Read Online Winston Churchill's War Leadership by Sir Martin Gilbert - Free Book Online
Authors: Sir Martin Gilbert
Tags: Fiction
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the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone. Such a course would not be in the moral or economic interests of either of our countries. We here should be unable, after the war, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United States over and above the volume of our exports which is agreeable to your tariffs and industrial economy. Not only should we in Great Britain suffer cruel privations, but widespread unemployment in the United States would follow the curtailment of American exporting power . . . Moreover, I do not believe that the Government and the people of the United States would find it in accordance with the principles which guide them to confine the help which they have so generously promised only to such munitions of war and commodities as could be immediately paid for.
This letter to Roosevelt led to a turning point in Britain’s ability to remain at war and marked a triumph for a central element of Churchill’s war leadership—the use of the written word to persuade and convince. Within a few months, it led to an increased and much more secure American lifeline for Britain—the Lend-Lease arrangement—whereby Britain was sent everything it required from the United States, but did not have to pay until the war was over.
A third communication that illustrates Churchill’s use of the written word to try to influence events was sent to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, on 2 April 1941. In it Churchill set out the folly of Japan entering the war on the side of the German-Italian Axis, of which Japan was a part, posing a series of questions, each intended to sow doubts about the possibility of Japan emerging victorious from a war with the United States and Britain. The questions, numbered one to eight, started with a blunt reference to Japan’s senior partner in the Axis: “Will Germany, without the command of the sea or the command of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring, summer or autumn of 1941? Will Germany try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves?”
The second question dealt with Britain’s Atlantic lifeline. “Will the German attack on British shipping be strong enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores with Britain and the United States transforming their whole industry to war purposes?” Then came a reference to the part that Japan’s German and Italian allies might have in determining the position of the United States. “Did Japan’s accession to the Triple Pact make it more likely or less likely that the United States would come into the present war?” And following up from that question: “If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Britain, and Japan ranged herself with the Axis Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations enable them to dispose of the Axis Powers in Europe before turning their united strength against Japan?”
The fifth question was designed to remind the Japanese of the position of the weakest member of the Axis, Italy, whose fleet had suffered a serious naval defeat at the Battle of Taranto in November 1940, when three of Italy’s six battleships had been torpedoed from the air by British pilots (a remarkable precursor of Pearl Harbor). Churchill had three points to make in question form: “Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian Fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be?”
The sixth question drew the Japanese attention to a fact, the affirmation of which could readily be ascertained by the Japanese Intelligence services. “Will the British air force be stronger than the German Air Force before the end of 1941 and far stronger before the end of 1942?” Question seven went to the heart of the nature of the German occupation regimes in
This letter to Roosevelt led to a turning point in Britain’s ability to remain at war and marked a triumph for a central element of Churchill’s war leadership—the use of the written word to persuade and convince. Within a few months, it led to an increased and much more secure American lifeline for Britain—the Lend-Lease arrangement—whereby Britain was sent everything it required from the United States, but did not have to pay until the war was over.
A third communication that illustrates Churchill’s use of the written word to try to influence events was sent to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, on 2 April 1941. In it Churchill set out the folly of Japan entering the war on the side of the German-Italian Axis, of which Japan was a part, posing a series of questions, each intended to sow doubts about the possibility of Japan emerging victorious from a war with the United States and Britain. The questions, numbered one to eight, started with a blunt reference to Japan’s senior partner in the Axis: “Will Germany, without the command of the sea or the command of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring, summer or autumn of 1941? Will Germany try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves?”
The second question dealt with Britain’s Atlantic lifeline. “Will the German attack on British shipping be strong enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores with Britain and the United States transforming their whole industry to war purposes?” Then came a reference to the part that Japan’s German and Italian allies might have in determining the position of the United States. “Did Japan’s accession to the Triple Pact make it more likely or less likely that the United States would come into the present war?” And following up from that question: “If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Britain, and Japan ranged herself with the Axis Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations enable them to dispose of the Axis Powers in Europe before turning their united strength against Japan?”
The fifth question was designed to remind the Japanese of the position of the weakest member of the Axis, Italy, whose fleet had suffered a serious naval defeat at the Battle of Taranto in November 1940, when three of Italy’s six battleships had been torpedoed from the air by British pilots (a remarkable precursor of Pearl Harbor). Churchill had three points to make in question form: “Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian Fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be?”
The sixth question drew the Japanese attention to a fact, the affirmation of which could readily be ascertained by the Japanese Intelligence services. “Will the British air force be stronger than the German Air Force before the end of 1941 and far stronger before the end of 1942?” Question seven went to the heart of the nature of the German occupation regimes in
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