Read Online Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 by Hector C. Bywater - Free Book Online
Authors: Hector C. Bywater
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warships were at Hawaii, nearly five thousand miles distant.
The invading force outnumbered the American garrison in Luzon by at least six to one, it had a proportionate superiority in artillery and other equipment, and there were the guns of half the Japanese fleet to cover its landing. In case of need, reinforcements in men and material could be rushed from Japan in 20-knot ships in the space of three days, or from the advanced base at Formosa in thirty-six hours. Everything, therefore, favoured the Japanese enterprise. It has since been admitted that active preparations for the conquest of the Philippines had begun in the third week of February: well in advance, that is, of the actual declaration of war. The Army Transport Section at Tokyo had on its books upwards of one hundred vessels with a sea speed of fourteen knots or more, all of which could be requisitioned by the Government if required. But to do this would have caused a serious dislocation of the shipping industry, while the sudden withdrawal of all the fastest Japanese merchant ships from their ordinary routes must have inevitably aroused suspicion abroad and led to the inference that some great military undertaking was in view. It was accordingly decided not to use fast ships for the transport of the Philippine Expeditionary Force, but to employ instead the requisite number of slower vessels, with a collective speed of twelve knots. This of course, entailed a longer passage, but calculating on the destruction of the United States Asiatic squadron, and knowing that American reinforcements from the Eastern Pacific, in the unlikely event of their coming at all, could not arrive for several weeks, the Japanese military command was ready to accept the slight delay involved by the use of slower transports.
The Expeditionary Force was composed of five divisions, with an approximate strength of 100,000 men. A Japanese division is usually made up of two brigades of infantry, one regiment each of cavalry and artillery, one battalion each of engineers and train, together with chemical warfare (gas) and motor machine-gun sections. Four tank regiments accompanied the expedition, with a total of thirty light “Atsuta” tanks, which could travel over level ground at twelve miles an hour. Large motor-propelled barges or pontoons were carried on board the transports for landing tanks and artillery. The heaviest guns were 8-inch howitzers and 14-centimetre high-velocity pieces for long-range bombardment. Besides the naval aircraft carrier Matsushima , which had been detailed to sail with the convoy and had a complement of twenty planes, five transports were loaded up with army aircraft, the total number of planes at the disposal of the invaders being well over 180. While some of the larger vessels carried as many as 3,000 men, the average capacity of the transports was 2,000.
As landings on a supposed hostile coast had been practised year after year as a regular feature of Japanese army manoeuvres, this operation was one with which officers and men were perfectly familiar. All necessary equipment for such work — boats, barges, pontoons, and portable jetties — had been in readiness at the military depots for years. In the same way the tactical problems of co-operation between an invading army and its supporting fleet had been thoroughly worked out long beforehand. In their wars with Russia in 1904-5 and with China ten years earlier, the Japanese had shown remarkable skill in throwing large bodies of troops ashore with speed and safety. This time, of course, the landing was likely to be opposed, but as the American garrison was small, and could have no fore-knowledge of the exact place where the troops would be disembarked, the resistance was not expected to be of a very formidable nature.
To the Japanese general staff the defences of the Philippines were an open book. Every yard of the ground had been personally surveyed and mapped by Japanese officers. Not only was the
The invading force outnumbered the American garrison in Luzon by at least six to one, it had a proportionate superiority in artillery and other equipment, and there were the guns of half the Japanese fleet to cover its landing. In case of need, reinforcements in men and material could be rushed from Japan in 20-knot ships in the space of three days, or from the advanced base at Formosa in thirty-six hours. Everything, therefore, favoured the Japanese enterprise. It has since been admitted that active preparations for the conquest of the Philippines had begun in the third week of February: well in advance, that is, of the actual declaration of war. The Army Transport Section at Tokyo had on its books upwards of one hundred vessels with a sea speed of fourteen knots or more, all of which could be requisitioned by the Government if required. But to do this would have caused a serious dislocation of the shipping industry, while the sudden withdrawal of all the fastest Japanese merchant ships from their ordinary routes must have inevitably aroused suspicion abroad and led to the inference that some great military undertaking was in view. It was accordingly decided not to use fast ships for the transport of the Philippine Expeditionary Force, but to employ instead the requisite number of slower vessels, with a collective speed of twelve knots. This of course, entailed a longer passage, but calculating on the destruction of the United States Asiatic squadron, and knowing that American reinforcements from the Eastern Pacific, in the unlikely event of their coming at all, could not arrive for several weeks, the Japanese military command was ready to accept the slight delay involved by the use of slower transports.
The Expeditionary Force was composed of five divisions, with an approximate strength of 100,000 men. A Japanese division is usually made up of two brigades of infantry, one regiment each of cavalry and artillery, one battalion each of engineers and train, together with chemical warfare (gas) and motor machine-gun sections. Four tank regiments accompanied the expedition, with a total of thirty light “Atsuta” tanks, which could travel over level ground at twelve miles an hour. Large motor-propelled barges or pontoons were carried on board the transports for landing tanks and artillery. The heaviest guns were 8-inch howitzers and 14-centimetre high-velocity pieces for long-range bombardment. Besides the naval aircraft carrier Matsushima , which had been detailed to sail with the convoy and had a complement of twenty planes, five transports were loaded up with army aircraft, the total number of planes at the disposal of the invaders being well over 180. While some of the larger vessels carried as many as 3,000 men, the average capacity of the transports was 2,000.
As landings on a supposed hostile coast had been practised year after year as a regular feature of Japanese army manoeuvres, this operation was one with which officers and men were perfectly familiar. All necessary equipment for such work — boats, barges, pontoons, and portable jetties — had been in readiness at the military depots for years. In the same way the tactical problems of co-operation between an invading army and its supporting fleet had been thoroughly worked out long beforehand. In their wars with Russia in 1904-5 and with China ten years earlier, the Japanese had shown remarkable skill in throwing large bodies of troops ashore with speed and safety. This time, of course, the landing was likely to be opposed, but as the American garrison was small, and could have no fore-knowledge of the exact place where the troops would be disembarked, the resistance was not expected to be of a very formidable nature.
To the Japanese general staff the defences of the Philippines were an open book. Every yard of the ground had been personally surveyed and mapped by Japanese officers. Not only was the
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