Read Online We Meant Well by Peter Van Buren - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Peter Van Buren
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interlocking extended families, a tribe could potentially encompass many thousands of people spread across the country. In the words of a common Iraqi threat, âWe will seek revenge and my tribe is not small.â A head sheik led each tribe, with subtribes run by lesser sheiks, typically blood relatives. The sheiks prided themselves on long claims to power. One of the biggest big shots I knew proudly displayed in his home an elaborate family tree tracing his lineage through the Prophet directly back to the biblical Adam.
Rather than fight such a long-standing system, Saddam co-opted the tribal organizations that undergirded Iraq, manipulating the local sheiks toward his own ends by giving power to some, money to others, and depriving those who crossed him of both. This system worked so well that after the United States liberated Iraq, instead of holding local elections as the starting point for converting the country into a democracy, we appointed sheiks as local leaders, with the promise of elections to follow, someday. Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.
Having appointed the sheiks, the United States then set about rebuilding a democratic Iraq, using the sheiks as conduits to push reconstruction money into local communities. The goal was to hide the US role and make it seem like all the projects were local efforts, something we made ourselves believe while no one else did. Corruption was a problem. Since the sheiks suggested projects on behalf of their communities, coincidentally they tended to benefit personally from those projects, manipulating the local people toward their own ends by giving power to some, money to others, and taking both from those who crossed them. The sheiks controlled the territory like Mafia dons, owning the big-scale projects, picking them apart, and selling off trucks and generators for profit. We tolerated this. Every gesture we made toward the sheiks was justified as a short-term but necessary expediency and every gesture toward the sheiks undermined the broader concept of real elected government.
The sheiks all wore many hats, filling the power vacuum post-2003 and exploiting sectarian differences as we fumbled around trying to create Greater Georgebushistan (peace be upon him). The sheiks were easy to deal with as they wanted our money, understood authority and violence, and could in the short term get things done. Most sheiks had a fan spread of business cards to offer you, depending on circumstancesâsheik leader, general contractor, procurement guy, generic businessman, whatever you needed.
When money became scarce for local initiatives (the periodic swing in Embassy emphasis between big projects and grassroots efforts seemed to take place every few months), the sheiks would begin to fight among themselves. In the Rasheed area, a crummy scrap of land outside Baghdad controlled by thugs even during Saddamâs time, district council chair Sheik Aman was removed from his position under threat of death by Sheik Yasser, who then replaced him. During a TV broadcast Sheik Aman waived a court decision he claimed returned him to the chair and at the next meeting, displaying a flair for the dramatic and an interest in physical persuasion, he grabbed the councilâs official seals and stormed out. Sheik Yasser promptly held a news conference to denounce Sheik Aman for stealing the council seals. If there were limits to corruption, both men were still trying to find them. The position of district council chair was important because the United States, after creating these bodies, also used them to distribute money. Boring Iraqi district offices morphed into smoke-filled back rooms. âMy favorite description is the bar scene in Star Wars ,â one ePRT member recalled, invoking a description to be repeated by every subsequent ePRT member. âOur district council chair was the Tony Soprano for the area. At meetings, heâd say âYou will use my contractor or your
Rather than fight such a long-standing system, Saddam co-opted the tribal organizations that undergirded Iraq, manipulating the local sheiks toward his own ends by giving power to some, money to others, and depriving those who crossed him of both. This system worked so well that after the United States liberated Iraq, instead of holding local elections as the starting point for converting the country into a democracy, we appointed sheiks as local leaders, with the promise of elections to follow, someday. Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.
Having appointed the sheiks, the United States then set about rebuilding a democratic Iraq, using the sheiks as conduits to push reconstruction money into local communities. The goal was to hide the US role and make it seem like all the projects were local efforts, something we made ourselves believe while no one else did. Corruption was a problem. Since the sheiks suggested projects on behalf of their communities, coincidentally they tended to benefit personally from those projects, manipulating the local people toward their own ends by giving power to some, money to others, and taking both from those who crossed them. The sheiks controlled the territory like Mafia dons, owning the big-scale projects, picking them apart, and selling off trucks and generators for profit. We tolerated this. Every gesture we made toward the sheiks was justified as a short-term but necessary expediency and every gesture toward the sheiks undermined the broader concept of real elected government.
The sheiks all wore many hats, filling the power vacuum post-2003 and exploiting sectarian differences as we fumbled around trying to create Greater Georgebushistan (peace be upon him). The sheiks were easy to deal with as they wanted our money, understood authority and violence, and could in the short term get things done. Most sheiks had a fan spread of business cards to offer you, depending on circumstancesâsheik leader, general contractor, procurement guy, generic businessman, whatever you needed.
When money became scarce for local initiatives (the periodic swing in Embassy emphasis between big projects and grassroots efforts seemed to take place every few months), the sheiks would begin to fight among themselves. In the Rasheed area, a crummy scrap of land outside Baghdad controlled by thugs even during Saddamâs time, district council chair Sheik Aman was removed from his position under threat of death by Sheik Yasser, who then replaced him. During a TV broadcast Sheik Aman waived a court decision he claimed returned him to the chair and at the next meeting, displaying a flair for the dramatic and an interest in physical persuasion, he grabbed the councilâs official seals and stormed out. Sheik Yasser promptly held a news conference to denounce Sheik Aman for stealing the council seals. If there were limits to corruption, both men were still trying to find them. The position of district council chair was important because the United States, after creating these bodies, also used them to distribute money. Boring Iraqi district offices morphed into smoke-filled back rooms. âMy favorite description is the bar scene in Star Wars ,â one ePRT member recalled, invoking a description to be repeated by every subsequent ePRT member. âOur district council chair was the Tony Soprano for the area. At meetings, heâd say âYou will use my contractor or your
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