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Authors: Basil Henry Liddell Hart
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manoeuvre to outflank the French Maginot Line, but also to forestall the danger of the Anglo-French forces entering Belgium and deploying on the frontier close to the Ruhr, ‘thereby bringing the war near to the heart of our armaments industry’. (As the French archives reveal, that was exactly what Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief, had been advocating.)
The disclosure of Hitler’s intentions came as a shock to Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Halder, the Chief of the General Staff. In common with most of the senior German generals, they did not share Hitler’s belief in the power of the new arms to overcome the opponents’ superiority in military trained manpower. Reckoning on customary lines in numbers of divisions, they argued that the German Army had not nearly enough strength to defeat the Western armies. They pointed out that the ninety-eight divisions which Germany had managed to mobilise were considerably fewer than the total on the other side, and that thirty-six of these divisions were badly armed and barely trained. They were apprehensive, too, that the war would spread into another world war, fearing that it would have a fatal ending for Germany.
They were so disturbed that they contemplated desperate remedies. Just as at the time of the Munich crisis, a year before, they started to consider taking action to overthrow Hitler. The idea was to despatch a picked force from the front to march on Berlin. But General Friedrich Fromm, the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, declined to co-operate — and his help was essential. Fromm argued that if the troops were ordered to turn against Hitler they would not obey — because most of the ordinary soldiers put their trust in Hitler. Fromm’s judgement about the troops’ reaction was probably correct. It is corroborated by most of the officers who were in touch with troops and did not know what was being discussed in higher headquarters.
The mass of the troops and people, if not intoxicated by triumph, were doped by Dr Goebbels’s propaganda about Hitler desiring peace while the Allies were determined on the destruction of Germany. Unfortunately, the Allied statesmen and Press furnished Goebbels with all too many quotable morsels of this kin d that he could use to support his picture of the Allied wolf wanting to devour the German lamb.
While this first wartime plot against Hitler was stillborn, he did not succeed in launching his offensive in the autumn as he had hoped. Ironically, that proved fortunate for him and unfortunate for the rest of the world - including the German people.
The date provisionally fixed for the offensive was November 12. On the 5th Brauchitsch made a fresh attempt to dissuade Hitler from invading France, setting forth at much length the reasons against it. But Hitler rebuffed his arguments and rebuked him severely, while insisting that the attack must start on the 12th. On the 7th, however, the order was cancelled — when meteorologists forecast bad weather. The date was put off three days, and then postponed again and again.
While the bad and bitter weather that set in was an obvious ground for postponement, Hitler was furious at having to acquiesce, and far from satisfied that it was the only cause. He summoned all the high commanders to a conference, on November 23. Here he set out to dispel their doubts about the necessity of taking the offensive — expressing anxiety about the looming menace of Russia, while emphasising that the Western Allies would not consider his peace offers and were multiplying their armaments. ‘Time is working for our adversary.’ ‘We have an Achilles’ Heel — the Ruhr. . . . If Britain and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger.’
He went on to reproach them with faint-heartedness, and let them know that he suspected them of trying to sabotage his plans. He pointed out that they had opposed each of his steps from
The disclosure of Hitler’s intentions came as a shock to Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Halder, the Chief of the General Staff. In common with most of the senior German generals, they did not share Hitler’s belief in the power of the new arms to overcome the opponents’ superiority in military trained manpower. Reckoning on customary lines in numbers of divisions, they argued that the German Army had not nearly enough strength to defeat the Western armies. They pointed out that the ninety-eight divisions which Germany had managed to mobilise were considerably fewer than the total on the other side, and that thirty-six of these divisions were badly armed and barely trained. They were apprehensive, too, that the war would spread into another world war, fearing that it would have a fatal ending for Germany.
They were so disturbed that they contemplated desperate remedies. Just as at the time of the Munich crisis, a year before, they started to consider taking action to overthrow Hitler. The idea was to despatch a picked force from the front to march on Berlin. But General Friedrich Fromm, the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, declined to co-operate — and his help was essential. Fromm argued that if the troops were ordered to turn against Hitler they would not obey — because most of the ordinary soldiers put their trust in Hitler. Fromm’s judgement about the troops’ reaction was probably correct. It is corroborated by most of the officers who were in touch with troops and did not know what was being discussed in higher headquarters.
The mass of the troops and people, if not intoxicated by triumph, were doped by Dr Goebbels’s propaganda about Hitler desiring peace while the Allies were determined on the destruction of Germany. Unfortunately, the Allied statesmen and Press furnished Goebbels with all too many quotable morsels of this kin d that he could use to support his picture of the Allied wolf wanting to devour the German lamb.
While this first wartime plot against Hitler was stillborn, he did not succeed in launching his offensive in the autumn as he had hoped. Ironically, that proved fortunate for him and unfortunate for the rest of the world - including the German people.
The date provisionally fixed for the offensive was November 12. On the 5th Brauchitsch made a fresh attempt to dissuade Hitler from invading France, setting forth at much length the reasons against it. But Hitler rebuffed his arguments and rebuked him severely, while insisting that the attack must start on the 12th. On the 7th, however, the order was cancelled — when meteorologists forecast bad weather. The date was put off three days, and then postponed again and again.
While the bad and bitter weather that set in was an obvious ground for postponement, Hitler was furious at having to acquiesce, and far from satisfied that it was the only cause. He summoned all the high commanders to a conference, on November 23. Here he set out to dispel their doubts about the necessity of taking the offensive — expressing anxiety about the looming menace of Russia, while emphasising that the Western Allies would not consider his peace offers and were multiplying their armaments. ‘Time is working for our adversary.’ ‘We have an Achilles’ Heel — the Ruhr. . . . If Britain and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger.’
He went on to reproach them with faint-heartedness, and let them know that he suspected them of trying to sabotage his plans. He pointed out that they had opposed each of his steps from
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