Read Online History of the Second World War by Basil Henry Liddell Hart - Free Book Online
Authors: Basil Henry Liddell Hart
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Polish campaign was drawing to a close, and before he made his public proposal for a general peace conference. It is evident that he had already come to realise that any such proposal was unlikely to receive consideration by the Western Allies. For the moment, however, he allowed only his immediate entourage to know how his mind was turning. He kept the General Staff in the dark until after he had publicly made his peace offer, on October 6, and it had been publicly rebuffed.
Three days later he set out his views in a long directive* for the German Army chiefs, giving the reasons for his conviction that an offensive in the West was the only possible course left to Germany. It is a most illuminating document. In it he set forth his conclusion that a prolonged war with France and Britain would exhaust Germany’s resources, and expose her to a deadly attack in the back from Russia. He feared that his pact with Russia would not ensure her neutrality a moment longer than suited her purpose. His fear urged him to force peace on France by an early offensive. He believed that once France fell out Britain would come to terms.
* Nuremberg Documents C-62.
He reckoned that for the moment he had the strength and equipment to beat France — because Germany possessed a superiority in the new arms that mattered most:
The tank-arm and air force have, at the present time, attained technical heights — not only as weapons of attack but also for defence — that no other power has reached. Their strategic potential for operations is ensured by their organisation and well-practised leadership, which is better than in any other country.
While recognising that the French had a superiority in the older weapons, particularly heavy artillery, he argued that ‘these weapons are of no decisive significance whatsoever in mobile warfare’. With his technical superiority in the newer arms he could also discount the French superiority in the number of trained soldiers.
He went on to argue that if he waited, in the hope that the French would get tired of war, ‘the development of British fighting power would bring to France a new fighting element that would be of great value to her, both psychologically and materially’ — to buttress her defence.
What must be prevented above all is that the enemy should make good the weakness of his own armaments, particularly in anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons — thereby creating a balance of power. In this respect the passing of every further month represents a loss of time unfavourable to the German power of attack.
He showed anxiety about the ‘will to war’ of the German soldier once the exhilarating effect of the easy conquest of Poland wore off. ‘His respect for himself is as great as the respect he commands from others, at present. But six months of delaying warfare and effective propaganda on the part of the enemy might cause these important qualities to weaken once more.’* Hitler felt that he must strike soon, before it was too late, saying: ‘In the present situation, time may be reckoned an ally of the Western powers rather than of ours.’ His memorandum wound up with the conclusion that: The attack is to be launched this autumn, if conditions are at all possible.’
* Events showed that Hitler’s anxiety was misplaced. French morale declined more than the German in the seven months’ delay that actually occurred. Allied propaganda was not effective — there was far too much talk of overthrowing Germany, and far too little attempt to distinguish between the ordinary German and the Nazi chiefs. Worse still, scant encouragement was given by the British Government to several secret approaches made by groups in Germany who wanted to overthrow Hitler and make peace if they could get satisfactory assurance as to the peace conditions that the Allies had in mind.
He insisted that Belgium must be included in the area of attack, not only to obtain room for
Three days later he set out his views in a long directive* for the German Army chiefs, giving the reasons for his conviction that an offensive in the West was the only possible course left to Germany. It is a most illuminating document. In it he set forth his conclusion that a prolonged war with France and Britain would exhaust Germany’s resources, and expose her to a deadly attack in the back from Russia. He feared that his pact with Russia would not ensure her neutrality a moment longer than suited her purpose. His fear urged him to force peace on France by an early offensive. He believed that once France fell out Britain would come to terms.
* Nuremberg Documents C-62.
He reckoned that for the moment he had the strength and equipment to beat France — because Germany possessed a superiority in the new arms that mattered most:
The tank-arm and air force have, at the present time, attained technical heights — not only as weapons of attack but also for defence — that no other power has reached. Their strategic potential for operations is ensured by their organisation and well-practised leadership, which is better than in any other country.
While recognising that the French had a superiority in the older weapons, particularly heavy artillery, he argued that ‘these weapons are of no decisive significance whatsoever in mobile warfare’. With his technical superiority in the newer arms he could also discount the French superiority in the number of trained soldiers.
He went on to argue that if he waited, in the hope that the French would get tired of war, ‘the development of British fighting power would bring to France a new fighting element that would be of great value to her, both psychologically and materially’ — to buttress her defence.
What must be prevented above all is that the enemy should make good the weakness of his own armaments, particularly in anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons — thereby creating a balance of power. In this respect the passing of every further month represents a loss of time unfavourable to the German power of attack.
He showed anxiety about the ‘will to war’ of the German soldier once the exhilarating effect of the easy conquest of Poland wore off. ‘His respect for himself is as great as the respect he commands from others, at present. But six months of delaying warfare and effective propaganda on the part of the enemy might cause these important qualities to weaken once more.’* Hitler felt that he must strike soon, before it was too late, saying: ‘In the present situation, time may be reckoned an ally of the Western powers rather than of ours.’ His memorandum wound up with the conclusion that: The attack is to be launched this autumn, if conditions are at all possible.’
* Events showed that Hitler’s anxiety was misplaced. French morale declined more than the German in the seven months’ delay that actually occurred. Allied propaganda was not effective — there was far too much talk of overthrowing Germany, and far too little attempt to distinguish between the ordinary German and the Nazi chiefs. Worse still, scant encouragement was given by the British Government to several secret approaches made by groups in Germany who wanted to overthrow Hitler and make peace if they could get satisfactory assurance as to the peace conditions that the Allies had in mind.
He insisted that Belgium must be included in the area of attack, not only to obtain room for
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