domestic support to get this trade agreement approved by Congress.
E NHANCING A MERICA â S REGIONAL leadership through such diplomatic, military, and economic moves is a vital part of managing China. Perhaps no country gained more from Americaâs post-9/11 focus on terrorism and the Middle East or its economic woes. The Chinese hard-liners saw the 2008 financial crisis as the opportunity to bet against American power, and to challenge more forcefully for regional position. 3 For Obama, a key reason for the rebalance was to improve Americaâs ability to deal with Chinaâs riseâa relationship he believes is the most important for the twenty-first century. This involved a mix of cooperation and confrontation, working on issues of mutual interest and standing up to China where interests collide.
Working with China is rooted in practical necessity. There are few global problems that can be solved without the United States and China acting together. Therefore the Obama team set out to develop a structure of cooperation between the two countries, centered on regular leader visits (Obama met with his Chinese counterpart more often than any previous president), and formal bureaucratic mechanisms such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual gathering co-led by the secretaries of state and treasury which brought together nearly a dozen Cabinet and agency heads to meet with their Chinese counterparts. Such discussions sought to build trust and led to progress in many areas of practical cooperation such as global health, non-proliferation, and climate change.
These efforts unintentionally stirred suspicions among many US friends and allies. As the power gap between the United States and China, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other, increased, some wondered whether this would lead to a new kind of global order led by a âG-2.â This arrangement was never the goal. Norwas it ever possible because the USâChina relationship, while increasingly cooperative on select issues, remained rooted in competition and distrust. As Kurt Campbell, one of the key shapers of the administrationâs approach to Asia, often observed, the USâChina relationship is like water polo. On the surface, it is a rough game with rules where the goal is to achieve a âpositive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship,â a mantra recited often by American and Chinese officials. But underwater, the relationship is one of pulling, scratching, and cheap shots, and the objective is to win outright.
Many aspects of Chinaâs rise take place in this darker place beneath the surface. It bullies its neighbors. It asserts its sovereign rights in the South China Sea and is effectively militarizing that region. It engages in aggressive mercantilist behavior in Africa and Latin America. It invests significantly in its military modernization, prioritizing capabilities to undermine Americaâs military advantage. Despite all the talk of âwin-winâ outcomes, the relationship is fundamentally one of competition.
China has its own version of the long game, and plays it quite well, especially when America is distracted and its resources over-leveraged. China seeks a diminished US role in Asia, at the very least forcing Washington to share regional influence. While China does not desire to lead the worldâit does not want to shoulder the burden of responsibilityâit wants to prevent any other country from standing in its way.
For Obama, the trickiest questions have been when and how to confront China. The results have been mixed. The United States has used its military presence to reassure partners and to challenge Beijingâs unilateral claims in the South China Sea (in an attempt to control access of vital sea lanes), yet China has built new military bases on reef islands. The Obama administration tried to convince its partners not to join a new financial institution to rival
E NHANCING A MERICA â S REGIONAL leadership through such diplomatic, military, and economic moves is a vital part of managing China. Perhaps no country gained more from Americaâs post-9/11 focus on terrorism and the Middle East or its economic woes. The Chinese hard-liners saw the 2008 financial crisis as the opportunity to bet against American power, and to challenge more forcefully for regional position. 3 For Obama, a key reason for the rebalance was to improve Americaâs ability to deal with Chinaâs riseâa relationship he believes is the most important for the twenty-first century. This involved a mix of cooperation and confrontation, working on issues of mutual interest and standing up to China where interests collide.
Working with China is rooted in practical necessity. There are few global problems that can be solved without the United States and China acting together. Therefore the Obama team set out to develop a structure of cooperation between the two countries, centered on regular leader visits (Obama met with his Chinese counterpart more often than any previous president), and formal bureaucratic mechanisms such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual gathering co-led by the secretaries of state and treasury which brought together nearly a dozen Cabinet and agency heads to meet with their Chinese counterparts. Such discussions sought to build trust and led to progress in many areas of practical cooperation such as global health, non-proliferation, and climate change.
These efforts unintentionally stirred suspicions among many US friends and allies. As the power gap between the United States and China, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other, increased, some wondered whether this would lead to a new kind of global order led by a âG-2.â This arrangement was never the goal. Norwas it ever possible because the USâChina relationship, while increasingly cooperative on select issues, remained rooted in competition and distrust. As Kurt Campbell, one of the key shapers of the administrationâs approach to Asia, often observed, the USâChina relationship is like water polo. On the surface, it is a rough game with rules where the goal is to achieve a âpositive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship,â a mantra recited often by American and Chinese officials. But underwater, the relationship is one of pulling, scratching, and cheap shots, and the objective is to win outright.
Many aspects of Chinaâs rise take place in this darker place beneath the surface. It bullies its neighbors. It asserts its sovereign rights in the South China Sea and is effectively militarizing that region. It engages in aggressive mercantilist behavior in Africa and Latin America. It invests significantly in its military modernization, prioritizing capabilities to undermine Americaâs military advantage. Despite all the talk of âwin-winâ outcomes, the relationship is fundamentally one of competition.
China has its own version of the long game, and plays it quite well, especially when America is distracted and its resources over-leveraged. China seeks a diminished US role in Asia, at the very least forcing Washington to share regional influence. While China does not desire to lead the worldâit does not want to shoulder the burden of responsibilityâit wants to prevent any other country from standing in its way.
For Obama, the trickiest questions have been when and how to confront China. The results have been mixed. The United States has used its military presence to reassure partners and to challenge Beijingâs unilateral claims in the South China Sea (in an attempt to control access of vital sea lanes), yet China has built new military bases on reef islands. The Obama administration tried to convince its partners not to join a new financial institution to rival
Similar Books
