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Pacific Asia. Throughout 1957 the Soviet ambassador was instructed to discuss American policies and the internal situation in Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia in detail with Mao and the Chinese leaders and to pay special attention to China's defense needs. This belated Soviet attempt at foreign policy integration was obviously appreciated by Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and the heads of the Chinese military and intelligence services. But to Mao the Soviet initiatives seemed suspect in view of the political gap between his own aims for
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China and Soviet practices. When Khrushchev decided to turn to military integration, Mao's suspicions came out in full bloom.
67
Descent, 1958-1960
Mao's November 1957 visit to Moscow for the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution marked a watershed in Sino-Soviet relations. The chairman's official and unofficial remarks during his trip show that he no longer deferred to Soviet views on ideology and policies; on the contrary, Mao expected Soviet and East European leaders to learn from him. His lessons were clear: The Soviet Union, China, and socialist and progressive movements around the world constituted a stronger force than the United States and its allies: "The east wind prevails over the west wind." The Soviet leadership should confront the Americans with confidence in their own strength and without fearing war. These international policies should be underpinned in all socialist countries by a reinvigora-tion of socialist transformation and mobilization of the masses.
In his rambling speeches in Moscow in which he demonstrated his agitation and his determination not to be humiliated as he had been during his first visit Mao took care not to be accused of anti-Soviet attitudes. "The Soviet Union is the only country which is qualified to be a leader," Mao said, adding "I have been to Moscow twice, the first time made me very unhappy. 'Brotherly parties' it sounded beautiful, but actually we were not equal. Now I feel some kind of equality." 68
For Khrushchev himself and for many of the East and West European Communist leaders present, Mao's behavior could not have come at a more unfortunate time. In the summer of 1957 Khrushchev had defeated a Stalinist plot against his leadership in the CPSU Politburo, in which the plotters Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and others had argued for positions not unlike those of Mao. In the fall Khrushchev wanted to take advantage of his victory to redirect Soviet foreign policy toward a relaxation of tensions with the West. Most Communist leaders welcomed the new trend in Soviet policy and the beliefs in peaceful coexistence and nonviolent revolution that accompanied it.69
Mao and Deng Xiaoping, who had accompanied the chairman to Moscow for secret talks on Chinese complaints concerning Soviet aid, felt that the other Communist parties had taken note of the Chinese positions. In the spring of 1958 Mao repeatedly assured the Soviets of his intentions to follow the Soviet lead in foreign policy. "We completely support every one of the recent foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union," Mao told Ambassador Parel Iudin on February 28. "[They are] distinguished by great flexibility and thorough thinking." 70
Mao's concurrence with Khrushchev's early attempts at Great Power détente
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may have been a way of deflecting Soviet criticism of the Great Leap Forward, the intense campaign to raise production through mass mobilization that Mao promoted from 1957-1958 on. Soviet diplomats and experts noted very early on that production targets were inflated and that the sudden collapse in central planning and shifting of labor from agriculture to rudimentary steel mills and production plants were recipes for disaster. Mao did not respond to the Soviet criticism, even though he must have been very annoyed by it. According to his colleagues, he waited for the results of the Leap to prove the Soviets wrong.
71
In late May
page_20
Page 20
China and Soviet practices. When Khrushchev decided to turn to military integration, Mao's suspicions came out in full bloom.
67
Descent, 1958-1960
Mao's November 1957 visit to Moscow for the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution marked a watershed in Sino-Soviet relations. The chairman's official and unofficial remarks during his trip show that he no longer deferred to Soviet views on ideology and policies; on the contrary, Mao expected Soviet and East European leaders to learn from him. His lessons were clear: The Soviet Union, China, and socialist and progressive movements around the world constituted a stronger force than the United States and its allies: "The east wind prevails over the west wind." The Soviet leadership should confront the Americans with confidence in their own strength and without fearing war. These international policies should be underpinned in all socialist countries by a reinvigora-tion of socialist transformation and mobilization of the masses.
In his rambling speeches in Moscow in which he demonstrated his agitation and his determination not to be humiliated as he had been during his first visit Mao took care not to be accused of anti-Soviet attitudes. "The Soviet Union is the only country which is qualified to be a leader," Mao said, adding "I have been to Moscow twice, the first time made me very unhappy. 'Brotherly parties' it sounded beautiful, but actually we were not equal. Now I feel some kind of equality." 68
For Khrushchev himself and for many of the East and West European Communist leaders present, Mao's behavior could not have come at a more unfortunate time. In the summer of 1957 Khrushchev had defeated a Stalinist plot against his leadership in the CPSU Politburo, in which the plotters Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and others had argued for positions not unlike those of Mao. In the fall Khrushchev wanted to take advantage of his victory to redirect Soviet foreign policy toward a relaxation of tensions with the West. Most Communist leaders welcomed the new trend in Soviet policy and the beliefs in peaceful coexistence and nonviolent revolution that accompanied it.
Mao and Deng Xiaoping, who had accompanied the chairman to Moscow for secret talks on Chinese complaints concerning Soviet aid, felt that the other Communist parties had taken note of the Chinese positions. In the spring of 1958 Mao repeatedly assured the Soviets of his intentions to follow the Soviet lead in foreign policy. "We completely support every one of the recent foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union," Mao told Ambassador Parel Iudin on February 28. "[They are] distinguished by great flexibility and thorough thinking." 70
Mao's concurrence with Khrushchev's early attempts at Great Power détente
page_21
Page 21
may have been a way of deflecting Soviet criticism of the Great Leap Forward, the intense campaign to raise production through mass mobilization that Mao promoted from 1957-1958 on. Soviet diplomats and experts noted very early on that production targets were inflated and that the sudden collapse in central planning and shifting of labor from agriculture to rudimentary steel mills and production plants were recipes for disaster. Mao did not respond to the Soviet criticism, even though he must have been very annoyed by it. According to his colleagues, he waited for the results of the Leap to prove the Soviets wrong.
71
In late May
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