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Authors: James R. Arnold
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to confirm that victory was within reach, came the capture of the insurgent supreme commander,
Emilio Aguinaldo.
A Spectacular Raid
Starting in the autumn of 1899, the time Aguinaldo decided to inaugurate guerrilla war, the Filipino leader became a marked
man. American units vied with one another for the glory of capturing the insurgent leader. None surpassed the zeal of Batson’s
Macabebe Scouts. “I hunted one of his Generals to his hole the other night,” Batson wrote his wife, “and captured all his
effects as well as his two daughters.” 18 Such relentless pursuit forced Aguinaldo to keep on the move. He and his small band of loyal staff endured exhausting treks
across rugged terrain. They were often hungry, reduced to foraging for wild legumes supplemented by infrequent meat eaten
without salt. Sickness and desertion reduced their ranks. Aguinaldo’s response was periodic exemplary punishments, drumhead
courts-martial, firing squads, and reprisal raids against villages that either collaborated with the Americans or failed to
support the insurgents. “Ah, what a costly thing is in dependence!” lamented Aguinaldo’s chief of staff. 19
Aguinaldo took solace from the occasional contact with the outside. In February 1900 he received a bundle of letters including
a report that the war was going well with the Americans suffering “disastrous” political and military defeats. A correspondent
in Manila affirmed that the people “were ready to drink the enemy’s blood.” 20 The high command’s ignorance of outside events was startling. For example, Aguinaldo and his party learned from a visitor
that five nations had recognized Philippine independence. However, his chief of staff reported that “we do not know who these
five nations are.” 21 Indeed, the chief of staff candidly recorded that since fleeing into the mountains “we have remained in complete ignorance
of what is going on in the present war.” 22
During his exodus Aguinaldo was unable to exercise effective command of his far-flung forces. This did not change after he
sought refuge in the remote mountain town of Palanan in northern Luzon. All Aguinaldo could do was write general instructions
to his subordinates and issue exhortations to the Philippine people. His efforts had scant effect on the war. What was important
was his mere existence. He was the living symbol of Filipino nationalism. In addition—and this mattered to the ilustrados who managed the war at the regional and local levels—as long as he remained free the insurgents could say that they fought
on behalf of a legitimate national government.
Aguinaldo’s efforts to maintain a semblance of command authority led to his downfall. In January 1901 an insurgent courier,
Cecilio Sigis-mundo, asked a town mayor for help getting through American lines. His request was standard practice. The mayor’s
response was not. He happened to be loyal to the Americans and persuaded the courier to surrender. Sigismundo carried twenty
letters from Aguinaldo to guerrilla commanders. Two days of intense labor broke the code and revealed that one of the letters
was addressed to Aguinaldo’s cousin. It requested that reinforcements be sent to Aguinaldo’s mountain hideout in Palanan.
This request gave Brigadier General Fred Funston an idea.
Funston interviewed Sigismundo to learn details about Aguinaldo’s headquarters (and, according to Aguinaldo, subjected him
to the “water cure,” an old Spanish torture whereby soldiers forced water down a prisoner’s throat and then applied pressure
to the distended stomach until the prisoner either “confessed” or vomited; in the latter case the pro cess started again). 23 Palanan was ten miles from the coast, connected to the outside world by a single jungle trail. Although Americans had never
operated in this region, obviously the trail would be watched. Funston conceived a bold, hugely risky scheme to
Emilio Aguinaldo.
A Spectacular Raid
Starting in the autumn of 1899, the time Aguinaldo decided to inaugurate guerrilla war, the Filipino leader became a marked
man. American units vied with one another for the glory of capturing the insurgent leader. None surpassed the zeal of Batson’s
Macabebe Scouts. “I hunted one of his Generals to his hole the other night,” Batson wrote his wife, “and captured all his
effects as well as his two daughters.” 18 Such relentless pursuit forced Aguinaldo to keep on the move. He and his small band of loyal staff endured exhausting treks
across rugged terrain. They were often hungry, reduced to foraging for wild legumes supplemented by infrequent meat eaten
without salt. Sickness and desertion reduced their ranks. Aguinaldo’s response was periodic exemplary punishments, drumhead
courts-martial, firing squads, and reprisal raids against villages that either collaborated with the Americans or failed to
support the insurgents. “Ah, what a costly thing is in dependence!” lamented Aguinaldo’s chief of staff. 19
Aguinaldo took solace from the occasional contact with the outside. In February 1900 he received a bundle of letters including
a report that the war was going well with the Americans suffering “disastrous” political and military defeats. A correspondent
in Manila affirmed that the people “were ready to drink the enemy’s blood.” 20 The high command’s ignorance of outside events was startling. For example, Aguinaldo and his party learned from a visitor
that five nations had recognized Philippine independence. However, his chief of staff reported that “we do not know who these
five nations are.” 21 Indeed, the chief of staff candidly recorded that since fleeing into the mountains “we have remained in complete ignorance
of what is going on in the present war.” 22
During his exodus Aguinaldo was unable to exercise effective command of his far-flung forces. This did not change after he
sought refuge in the remote mountain town of Palanan in northern Luzon. All Aguinaldo could do was write general instructions
to his subordinates and issue exhortations to the Philippine people. His efforts had scant effect on the war. What was important
was his mere existence. He was the living symbol of Filipino nationalism. In addition—and this mattered to the ilustrados who managed the war at the regional and local levels—as long as he remained free the insurgents could say that they fought
on behalf of a legitimate national government.
Aguinaldo’s efforts to maintain a semblance of command authority led to his downfall. In January 1901 an insurgent courier,
Cecilio Sigis-mundo, asked a town mayor for help getting through American lines. His request was standard practice. The mayor’s
response was not. He happened to be loyal to the Americans and persuaded the courier to surrender. Sigismundo carried twenty
letters from Aguinaldo to guerrilla commanders. Two days of intense labor broke the code and revealed that one of the letters
was addressed to Aguinaldo’s cousin. It requested that reinforcements be sent to Aguinaldo’s mountain hideout in Palanan.
This request gave Brigadier General Fred Funston an idea.
Funston interviewed Sigismundo to learn details about Aguinaldo’s headquarters (and, according to Aguinaldo, subjected him
to the “water cure,” an old Spanish torture whereby soldiers forced water down a prisoner’s throat and then applied pressure
to the distended stomach until the prisoner either “confessed” or vomited; in the latter case the pro cess started again). 23 Palanan was ten miles from the coast, connected to the outside world by a single jungle trail. Although Americans had never
operated in this region, obviously the trail would be watched. Funston conceived a bold, hugely risky scheme to
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