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Authors: James R. Arnold
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severity, General Order 100 gained international accep-tance and served as
the basis for the first formal international agreements on the laws of war. On December 20, 1900, with the American presidential
election comfortably past, MacArthur informed the Filipino people of his new policy. Written in English, Spanish, and Tagalog,
his proclamation stated that the insurgents and their supporters were “collectively and individually” guilty of violating
the laws of war as encoded in General Order 100. 12 They would eventually be brought to justice. The proclamation’s special focus was on the most successful guerrilla elements,
namely, those who kidnapped and assassinated American collaborators, participated in the guerrilla’s shadow government that
operated in American-occupied towns, or fought without belonging to an orga nized military unit. MacArthur pledged to counter
their deeds with exemplary punishments as determined by American military tribunals. He noted that the excuse that someone
was acting because of intimidation by the insurgents would rarely be accepted.
MacArthur took additional steps permitted by General Order 100. He sent into exile prominent Filipino leaders. He ended the
misguided policy of automatically releasing prisoners. He authorized his provost marshals to arrest and detain suspects without
evidence. MacArthur specifically warned that insurgent leaders involved with assassinations would be forbidden from returning
to normal civil life once the fighting ended. This threat gave insurgent leaders pause. They had grown up as members of the
islands’ upper class and heretofore had assumed that, win or lose, when the conflict ended they would resume their privileged
lives.
Prior to MacArthur’s proclamation to the Filipino people, many American officers such as Matt Batson had already regarded
General Order 100 as justification for burning crops and buildings, incarcerating suspects, imposing curfews that authorized
shooting on sight anyone found near a telegraph line, and executing prisoners. In one sense, MacArthur was merely providing
official ac knowledg ment for practices already widely employed. However, most American military men had a different sense
of what MacArthur’s new policy implied. They understood that going forward they had official sanction for waging a much harder
war. General Samuel S. Sumner explained, “I am aware that this is a severe and stringent measure and will entail hardships
and suffering on the inhabitants, but it seems the only practical means at hand.” 13
MacArthur’s new counterinsurgency strategy coincided with a surprising decline in American popular support for the war. The
anti-imperialists were enraged that first the McKinley administration had waited until after the election to acknowledge the
extent of the Philippine insurgency and then implemented a much harsher policy. Anti-imperialist headlines announced that
MacArthur intended to show no mercy, telling Filipinos to “Be Good or Be Shot.” 14 As discouraging reports of violence and killing continued, opposition to the war spread beyond the anti-imperialists. On
the second day of 1901, the formerly supportive New York Times presented an opinion that spoke for many:
The American people are plainly tired of the Philippine War. The administration must be aware that the case of its enemies
is not weakened nor the confidence of its friends augmented by the daily reading about all this cost and killing. To kill
rebellion by inches and trust to patience and slow time to bring back peace and contentment is not a humane or wise policy.
It cannot be the lack of money. Is it the lack of troops, supplies, transportation, ammunition, artillery? Is it the lack
of a competent commander? The public simply does not know where the trouble lies. It does know that there is trouble somewhere.
Where is it? How long is this Philippine War going to last? 15
The
the basis for the first formal international agreements on the laws of war. On December 20, 1900, with the American presidential
election comfortably past, MacArthur informed the Filipino people of his new policy. Written in English, Spanish, and Tagalog,
his proclamation stated that the insurgents and their supporters were “collectively and individually” guilty of violating
the laws of war as encoded in General Order 100. 12 They would eventually be brought to justice. The proclamation’s special focus was on the most successful guerrilla elements,
namely, those who kidnapped and assassinated American collaborators, participated in the guerrilla’s shadow government that
operated in American-occupied towns, or fought without belonging to an orga nized military unit. MacArthur pledged to counter
their deeds with exemplary punishments as determined by American military tribunals. He noted that the excuse that someone
was acting because of intimidation by the insurgents would rarely be accepted.
MacArthur took additional steps permitted by General Order 100. He sent into exile prominent Filipino leaders. He ended the
misguided policy of automatically releasing prisoners. He authorized his provost marshals to arrest and detain suspects without
evidence. MacArthur specifically warned that insurgent leaders involved with assassinations would be forbidden from returning
to normal civil life once the fighting ended. This threat gave insurgent leaders pause. They had grown up as members of the
islands’ upper class and heretofore had assumed that, win or lose, when the conflict ended they would resume their privileged
lives.
Prior to MacArthur’s proclamation to the Filipino people, many American officers such as Matt Batson had already regarded
General Order 100 as justification for burning crops and buildings, incarcerating suspects, imposing curfews that authorized
shooting on sight anyone found near a telegraph line, and executing prisoners. In one sense, MacArthur was merely providing
official ac knowledg ment for practices already widely employed. However, most American military men had a different sense
of what MacArthur’s new policy implied. They understood that going forward they had official sanction for waging a much harder
war. General Samuel S. Sumner explained, “I am aware that this is a severe and stringent measure and will entail hardships
and suffering on the inhabitants, but it seems the only practical means at hand.” 13
MacArthur’s new counterinsurgency strategy coincided with a surprising decline in American popular support for the war. The
anti-imperialists were enraged that first the McKinley administration had waited until after the election to acknowledge the
extent of the Philippine insurgency and then implemented a much harsher policy. Anti-imperialist headlines announced that
MacArthur intended to show no mercy, telling Filipinos to “Be Good or Be Shot.” 14 As discouraging reports of violence and killing continued, opposition to the war spread beyond the anti-imperialists. On
the second day of 1901, the formerly supportive New York Times presented an opinion that spoke for many:
The American people are plainly tired of the Philippine War. The administration must be aware that the case of its enemies
is not weakened nor the confidence of its friends augmented by the daily reading about all this cost and killing. To kill
rebellion by inches and trust to patience and slow time to bring back peace and contentment is not a humane or wise policy.
It cannot be the lack of money. Is it the lack of troops, supplies, transportation, ammunition, artillery? Is it the lack
of a competent commander? The public simply does not know where the trouble lies. It does know that there is trouble somewhere.
Where is it? How long is this Philippine War going to last? 15
The
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