the most difficult challenge because of the volume of daily trash, the limited equipment to haul it away, and security. Concrete T-wall barriers located on either end of the market served as security checkpoints, making access for collection vehicles difficult and thus unpredictable. Without daily removal, there was both a danger to public health and increased risk, because garbage was a prime location for hidden explosives. The accumulated trash everywhere also signaled the utter lack of concern by the US-supported Iraqi government for the welfare of the people it ruled since the departure of the evil dictator who, officially, was better off gone. Freedom for sure, but unfortunately it was the freedom to not care.
Yasmine described the lack of experience among officials and corruption as further impediments. What the country needed, she said, âwas educated, honest technocrats.â She mentioned officials who underspecified and then overpriced equipment so they could skim money. She lamented the lack of budget preparation. Without local input, the Baghdad-based Ministry of Municipalities developed the budgets for all the regional areas. This was especially galling for a long-term resident like Yasmine, who sincerely cared about the place she had grown up in. While she noted the frequency (and unproductiveness) of her meetings with US-appointed politicians, it disappointed her that fellow municipal directors never even bothered to show up for the coordination sessions she tried to schedule. This was all in spite of a multiyear, $250 million contract let out by the United States to hold good-government classes for these same Iraqi officials to teach them to be better bureaucrats. The contract was held by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which, while a part of the US government, did not report to the State Department. So, although I knew from talking to Yasmine that such a program was running in my area, I had no way to influence it or learn more about it except if Yasmine told me things or I happened to find some information on the Web, management by Google. The USAID representative would not tell me what he was working on. He would report to his boss, who would write a summary for my boss, who often remembered to forward it to me. We did not play well together.
Like USAID and State, the Army and State also had a hard time getting their vision for what we were doing in Iraq synchronized. The Army can be hard to understand. They often did things their own way for their own reasons, a bad idea when you were talking about the coordinated conduct of foreign policy and reconstruction of Iraq in support of our national security goals. While the State Department saw its mission as trending toward bigger picture stuff, the Army often focused on more immediate things. The argument was not a simple oneâwas it right to focus on a five-year water plant rebuilding project while local children suffered from dysentery that could be relieved by bringing in truckloads of bottled water daily? In an ideal world one could do both, satisfy the short-term need while working in the background on the long-term solution. We, however, worked in rural Iraq one year at a time, not an ideal world, and so couldnât agree on what was best to do.
Everyone did agree garbage was a problem, and it was obvious the solution was for someone to pick it up. But trash pickup was the archetypal example of everything that wasnât working with reconstruction. âIf the trash isnât picked up soon,â said the Brigade Commander, âsomebody will plant an IED in it and one of my boys will die. Iâm going to pay people to pick up the trash now rather than wait for the Iraqi government.â It was a pragmatic approach to security but one that provided a disincentive for municipalities to discharge their responsibilities. As long as the United States would pay for trash pickup, why should the municipality? Using
Yasmine described the lack of experience among officials and corruption as further impediments. What the country needed, she said, âwas educated, honest technocrats.â She mentioned officials who underspecified and then overpriced equipment so they could skim money. She lamented the lack of budget preparation. Without local input, the Baghdad-based Ministry of Municipalities developed the budgets for all the regional areas. This was especially galling for a long-term resident like Yasmine, who sincerely cared about the place she had grown up in. While she noted the frequency (and unproductiveness) of her meetings with US-appointed politicians, it disappointed her that fellow municipal directors never even bothered to show up for the coordination sessions she tried to schedule. This was all in spite of a multiyear, $250 million contract let out by the United States to hold good-government classes for these same Iraqi officials to teach them to be better bureaucrats. The contract was held by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which, while a part of the US government, did not report to the State Department. So, although I knew from talking to Yasmine that such a program was running in my area, I had no way to influence it or learn more about it except if Yasmine told me things or I happened to find some information on the Web, management by Google. The USAID representative would not tell me what he was working on. He would report to his boss, who would write a summary for my boss, who often remembered to forward it to me. We did not play well together.
Like USAID and State, the Army and State also had a hard time getting their vision for what we were doing in Iraq synchronized. The Army can be hard to understand. They often did things their own way for their own reasons, a bad idea when you were talking about the coordinated conduct of foreign policy and reconstruction of Iraq in support of our national security goals. While the State Department saw its mission as trending toward bigger picture stuff, the Army often focused on more immediate things. The argument was not a simple oneâwas it right to focus on a five-year water plant rebuilding project while local children suffered from dysentery that could be relieved by bringing in truckloads of bottled water daily? In an ideal world one could do both, satisfy the short-term need while working in the background on the long-term solution. We, however, worked in rural Iraq one year at a time, not an ideal world, and so couldnât agree on what was best to do.
Everyone did agree garbage was a problem, and it was obvious the solution was for someone to pick it up. But trash pickup was the archetypal example of everything that wasnât working with reconstruction. âIf the trash isnât picked up soon,â said the Brigade Commander, âsomebody will plant an IED in it and one of my boys will die. Iâm going to pay people to pick up the trash now rather than wait for the Iraqi government.â It was a pragmatic approach to security but one that provided a disincentive for municipalities to discharge their responsibilities. As long as the United States would pay for trash pickup, why should the municipality? Using
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