Read Online Voyagers of the Titanic by Richard Davenport-Hines - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Richard Davenport-Hines
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protect strollers from sea winds and spray. These windows, which were fitted on the Titanic, became known as the Ismay screens.
Harland & Wolff identified three hazards that might make a liner sink. It might run aground; it might collide with another ship or obstacle; or another ship might run into it. To meet the first danger, they provided the Titanic with a double bottom, though not a double hull, as Cunard had specified for the Lusitania and Mauretania . Seven feet above the lower steel plates they inserted a second set of steel plates so that if the keel were holed by the seabed, the ship would not be flooded by water. To meet the second and third dangers, the Titanic was fitted with fifteen bulkheads that divided the hull into sixteen watertight compartments. The bulkheads required apertures so that crew and passengers could move about the ship, but these were fitted with watertight doors that could be shut with the flick of a switch by the ship’s officers. Each bulkhead door automatically shut if the compartment became flooded with more than six inches of water. If the Titanic ’s bow were smashed by a collision, it would stay afloat even if the first four of these compartments were flooded. If another ship stove in its side, the Titanic could float with any two of its central compartments flooded. This seemed impressive, even indefeasible, for most ships had only one or two bulkheads in the bow as a defense against collision—not sixteen watertight compartments. However, the bulkheads added to the ship’s cost, and Harland & Wolff’s designers concluded that it was unnecessary for them to reach higher than D deck fore and aft and E deck amidships. In places, therefore, the bulkheads were no more than fifteen feet above the waterline. Although the Titanic would not sink if the first four compartments were holed in a head-on collision, or if two compartments were breached by another ship hitting broadside, it was a different matter if the front six compartments were somehow damaged. Then the bow would sink so low that water would flood over the top of the bulkhead separating the sixth from the seventh compartment, and from the seventh to the eighth—a process that would continue until the ship sank. This seemed unthinkable.
Alexander Carlisle, Harland & Wolff’s general manager, who was in charge of the equipment and decoration of the Olympic and Titanic, anticipated that the Board of Trade, the government department regulating British-registered ships, would introduce regulations requiring a greater provision of lifeboats on superliners. His brother-in-law Pirrie told him to make plans on that assumption, and he brought proposals for forty-eight or even sixty-four lifeboats to conferences with White Star. At these conferences Pirrie and Ismay did all the talking: Carlisle recalled that he and Ismay’s deputy, Harold Sanderson, “were more or less dummies.” 7 At one day-long meeting, they talked for a total of five or ten minutes about lifeboat provision; and despite Carlisle’s misgivings, which he dared not express before Pirrie, the provision of lifeboats was cut from forty-eight to twenty once it became clear that the Board of Trade was not going to alter its regulations. This reduced clutter on the deck as well as costs, but meant that the liner would have lifeboat capacity for a maximum of one-third of its passengers and crew. The risk seemed minimal when the consensus held that the liner was invulnerable.
It is notorious that the Titanic was certified to carry 3,547 passengers and crew but had lifeboat capacity for only 1,178 souls. Indeed, the ship was certified to carry 1,134 steerage passengers and would have required nineteen lifeboats if each of them were to have a place. Instead it carried fourteen wooden lifeboats (thirty feet long) with an official capacity of 65; four Engelhardt boats with collapsible canvas sides, which could take 47 passengers apiece; and two cutters for rescuing people
Harland & Wolff identified three hazards that might make a liner sink. It might run aground; it might collide with another ship or obstacle; or another ship might run into it. To meet the first danger, they provided the Titanic with a double bottom, though not a double hull, as Cunard had specified for the Lusitania and Mauretania . Seven feet above the lower steel plates they inserted a second set of steel plates so that if the keel were holed by the seabed, the ship would not be flooded by water. To meet the second and third dangers, the Titanic was fitted with fifteen bulkheads that divided the hull into sixteen watertight compartments. The bulkheads required apertures so that crew and passengers could move about the ship, but these were fitted with watertight doors that could be shut with the flick of a switch by the ship’s officers. Each bulkhead door automatically shut if the compartment became flooded with more than six inches of water. If the Titanic ’s bow were smashed by a collision, it would stay afloat even if the first four of these compartments were flooded. If another ship stove in its side, the Titanic could float with any two of its central compartments flooded. This seemed impressive, even indefeasible, for most ships had only one or two bulkheads in the bow as a defense against collision—not sixteen watertight compartments. However, the bulkheads added to the ship’s cost, and Harland & Wolff’s designers concluded that it was unnecessary for them to reach higher than D deck fore and aft and E deck amidships. In places, therefore, the bulkheads were no more than fifteen feet above the waterline. Although the Titanic would not sink if the first four compartments were holed in a head-on collision, or if two compartments were breached by another ship hitting broadside, it was a different matter if the front six compartments were somehow damaged. Then the bow would sink so low that water would flood over the top of the bulkhead separating the sixth from the seventh compartment, and from the seventh to the eighth—a process that would continue until the ship sank. This seemed unthinkable.
Alexander Carlisle, Harland & Wolff’s general manager, who was in charge of the equipment and decoration of the Olympic and Titanic, anticipated that the Board of Trade, the government department regulating British-registered ships, would introduce regulations requiring a greater provision of lifeboats on superliners. His brother-in-law Pirrie told him to make plans on that assumption, and he brought proposals for forty-eight or even sixty-four lifeboats to conferences with White Star. At these conferences Pirrie and Ismay did all the talking: Carlisle recalled that he and Ismay’s deputy, Harold Sanderson, “were more or less dummies.” 7 At one day-long meeting, they talked for a total of five or ten minutes about lifeboat provision; and despite Carlisle’s misgivings, which he dared not express before Pirrie, the provision of lifeboats was cut from forty-eight to twenty once it became clear that the Board of Trade was not going to alter its regulations. This reduced clutter on the deck as well as costs, but meant that the liner would have lifeboat capacity for a maximum of one-third of its passengers and crew. The risk seemed minimal when the consensus held that the liner was invulnerable.
It is notorious that the Titanic was certified to carry 3,547 passengers and crew but had lifeboat capacity for only 1,178 souls. Indeed, the ship was certified to carry 1,134 steerage passengers and would have required nineteen lifeboats if each of them were to have a place. Instead it carried fourteen wooden lifeboats (thirty feet long) with an official capacity of 65; four Engelhardt boats with collapsible canvas sides, which could take 47 passengers apiece; and two cutters for rescuing people
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