam with supplies, weapons, and personnel and doing its best to control both land and population.
    Analysis also indicated that the exchange ratio (En KIA/Fr KHA), or friendly efficiency, was much greater when the ARVN initiated ground attacks than when the enemy initiated attacks. The same was true for the enemy casualty ratio (En KIA/Cntc), or friendly effectiveness. The data indicated that three times as many enemy soldiers were killed when the ARVN initiated the contact. When we completed our initial analysis, I met with General Vien, the JGS chairman, and Brigadier General Tho, the JGS J-3, to speak to them about the data. They were very pleased and relieved to learn we had definitely concluded that the communists were initiating the great majority of combat incidentsbecause they were being pressured by Hanoi and somewhat by Washington concerning the initiation of combat operations. I also informed them that the army’s effectiveness was high when they had initiated contacts. I suggested it was imperative for the RVNAF to seize the initiative to keep the enemy off balance and to prevent it from systematically massing forces to attack the thousands of outposts and hamlets throughout South Vietnam. The JGS recognized the situation, and as a result orders went out for the RVNAF to take the initiative.
    In early 1974, South Vietnam still had the advantage of firepower and maneuver. Its army was better trained and had higher morale than that of North Vietnam, whose personnel had been led to believe that the 1972 Easter Offensive was to be the final blow to South Vietnam and that they would be returning home to their families.
    USSAG monitored the combat in South Vietnam through the daily situation reports and by frequent visits to the DAO and JGS. We also had the important advantage of the Seventh Air Force’s aerial reconnaissance of the active fronts in South Vietnam. We continued to collate the enhanced combat data that was available by field reporting commencing on 2 December 1973. In early April, after four months of data, we presented the