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Authors: Odd Arne Westad
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and early June 1958 the Soviet Union started presenting a new set of proposals for military cooperation and integration between the two allies. These plans had been under preparation for some time in the Soviet ministries of defense and foreign affairs. The main points of the plans were joint technical intelligence facilities, Soviet-operated early-warning systems, and long-distance naval communications stations, all to be installed in China and paid for by the Soviet Union. Moscow would supply China with advanced equipment for amphibious operations and send instructors. In early July the Soviets also suggested setting up a joint force of nuclear submarines to operate along the Chinese coast and in the western Pacific. This latter initiative was intended as a positive response to the Chinese request to buy nuclear submarines from the Soviet Union. 72
For the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Soviet initiatives came at the worst possible moment. Mao had called a meeting of the Chinese military leadership in late May, probably because he needed to shore up the army's support for his Great Leap initiatives, enthusiasm for which was flagging among several of his Politburo colleagues. During the two-month meeting of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Committee, Mao repeatedly stressed self-reliance, criticized "dogmatism" and excessive dependence on the Soviet Union, and underlined the "high tide" of the international revolutionary movement. Turning down or amending the Soviet proposals became a way visibly to demonstrate the correctness of Mao's positions. 73
Mao's reaction to the Soviet proposals set off alarm bells in Moscow. In the summer of 1958 the Soviet leaders reviewed their aid programs to China and started to worry about how China would use the technologies transferred from the Soviet Union. After receiving a thorough report about the status of the Chinese nuclear programs and the effects further Soviet assistance would have on Chinese capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, Khrushchev decided to slow down the transfer of nuclear technology under pretext of technical difficulties. After learning in early July of the CCP's intentions to put military pressure on Taiwan to challenge U.S. resolve in the Taiwan Straits, the Soviet leaders wor-
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ried that Chinese policy could lead to war, even though they never advised the People's Republic not to take military action.
74
During Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in the late summer of 1958, the Soviet leader was on his diplomatic best behavior. After listening to Mao's monologues on how the countries of the world were turning against the United States, Khrushchev attempted to return to the plans for future military integration, which, he claimed, would be to the advantage of both allies. The Soviet leader believed that he had convinced the Chinese of the need to take great care not to involve the United States in any fighting around Taiwan, in return for a Soviet promise to take a tougher stand against American policies in the Middle East. Each leader came away from the meetings believing that he had convinced the other of the rectitude of his own view of international affairs, while refraining from criticizing the other's internal policies. 75
The Chinese shelling of the GMD-controlled islands Jinmen and Mazu in the Taiwan Straits which began right after Khrushchev's return from Beijing set off a complex set of events that further undermined Sino-Soviet solidarity. The Chinese believed that the Soviet leaders had attempted to lessen their commitment to the defense of China after learning of the strong American response to the People's Liberation Army's attack, and that the Soviet offer of military experts, logistical support, and the use of Soviet bombers and artillery was an attempt to control the outcome of the crisis. The Soviets felt that the Chinese had been unwilling to coordinate policies with Moscow, even after the Soviet Union had publicly
For the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Soviet initiatives came at the worst possible moment. Mao had called a meeting of the Chinese military leadership in late May, probably because he needed to shore up the army's support for his Great Leap initiatives, enthusiasm for which was flagging among several of his Politburo colleagues. During the two-month meeting of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Committee, Mao repeatedly stressed self-reliance, criticized "dogmatism" and excessive dependence on the Soviet Union, and underlined the "high tide" of the international revolutionary movement. Turning down or amending the Soviet proposals became a way visibly to demonstrate the correctness of Mao's positions. 73
Mao's reaction to the Soviet proposals set off alarm bells in Moscow. In the summer of 1958 the Soviet leaders reviewed their aid programs to China and started to worry about how China would use the technologies transferred from the Soviet Union. After receiving a thorough report about the status of the Chinese nuclear programs and the effects further Soviet assistance would have on Chinese capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, Khrushchev decided to slow down the transfer of nuclear technology under pretext of technical difficulties. After learning in early July of the CCP's intentions to put military pressure on Taiwan to challenge U.S. resolve in the Taiwan Straits, the Soviet leaders wor-
page_22
Page 22
ried that Chinese policy could lead to war, even though they never advised the People's Republic not to take military action.
74
During Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in the late summer of 1958, the Soviet leader was on his diplomatic best behavior. After listening to Mao's monologues on how the countries of the world were turning against the United States, Khrushchev attempted to return to the plans for future military integration, which, he claimed, would be to the advantage of both allies. The Soviet leader believed that he had convinced the Chinese of the need to take great care not to involve the United States in any fighting around Taiwan, in return for a Soviet promise to take a tougher stand against American policies in the Middle East. Each leader came away from the meetings believing that he had convinced the other of the rectitude of his own view of international affairs, while refraining from criticizing the other's internal policies. 75
The Chinese shelling of the GMD-controlled islands Jinmen and Mazu in the Taiwan Straits which began right after Khrushchev's return from Beijing set off a complex set of events that further undermined Sino-Soviet solidarity. The Chinese believed that the Soviet leaders had attempted to lessen their commitment to the defense of China after learning of the strong American response to the People's Liberation Army's attack, and that the Soviet offer of military experts, logistical support, and the use of Soviet bombers and artillery was an attempt to control the outcome of the crisis. The Soviets felt that the Chinese had been unwilling to coordinate policies with Moscow, even after the Soviet Union had publicly
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