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Authors: John J. Mearsheimer
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false statements. Specifically, “A statement can be considered false for 1001 purposes even though it is ‘literally’ true if it misleads federal agents.” See JaeYoun John Kim, “False Statements,”
American Criminal Law Review
40, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 515.
2 . Harry G. Frankfurt has written a highly regarded book,
On Bullshit
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), which might seem relevant for this book, but is not for two reasons. First, as the author makes clear, bullshitting is fundamentally different than lying. A bullshitter pays virtually no attention to whether or not he is telling the truth. “The truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him…. His intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it.” (55) In the course of telling his story—usually a “panoramic” story—he may say some things that are false, but this is not lying because he is not purposely saying something that he knows to be untrue. (52) “His eye is not on the facts at all.” (56) Liars, in contrast, pay careful attention to the facts, although they do not tell the truth about them. The liar “is attempting to lead us away from a correct apprehension of reality.” (54–55) Second, there is little evidence of bullshitting in international politics, probably because it is usually easy to recognize and thus unlikely to have much of a payoff. As Frankfurt notes, “Most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken in by it. So the phenomenon has not aroused much deliberate concern, nor attracted much sustained inquiry.” (1) He also notes that bullshitting is commonplace in good part because people often feel compelled “to speak extensively about matters of which they are to some degree ignorant.” (63) Statesmen and diplomats rarely find themselves in that situation, which is not to deny that they sometimes make foolish decisions. In short, it does not make sense to treat bullshitting as a fourth category of deception.
3 . Quoted in Corey Dade, Suzanne Vranica, and Kevin Helliker, “Woods Aims to Stem Damage,”
Wall Street Journal
, December 3, 2009.
4 . American Bar Association,
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
, August 2002, Rule 3.3 (a). See also Monroe H. Freedman,
Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975); Robert J. Spitzer,
Saving the Constitution from Lawyers: How Legal Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11–14. It is worth noting that many legal scholars believe that “the adversary system assumes that the most efficient and fair way of determining the truth is by presenting the strongest possible case for each side of the controversy before an impartial judge or jury” (Freedman,
Ethics in an Adversary System
, 9). In other words, spinning by the rival lawyers is ultimately the best way to find the truth. But not all students of the law share that view. See Stephan Landsman,
Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication
(St. Paul, MN: West, 1988), chap. 2.
5 . James Risen, “Captives Deny Qaeda Worked with Baghdad,”
New York Times
, June 9, 2003. There was further evidence from the intelligence community that cast doubt on the purported link between bin Laden and Saddam. See
Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration’s Public Statements on Iraq
, Report prepared for Congressman Henry A. Waxman by the Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, March 16, 2004, 21–25.
6 . According to the United States Code, concealment is criminal behavior when it involves a “trick, scheme, or device.” In other words, there must be an “affirmative act of concealment.” See Kim, “False Statements,” 515. In my classification, such behavior would be akin to lying—indeed it would probably involve lying; it would not fit my definition of concealment, which does not
American Criminal Law Review
40, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 515.
2 . Harry G. Frankfurt has written a highly regarded book,
On Bullshit
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), which might seem relevant for this book, but is not for two reasons. First, as the author makes clear, bullshitting is fundamentally different than lying. A bullshitter pays virtually no attention to whether or not he is telling the truth. “The truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him…. His intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it.” (55) In the course of telling his story—usually a “panoramic” story—he may say some things that are false, but this is not lying because he is not purposely saying something that he knows to be untrue. (52) “His eye is not on the facts at all.” (56) Liars, in contrast, pay careful attention to the facts, although they do not tell the truth about them. The liar “is attempting to lead us away from a correct apprehension of reality.” (54–55) Second, there is little evidence of bullshitting in international politics, probably because it is usually easy to recognize and thus unlikely to have much of a payoff. As Frankfurt notes, “Most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken in by it. So the phenomenon has not aroused much deliberate concern, nor attracted much sustained inquiry.” (1) He also notes that bullshitting is commonplace in good part because people often feel compelled “to speak extensively about matters of which they are to some degree ignorant.” (63) Statesmen and diplomats rarely find themselves in that situation, which is not to deny that they sometimes make foolish decisions. In short, it does not make sense to treat bullshitting as a fourth category of deception.
3 . Quoted in Corey Dade, Suzanne Vranica, and Kevin Helliker, “Woods Aims to Stem Damage,”
Wall Street Journal
, December 3, 2009.
4 . American Bar Association,
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
, August 2002, Rule 3.3 (a). See also Monroe H. Freedman,
Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975); Robert J. Spitzer,
Saving the Constitution from Lawyers: How Legal Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11–14. It is worth noting that many legal scholars believe that “the adversary system assumes that the most efficient and fair way of determining the truth is by presenting the strongest possible case for each side of the controversy before an impartial judge or jury” (Freedman,
Ethics in an Adversary System
, 9). In other words, spinning by the rival lawyers is ultimately the best way to find the truth. But not all students of the law share that view. See Stephan Landsman,
Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication
(St. Paul, MN: West, 1988), chap. 2.
5 . James Risen, “Captives Deny Qaeda Worked with Baghdad,”
New York Times
, June 9, 2003. There was further evidence from the intelligence community that cast doubt on the purported link between bin Laden and Saddam. See
Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration’s Public Statements on Iraq
, Report prepared for Congressman Henry A. Waxman by the Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, March 16, 2004, 21–25.
6 . According to the United States Code, concealment is criminal behavior when it involves a “trick, scheme, or device.” In other words, there must be an “affirmative act of concealment.” See Kim, “False Statements,” 515. In my classification, such behavior would be akin to lying—indeed it would probably involve lying; it would not fit my definition of concealment, which does not
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