Read Online Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 by Hector C. Bywater - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Hector C. Bywater
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line of patrol east of Cape Engaño, and the remaining two ( S 11 and S 15 ) being sent north to cruise in the Balingtang Channel, through which the Japanese transports might be expected to pass on their way south.
CHAPTER IV
Japanese transports attacked by American aircraft and submarines on reaching Philippines — Landings effected despite heavy casualties — Desperate resistance of American Army — Surrender of Manila — A few light craft escape — Philippines entirely conquered by the Japanese — Absence of news from Guam causes concern in the United States
EARLY on the morning of March 11, American airplanes from Luzon sighted several warships fifty miles N.W. of Santa Cruz, steaming S.E. They were soon identified as the battle cruisers Kongo and Haruna , with many smaller vessels. This squadron was so well screened by its destroyers and light cruisers that no chance of submarine attack was offered, even had any of the American boats been in the immediate neighbourhood. Since these ships were evidently the vanguard of the fleet which was to cover the landing of the invading army, all United States aircraft within call of the Santa Cruz area were immediately ordered to attack. But a few minutes after this order had been issued, a radio signal from the station at Cape Engaño reported that a large fleet of ships had been sighted by aircraft fifty miles east of that point, making for the southward. Almost before this message had been read and its significance noted, a further report came in, announcing the approach of “a large fleet” towards Cape Bolinao. There could be no doubt as to the portent of these messages. The Japanese obviously designed to make landings on both sides of the island, no doubt simultaneously, thereby compelling the garrison to split up its meagre forces and resist an onslaught by overwhelming numbers at two points on the coast, one in the east and the other in the west. General O’Neill, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States military forces, lost no time in taking what steps he could to meet this emergency. The order for airplanes to attack the enemy warships off Santa Cruz was negatived; every machine must be held ready to launch itself against the transports. At the same time all submarines were called up by Captain Gurner and given the position of the three enemy formations which had been sighted. If the ships seen off Cape Bolinao were transports, as appeared probable, they were most likely making for Lingayen Gulf, within which good landing beaches were to be found. To meet the contingency of a descent at one or more of these points, two of the 8-inch railroad guns were rushed north up the line as fast as a locomotive could take them, while aircraft were concentrated at Dagupan. The destination of the vessels which had passed Cape Engaño might be any one of the half-dozen bays or inlets on the eastern littoral, but it was rightly conjectured that they were making for some point well to the south, since Manila must surely be the ultimate objective of any force landed.
At 11 a.m. on March 11, the Japanese warships already mentioned approached Santa Cruz until within easy range and fired a few shells into the town, destroying the telegraph station and several houses. This bombardment was so obviously a ruse to draw the defenders away from other parts of the coast that it failed in its purpose. Receiving no answer to their fire, the ships steamed south at high speed, leaving several of their escort planes to engage an American airman who had come out from Iba to keep the squadron under observation. For a time it was thought to be making for Manila, but it soon turned north again and was lost to sight. And now, for the first time, the enemy showed his hand. At 3 p.m. a flight of American planes patrolling between Cape Bolinao and San Fernando was suddenly and fiercely attacked by Japanese machines.
While this combat was in progress, more enemy planes came over the land,
CHAPTER IV
Japanese transports attacked by American aircraft and submarines on reaching Philippines — Landings effected despite heavy casualties — Desperate resistance of American Army — Surrender of Manila — A few light craft escape — Philippines entirely conquered by the Japanese — Absence of news from Guam causes concern in the United States
EARLY on the morning of March 11, American airplanes from Luzon sighted several warships fifty miles N.W. of Santa Cruz, steaming S.E. They were soon identified as the battle cruisers Kongo and Haruna , with many smaller vessels. This squadron was so well screened by its destroyers and light cruisers that no chance of submarine attack was offered, even had any of the American boats been in the immediate neighbourhood. Since these ships were evidently the vanguard of the fleet which was to cover the landing of the invading army, all United States aircraft within call of the Santa Cruz area were immediately ordered to attack. But a few minutes after this order had been issued, a radio signal from the station at Cape Engaño reported that a large fleet of ships had been sighted by aircraft fifty miles east of that point, making for the southward. Almost before this message had been read and its significance noted, a further report came in, announcing the approach of “a large fleet” towards Cape Bolinao. There could be no doubt as to the portent of these messages. The Japanese obviously designed to make landings on both sides of the island, no doubt simultaneously, thereby compelling the garrison to split up its meagre forces and resist an onslaught by overwhelming numbers at two points on the coast, one in the east and the other in the west. General O’Neill, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States military forces, lost no time in taking what steps he could to meet this emergency. The order for airplanes to attack the enemy warships off Santa Cruz was negatived; every machine must be held ready to launch itself against the transports. At the same time all submarines were called up by Captain Gurner and given the position of the three enemy formations which had been sighted. If the ships seen off Cape Bolinao were transports, as appeared probable, they were most likely making for Lingayen Gulf, within which good landing beaches were to be found. To meet the contingency of a descent at one or more of these points, two of the 8-inch railroad guns were rushed north up the line as fast as a locomotive could take them, while aircraft were concentrated at Dagupan. The destination of the vessels which had passed Cape Engaño might be any one of the half-dozen bays or inlets on the eastern littoral, but it was rightly conjectured that they were making for some point well to the south, since Manila must surely be the ultimate objective of any force landed.
At 11 a.m. on March 11, the Japanese warships already mentioned approached Santa Cruz until within easy range and fired a few shells into the town, destroying the telegraph station and several houses. This bombardment was so obviously a ruse to draw the defenders away from other parts of the coast that it failed in its purpose. Receiving no answer to their fire, the ships steamed south at high speed, leaving several of their escort planes to engage an American airman who had come out from Iba to keep the squadron under observation. For a time it was thought to be making for Manila, but it soon turned north again and was lost to sight. And now, for the first time, the enemy showed his hand. At 3 p.m. a flight of American planes patrolling between Cape Bolinao and San Fernando was suddenly and fiercely attacked by Japanese machines.
While this combat was in progress, more enemy planes came over the land,
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