Read Online The Moscow Option by David Downing - Free Book Online
Authors: David Downing
Tags: alternate history
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held on to his hopes that the British would not move first.
On 4 October General von Paulus arrived at Afrika Korps HQ with General Bastico, Rommel’s nominal superior in North Africa. He brought news of the Karinhall Conference, of the decision to commit greater forces in North Africa and to attempt the capture of Malta. Rommel was pleased; he had been advocating as much for several months. He doubtless also understood Paulus’s strict instructions not to risk Axis control of Cyrenaica, but was characteristically loth to abandon his intention of attacking Tobruk. Paulus did not specifically forbid him to do so, but in view of later events it seems certain that he reached the conclusion, during his two-day stay in the desert, that such an attack would constitute an unnecessary gamble. At any rate, three days after his visitors’ departure Rommel received a direct order from Halder not to attack Tobruk. He was to remain on the defensive. Halder, hitherto deeply involved with events in Russia, seems to have taken this opportunity to re-establish his authority over the errant Rommel, a general whom he neither liked nor respected. But whatever his motives the decision was a sound one, as was soon to become apparent.
III
For over a century Great Britain had been staking a claim to at least a shared control of the Mediterranean Sea. The interests at stake had changed as the years passed by, but whichever they were - the overland route to India, the Suez Canal, Middle Eastern oil - they were always deemed vital to the well-being of the Empire at peace or the Empire at war.
There was of course an element of the self-fulfilling prophecy in Britain’s Mediterranean obsession, the forces deployed there invited counter-concentration and hence needed reinforcement. But for all that there was little doubt in most British minds in the summer of 1941 that the defence of the Mediterranean/Middle East area came second only to the defence of the British Isles in the list of priorities. Perhaps the war could not be lost there, but it could hardly be won if the area fell to the enemy.
Whatever happened, it was likely to prove cumulative. In the worst instance the fall of Malta would herald the fall of Egypt, which in turn would lead to the loss of the Middle East oilfields. The strain on shipping resources, already heavy, would be stretched to breaking-point by the need to bring oil across the Atlantic from America. Only in Europe would the British be able to confront the Germans, and the ships which were to bring the wherewithal for a cross-Channel invasion across the Atlantic would be carrying oil instead. There would be little chance of victory.
In the best instance the capture of Cyrenaica would ensure Malta’s safety; the island fortress would continue to take a heavy toll of Axis shipping, prevent supplies reaching Rommel, and hence make possible the conquest of Tripolitania and Tunisia. Then Sicily could be attacked, and the Mediterranean opened to merchant shipping. The high number of ships employed on the long route round the Cape would no longer be necessary, and a good number could be transferred to the Atlantic for ferrying across the requisites of a Second Front in Europe. Victory would be assured.
Winston Churchill was fully alive to the possibilities inherent in these two scenarios, and was naturally determined to pursue the second, more amenable one, with all the considerable vigour at his disposal. He had been much cheered by O’Connor’s dazzling victory over the Italians in December 1940, and equally chagrined by the string of disasters that had followed on its tail. The Germany entry into Africa had seen all of O’Connor’s gains reversed, Greece had fallen with a whimper and Crete, if with more of a bang, had tumbled after it. Then the much-heralded ‘Battleaxe’ offensive had clattered to a pathetic halt after a mere two days. It was more than the Prime Minister could comfortably stomach. The heads of
On 4 October General von Paulus arrived at Afrika Korps HQ with General Bastico, Rommel’s nominal superior in North Africa. He brought news of the Karinhall Conference, of the decision to commit greater forces in North Africa and to attempt the capture of Malta. Rommel was pleased; he had been advocating as much for several months. He doubtless also understood Paulus’s strict instructions not to risk Axis control of Cyrenaica, but was characteristically loth to abandon his intention of attacking Tobruk. Paulus did not specifically forbid him to do so, but in view of later events it seems certain that he reached the conclusion, during his two-day stay in the desert, that such an attack would constitute an unnecessary gamble. At any rate, three days after his visitors’ departure Rommel received a direct order from Halder not to attack Tobruk. He was to remain on the defensive. Halder, hitherto deeply involved with events in Russia, seems to have taken this opportunity to re-establish his authority over the errant Rommel, a general whom he neither liked nor respected. But whatever his motives the decision was a sound one, as was soon to become apparent.
III
For over a century Great Britain had been staking a claim to at least a shared control of the Mediterranean Sea. The interests at stake had changed as the years passed by, but whichever they were - the overland route to India, the Suez Canal, Middle Eastern oil - they were always deemed vital to the well-being of the Empire at peace or the Empire at war.
There was of course an element of the self-fulfilling prophecy in Britain’s Mediterranean obsession, the forces deployed there invited counter-concentration and hence needed reinforcement. But for all that there was little doubt in most British minds in the summer of 1941 that the defence of the Mediterranean/Middle East area came second only to the defence of the British Isles in the list of priorities. Perhaps the war could not be lost there, but it could hardly be won if the area fell to the enemy.
Whatever happened, it was likely to prove cumulative. In the worst instance the fall of Malta would herald the fall of Egypt, which in turn would lead to the loss of the Middle East oilfields. The strain on shipping resources, already heavy, would be stretched to breaking-point by the need to bring oil across the Atlantic from America. Only in Europe would the British be able to confront the Germans, and the ships which were to bring the wherewithal for a cross-Channel invasion across the Atlantic would be carrying oil instead. There would be little chance of victory.
In the best instance the capture of Cyrenaica would ensure Malta’s safety; the island fortress would continue to take a heavy toll of Axis shipping, prevent supplies reaching Rommel, and hence make possible the conquest of Tripolitania and Tunisia. Then Sicily could be attacked, and the Mediterranean opened to merchant shipping. The high number of ships employed on the long route round the Cape would no longer be necessary, and a good number could be transferred to the Atlantic for ferrying across the requisites of a Second Front in Europe. Victory would be assured.
Winston Churchill was fully alive to the possibilities inherent in these two scenarios, and was naturally determined to pursue the second, more amenable one, with all the considerable vigour at his disposal. He had been much cheered by O’Connor’s dazzling victory over the Italians in December 1940, and equally chagrined by the string of disasters that had followed on its tail. The Germany entry into Africa had seen all of O’Connor’s gains reversed, Greece had fallen with a whimper and Crete, if with more of a bang, had tumbled after it. Then the much-heralded ‘Battleaxe’ offensive had clattered to a pathetic halt after a mere two days. It was more than the Prime Minister could comfortably stomach. The heads of
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