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Authors: Basil Henry Liddell Hart
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the re-occupation of the Rhineland onwards, that he had been justified by success each time, and that he now expected them to follow his ideas unconditionally. Brauchitsch’s attempt to point out the differences and greater risks in the new venture merely drew down on his head a harder rebuke. That evening Hitler saw Brauchitsch privately and gave him a further ‘dressing down’. Brauchitsch thereupon tendered his resignation, but Hitler brushed it aside, and told him to obey orders.
However, the weather proved a better saboteur than the generals, and led to a fresh series of postponements during the first half of December. Then Hitler decided to wait until the New Year, and grant Christmas leave. The weather was again bad just after Christmas but on January 10 Hitler fixed the start of the offensive for the 17th.
But the very day he took that decision the most dramatic ‘intervention’ took place. The story of it has been mentioned in numerous accounts, but was most succinctly put in that of General Student, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Airborne Forces:
On January 10 a major detailed by me as liaison officer to the 2nd Air Fleet flew from Munster to Bonn to discuss some unimportant details of the plan with the Air Force. He carried with him, however, the complete operational plan for the attack in the West.
In icy weather and a strong wind he lost his way over the frozen and snow-covered Rhine, and flew into Belgium, where he had to make a forced landing. He was unable to burn completely the vital document. Important parts of it fell into the hands of the Belgians, and consequently the outline of the German plan for the Western offensive. The German Air Attache in the Hague reported that on the same evening the King of the Belgians had a long telephone conversation with the Queen of Holland.*
* Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 149.
Of course, the Germans did not know at the time exactly what had happened to the papers, but they naturally feared the worst, and had to reckon with it. In that crisis Hitler kept a cool head, in contrast to others:
It was interesting to watch the reactions of this incident on Germany’s leading men. While Goering was in a rage, Hitler remained quite calm and self-possessed. . . . At first he wanted to strike immediately, but fortunately refrained — and decided to drop the original operational plan entire. This was replaced by the Manstein plan.*
* Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 149.
General Walter Warlimont, who held a key post* in the Supreme Command headquarters, recorded that Hitler made up his mind on January 16 to change the plan, and that ‘this was chiefly due to the air accident’.†
* He was Deputy Chief of the O.K.W. Operations Staff, under General Jodl.
† Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 155.
That proved very unfortunate for the Allies, even though they were given a further four months’ grace for preparation — since the German offensive was now put off indefinitely while the plan was being completely recast, and did not come until May 10. When it was launched, it threw the Allies completely off their balance and led to the speedy collapse of the French armies, while the British barely escaped by sea, from Dunkirk.
It is natural to ask whether the major’s forced-landing really was an accident. It might be expected that any of the German generals involved would after the war be only too glad to put himself in a favourable light with his captors by claiming that he had arranged this warning to the Allies. Yet, in fact, none did so — and all seemed convinced that the accident was quite genuine. But we know that Admiral Canaris, the head of the German Secret Service — who was later executed — took many hidden steps to thwart Hitler’s aims, and that just prior to the attacks in the spring on Norway, Holland, and Belgium, warnings were conveyed to the threatened countries —
However, the weather proved a better saboteur than the generals, and led to a fresh series of postponements during the first half of December. Then Hitler decided to wait until the New Year, and grant Christmas leave. The weather was again bad just after Christmas but on January 10 Hitler fixed the start of the offensive for the 17th.
But the very day he took that decision the most dramatic ‘intervention’ took place. The story of it has been mentioned in numerous accounts, but was most succinctly put in that of General Student, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Airborne Forces:
On January 10 a major detailed by me as liaison officer to the 2nd Air Fleet flew from Munster to Bonn to discuss some unimportant details of the plan with the Air Force. He carried with him, however, the complete operational plan for the attack in the West.
In icy weather and a strong wind he lost his way over the frozen and snow-covered Rhine, and flew into Belgium, where he had to make a forced landing. He was unable to burn completely the vital document. Important parts of it fell into the hands of the Belgians, and consequently the outline of the German plan for the Western offensive. The German Air Attache in the Hague reported that on the same evening the King of the Belgians had a long telephone conversation with the Queen of Holland.*
* Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 149.
Of course, the Germans did not know at the time exactly what had happened to the papers, but they naturally feared the worst, and had to reckon with it. In that crisis Hitler kept a cool head, in contrast to others:
It was interesting to watch the reactions of this incident on Germany’s leading men. While Goering was in a rage, Hitler remained quite calm and self-possessed. . . . At first he wanted to strike immediately, but fortunately refrained — and decided to drop the original operational plan entire. This was replaced by the Manstein plan.*
* Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 149.
General Walter Warlimont, who held a key post* in the Supreme Command headquarters, recorded that Hitler made up his mind on January 16 to change the plan, and that ‘this was chiefly due to the air accident’.†
* He was Deputy Chief of the O.K.W. Operations Staff, under General Jodl.
† Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 155.
That proved very unfortunate for the Allies, even though they were given a further four months’ grace for preparation — since the German offensive was now put off indefinitely while the plan was being completely recast, and did not come until May 10. When it was launched, it threw the Allies completely off their balance and led to the speedy collapse of the French armies, while the British barely escaped by sea, from Dunkirk.
It is natural to ask whether the major’s forced-landing really was an accident. It might be expected that any of the German generals involved would after the war be only too glad to put himself in a favourable light with his captors by claiming that he had arranged this warning to the Allies. Yet, in fact, none did so — and all seemed convinced that the accident was quite genuine. But we know that Admiral Canaris, the head of the German Secret Service — who was later executed — took many hidden steps to thwart Hitler’s aims, and that just prior to the attacks in the spring on Norway, Holland, and Belgium, warnings were conveyed to the threatened countries —
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