Read Online Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 by Hector C. Bywater - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Hector C. Bywater
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site and armament of every existing battery known with exactitude, but every position where a new battery might be placed was clearly marked on the large-scale maps prepared at the Imperial Staff College in Tokyo. At no time had a landing been contemplated in the near vicinity of Manila. Strong batteries, equipped with 12-inch rifles on disappearing mounts, were in position on the island of Corregidor, while others crowned the headlands on either side of the 12-mile entrance to the bay. As these pieces could sweep the sea over a radius of many miles, it would have been madness to expose warships, let alone crowded transports, to their devastating fire. To silence them by naval bombardment was out of the question. Their massive concrete emplacements were shell-proof: nothing short of a direct hit on the gun itself or its mounting would be effective, and as the piece showed above the parapet only for a few seconds at a time, it offered a hopeless target. Against bomb attack from the air the batteries were protected by strong shields of steel.
Nor were these guns the only peril that menaced hostile ships seeking to penetrate the bay. Lying across the entrance were several rows of mines, through which no channel could be swept so long as the batteries on the heights remained in American hands. At Subig Bay, some forty miles up the coast, other batteries and mine-fields were in position, but this place, within which the old American naval Station of Olongapo was situated, was also given a wide berth. With so many other landing places available, where no fixed defences existed, the Japanese saw no reason for exposing their ships to the guns and mines of fortified harbours.
The chief danger, they perceived, would come from the American aircraft, and, as events were to prove, their information as to the number of these was at fault. According to the last report from Japanese agents, not more than fifty serviceable planes were in the islands at the end of February. But on the 25th of that month a transport had arrived at Manila bringing thirty machines of a new and powerful type. These, as we shall see, played a very important part in the defence of Luzon. The American military force did not exceed 17,000 all told. Eight thousand of these were United States regulars — infantry, artillery, and engineers — two thousand were marines, and the remainder native troops, Philippine scouts and militia. There were ten field batteries of four guns each, three mountain batteries, and a dozen mobile 6-inch guns on caterpillar mounts. The artillery establishment was completed by six 8-inch guns on railway mounts, which could be sent at a good speed to any point along the line and fired direct from the rails. It was hoped by means of these guns to bring the enemy ships under heavy fire if they attempted to disembark troops along the northwest coast of the island, to which the railroad ran parallel. Finally, there were the surviving four destroyers and twelve submarines, whose officers and men (now under the orders of Captain Gurner of the Cleveland ) were burning to avenge their fallen comrades of the cruiser squadron.
When news of the disaster to Rear-Admiral Ribley’s command reached Manila the same evening (March 6), it was patent to everyone that an invasion was impending. The blow might fall at any moment, for nothing seemed more probable than that the transports of the invading army were already approaching the coast. Actually, as we know, their sailing from Kure had been deferred until news of the American squadron’s destruction reached Japan; but of this fact the defenders were naturally ignorant. All that night, and throughout the days and nights that followed, aircraft and submarines maintained between them a sleepless watch over the northern approaches to Luzon. As there was no telling from which quarter the invaders would appear, the submarine flotilla was divided, five boats remaining on the west coast, five going to form a
Nor were these guns the only peril that menaced hostile ships seeking to penetrate the bay. Lying across the entrance were several rows of mines, through which no channel could be swept so long as the batteries on the heights remained in American hands. At Subig Bay, some forty miles up the coast, other batteries and mine-fields were in position, but this place, within which the old American naval Station of Olongapo was situated, was also given a wide berth. With so many other landing places available, where no fixed defences existed, the Japanese saw no reason for exposing their ships to the guns and mines of fortified harbours.
The chief danger, they perceived, would come from the American aircraft, and, as events were to prove, their information as to the number of these was at fault. According to the last report from Japanese agents, not more than fifty serviceable planes were in the islands at the end of February. But on the 25th of that month a transport had arrived at Manila bringing thirty machines of a new and powerful type. These, as we shall see, played a very important part in the defence of Luzon. The American military force did not exceed 17,000 all told. Eight thousand of these were United States regulars — infantry, artillery, and engineers — two thousand were marines, and the remainder native troops, Philippine scouts and militia. There were ten field batteries of four guns each, three mountain batteries, and a dozen mobile 6-inch guns on caterpillar mounts. The artillery establishment was completed by six 8-inch guns on railway mounts, which could be sent at a good speed to any point along the line and fired direct from the rails. It was hoped by means of these guns to bring the enemy ships under heavy fire if they attempted to disembark troops along the northwest coast of the island, to which the railroad ran parallel. Finally, there were the surviving four destroyers and twelve submarines, whose officers and men (now under the orders of Captain Gurner of the Cleveland ) were burning to avenge their fallen comrades of the cruiser squadron.
When news of the disaster to Rear-Admiral Ribley’s command reached Manila the same evening (March 6), it was patent to everyone that an invasion was impending. The blow might fall at any moment, for nothing seemed more probable than that the transports of the invading army were already approaching the coast. Actually, as we know, their sailing from Kure had been deferred until news of the American squadron’s destruction reached Japan; but of this fact the defenders were naturally ignorant. All that night, and throughout the days and nights that followed, aircraft and submarines maintained between them a sleepless watch over the northern approaches to Luzon. As there was no telling from which quarter the invaders would appear, the submarine flotilla was divided, five boats remaining on the west coast, five going to form a
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