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Authors: Odd Arne Westad
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in February 1956 must be seen in light of these changes in his political attitudes. The chairman welcomed Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, noting to the Soviet ambassador in March that if the CCP had followed Stalin's advice, it never would have taken power. For Mao, de-Stalinization implied Soviet criticism of Stalin's China policy and Moscow's recognition of the achievements of the CCP and of Mao himself. Therefore, Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin would enable Mao to further his own visions of socialism in China.
But while welcoming Khrushchev's "secret" speech, Mao saw at least three problems with the way the criticism of Stalin had been presented. He resented not having been consulted before the speech was made. Also, Mao felt that Khrushchev's condemnation was too general and wanted specific criticism of Stalin's policies (including, to be sure, his policies on China). Third, Mao took exception to the fact that the speech had been leaked to the West and feared that Khrushchev's behavior would weaken international socialism. 61
For Mao, the popular rebellions against Communist rule in Poland and Hungary in the summer and fall of 1956 confirmed his worst fears about the consequences of Khrushchev's behavior and made him turn violently against the process of de-Stalinization. 62 The East European crises arose just as Mao was receiving reports of resistance to collectivization and the party's control of culture and city administration. Expecting a full-scale confrontation with "counter-
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revolution" inside China, Mao convened all-night Politburo meetings with the Soviet ambassador present in which the chairman advised Khrushchev to crush the Hungarian revolution, while leaving the Polish party as much leeway as possible to solve its own problems.
63
Mao still accepted that the Soviet Union was the "older brother" among socialist states and expected the Chinese involvement with Eastern Europe to strengthen Soviet authority inside the Eastern Bloc. But he was in no way blind to how Chinese missions to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in the wake of the political upheavals also helped boost his own authority within the Communist world movement. "Now that the enemy is taking advantage of the criticism of Stalin to take the offensive on a worldwide scale, we ought to support the Soviet Union," Mao told a visiting Yugoslav delegation in January 1957. 64
The year 1957 was to be the last time the Sino-Soviet alliance functioned well. With criticism of the CCP mounting in the Hundred Flowers campaign a wave of political openness initiated by Mao himself to prove mass support for his party the chairman drew parallels between mistakes made in the Soviet Union and mistakes made by CCP officials that had cost the party popular support and hindered the country's development. "We still need to learn from the Soviet Union," Mao said; "however, we shall learn from them in a selective way, only accept good things, while avoiding picking up the bad things." 65
As Mao's doubts about the Soviets mounted, practical cooperation between the two sides continued. In some areas, such as military and nuclear technology, it even intensified. The secret October 1957 agreement on exchange of nuclear technology aimed at making China capable of producing its own nuclear weapons by 1960, and the many visits of high-level military delegations to each other's countries explored ways of extending Sino-Soviet cooperation in military production. Economic and educational cooperation also was extended in several agreements signed during 1957. 66
Nikita Khrushchev's response to the trouble in his eastern alliance China's meddling in Europe and its criticism of his foreign and domestic policies was at first remarkably moderate. Khrushchev with his earthy sense of politics seems to have sensed that what the alliance needed was a perception of common purpose, of having joint strategies for dealing with the political and military situation in
But while welcoming Khrushchev's "secret" speech, Mao saw at least three problems with the way the criticism of Stalin had been presented. He resented not having been consulted before the speech was made. Also, Mao felt that Khrushchev's condemnation was too general and wanted specific criticism of Stalin's policies (including, to be sure, his policies on China). Third, Mao took exception to the fact that the speech had been leaked to the West and feared that Khrushchev's behavior would weaken international socialism. 61
For Mao, the popular rebellions against Communist rule in Poland and Hungary in the summer and fall of 1956 confirmed his worst fears about the consequences of Khrushchev's behavior and made him turn violently against the process of de-Stalinization. 62 The East European crises arose just as Mao was receiving reports of resistance to collectivization and the party's control of culture and city administration. Expecting a full-scale confrontation with "counter-
page_19
Page 19
revolution" inside China, Mao convened all-night Politburo meetings with the Soviet ambassador present in which the chairman advised Khrushchev to crush the Hungarian revolution, while leaving the Polish party as much leeway as possible to solve its own problems.
63
Mao still accepted that the Soviet Union was the "older brother" among socialist states and expected the Chinese involvement with Eastern Europe to strengthen Soviet authority inside the Eastern Bloc. But he was in no way blind to how Chinese missions to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in the wake of the political upheavals also helped boost his own authority within the Communist world movement. "Now that the enemy is taking advantage of the criticism of Stalin to take the offensive on a worldwide scale, we ought to support the Soviet Union," Mao told a visiting Yugoslav delegation in January 1957. 64
The year 1957 was to be the last time the Sino-Soviet alliance functioned well. With criticism of the CCP mounting in the Hundred Flowers campaign a wave of political openness initiated by Mao himself to prove mass support for his party the chairman drew parallels between mistakes made in the Soviet Union and mistakes made by CCP officials that had cost the party popular support and hindered the country's development. "We still need to learn from the Soviet Union," Mao said; "however, we shall learn from them in a selective way, only accept good things, while avoiding picking up the bad things." 65
As Mao's doubts about the Soviets mounted, practical cooperation between the two sides continued. In some areas, such as military and nuclear technology, it even intensified. The secret October 1957 agreement on exchange of nuclear technology aimed at making China capable of producing its own nuclear weapons by 1960, and the many visits of high-level military delegations to each other's countries explored ways of extending Sino-Soviet cooperation in military production. Economic and educational cooperation also was extended in several agreements signed during 1957. 66
Nikita Khrushchev's response to the trouble in his eastern alliance China's meddling in Europe and its criticism of his foreign and domestic policies was at first remarkably moderate. Khrushchev with his earthy sense of politics seems to have sensed that what the alliance needed was a perception of common purpose, of having joint strategies for dealing with the political and military situation in
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