Read Online The Moscow Option by David Downing - Free Book Online Page B

but unfortunately they were under the sway of ideas propagated by the British tank enthusiasts of the ‘30s. This group, led by Hobart, had received so little support or understanding from other branches of the service that they had decided, in effect, ‘to hell with the rest of you’, and developed a theory of armoured warfare whereby tanks would operate, and win, completely on their own. The German notion of the armoured division as an all-arms formation centred around the mobility of the tank was not understood at all.
    So, aware of the existence of such problems but not of their precise nature, Auchinleck and Cunningham set about planning ‘Crusader’. They supervised the building of the necessary infrastructure - water pipelines, extension of the railway, the creation of supply dumps, etc. - and the organization and training of the growing army at their command. By the end of October Eighth Army had a better than three-to-one superiority in armour and a two-to-one superiority in aircraft over the enemy.
    These figures, in Auchinleck’s opinion, were subject to qualification. The tanks were mechanically unreliable, the men insufficiently trained in their use. Churchill preferred to play down the problems. While the army in North Africa trained and complained, the German armies in Russia had been closing in on Moscow. If the Soviet Union was defeated before Eighth Army so much as made a move, not only a golden chance would have been forfeited but Britain’s credibility would have suffered a shattering blow. When Auchinleck asked for a further fortnight’s postponement of the offensive he was refused. If the water and rail lines were not yet ready, if some of the armour had arrived without the necessary desert modifications, well, that was just too bad. Churchill noted the German successes in Russia, and he noted the quantitative disparity of forces in North Africa. He had allowed Auchinleck to wait this long only with the greatest reluctance; there could be no further extensions. The Chiefs of Staff agreed with him. Auchinleck was dissuaded from resigning by the Minister of State in Cairo, Oliver Lyttleton. 1 November it would be. The stage was set for a bigger and more disastrous ‘Battleaxe’.
     
    IV
    By prohibiting the attack on Tobruk Halder had made it possible for the Panzer Group leadership to concentrate its attention on the matter of the enemy’s forthcoming offensive. In mid-October air reconnaissance noticed the frantic work devoted to the extension of the railway west from Matruh and the build-up of supplies in the forward areas. The Italian intelligence network in Cairo confirmed that a major offensive was imminent.
    But from 27 October onwards low cloud hindered air reconnaissance and the sparse pickings of the German wireless intercept service were all the Axis command had to go on. Rommel accordingly deployed his forces to meet the likely eventualities. The mass of the Italian infantry remained in the siege lines around Tobruk and behind the frontier defences between Solium and Sidi Omar. The Italian armoured and motorised divisions - Ariete and Trieste - were held back to the west between Bir Hacheim and Bir el Gubi. The German light infantry ‘Afrika’ division (otherwise known as 90th Light) was stationed at Sidi Rezegh, ready to block either a move to relieve Tobruk from the south-east or to counter a break-out attempt by the beleaguered garrison. The two panzer divisions - the core of Rommel’s striking force - were deployed a short distance apart on the Trigh Capuzzo, ready to intercept either of the likely British moves. They could fall on the right flank of a drive on Tobruk or the left flank of a British attempt to encircle the frontier positions.
    Having organised his forces in such a way, Rommel waited. On 31 October it was noticed that the enemy was observing complete radio silence, and the Axis forces were placed on full alert.
    At dawn the following day ‘Crusader’ began. Led