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Authors: John J. Mearsheimer
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in the White House—and he deeply regretted that it was necessary on those occasions (ibid., 223–40).
8 . Regarding the Rhineland, the historian Alan Bullock writes: “Years later, reminiscing over the dinner table, Hitler asked: ‘What would have happened if anybody other than myself had been at the head of the Reich! Anyone you care to mention would have lost his nerve. I was obliged to lie and what saved me was my unshakeable obstinacy and my amazing aplomb. I threatened unless the situation eased to send six extra divisions into the Rhineland. The truth was, I had only four brigades. Next day, the English papers wrote that there had been an easing of the situation.’” Alan Bullock,
Hitler, a Study in Tyranny
, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 343. See also Michael Mihalka,
German Strategic Deception in the 1930s
, Rand Note N-1557-NA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1980); Arnd Plagge, “Patterns of Deception: Why and How Rising States Cloak Their Power” (working paper, Yale University, March 18, 2009).
9 . Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, 115–18, 126–30, 207–10; Jiri Hochman,
The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 6; Adam B. Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73
,2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), 241–43, 252–53; Adam B. Ulam,
Stalin: The Man and His Era
(New York: Viking, 1973), 502–3.
10 . Edgar M. Bottome,
The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy
(Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971), chaps. 2, 7; McGeorge Bundy,
Danger and Survival
(New York: Random House, 1988), 416; Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush,
Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), chaps. 3–5, 9; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), chap. 6.
11 . Holger H. Herwig, “The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered,”
International History Review
10, no. 1 (February 1988): 68–105; Paul M. Kennedy, “Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of 1900: A Strategical Critique,”
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen
2 (1970): 33–57; Paul M. Kennedy,
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), chap. 13, especially 223–27; Paul M. Kennedy,
Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945: Eight Studies
(London: Fontana, 1984), chaps. 4–5; Jonathan Steinberg,
Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet
(London: Macdonald, 1965), intro., chaps. 4–5.
12 . Quoted in “Report: Nixon Feared Israeli Nukes Would Spur Arms Race,”
Haaretz
, November 29, 2007. See also Avner Cohen,
Israel and the Bomb
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Seymour M. Hersh,
The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy
(New York: Random House, 1991).
13 . Bundy,
Danger and Survival
, 392. See also Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow,
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 78–80; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,
One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964
(New York: Norton, 1997), 222–23, 252–53; Zubok and Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War
, 266.
14 . Trevor Wilson,
The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914–1918
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988), 341; Ernest D. Swinton,
Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, Including the Genesis of the Tank
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1933), chap. 12. See also B. H. Liddell Hart,
The Real War: 1914–1918
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1930), 249, 255;B. H. Liddell Hart,
The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and Its Predecessors, Heavy Branch, Machine-Gun Corps, Tank Corps, and Royal Tank
8 . Regarding the Rhineland, the historian Alan Bullock writes: “Years later, reminiscing over the dinner table, Hitler asked: ‘What would have happened if anybody other than myself had been at the head of the Reich! Anyone you care to mention would have lost his nerve. I was obliged to lie and what saved me was my unshakeable obstinacy and my amazing aplomb. I threatened unless the situation eased to send six extra divisions into the Rhineland. The truth was, I had only four brigades. Next day, the English papers wrote that there had been an easing of the situation.’” Alan Bullock,
Hitler, a Study in Tyranny
, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 343. See also Michael Mihalka,
German Strategic Deception in the 1930s
, Rand Note N-1557-NA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, July 1980); Arnd Plagge, “Patterns of Deception: Why and How Rising States Cloak Their Power” (working paper, Yale University, March 18, 2009).
9 . Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, 115–18, 126–30, 207–10; Jiri Hochman,
The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 6; Adam B. Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73
,2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), 241–43, 252–53; Adam B. Ulam,
Stalin: The Man and His Era
(New York: Viking, 1973), 502–3.
10 . Edgar M. Bottome,
The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy
(Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971), chaps. 2, 7; McGeorge Bundy,
Danger and Survival
(New York: Random House, 1988), 416; Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush,
Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), chaps. 3–5, 9; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), chap. 6.
11 . Holger H. Herwig, “The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered,”
International History Review
10, no. 1 (February 1988): 68–105; Paul M. Kennedy, “Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of 1900: A Strategical Critique,”
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen
2 (1970): 33–57; Paul M. Kennedy,
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), chap. 13, especially 223–27; Paul M. Kennedy,
Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945: Eight Studies
(London: Fontana, 1984), chaps. 4–5; Jonathan Steinberg,
Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet
(London: Macdonald, 1965), intro., chaps. 4–5.
12 . Quoted in “Report: Nixon Feared Israeli Nukes Would Spur Arms Race,”
Haaretz
, November 29, 2007. See also Avner Cohen,
Israel and the Bomb
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Seymour M. Hersh,
The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy
(New York: Random House, 1991).
13 . Bundy,
Danger and Survival
, 392. See also Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow,
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 78–80; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,
One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964
(New York: Norton, 1997), 222–23, 252–53; Zubok and Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War
, 266.
14 . Trevor Wilson,
The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914–1918
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988), 341; Ernest D. Swinton,
Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, Including the Genesis of the Tank
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1933), chap. 12. See also B. H. Liddell Hart,
The Real War: 1914–1918
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1930), 249, 255;B. H. Liddell Hart,
The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and Its Predecessors, Heavy Branch, Machine-Gun Corps, Tank Corps, and Royal Tank
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