Read Online The Killing Season Uncut by Sarah Ferguson - Free Book Online
Authors: Sarah Ferguson
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to a leader in one country, and go to bed at night after talking to leaders in another country. You had to use the different time zones so that you could talk successively to a series of leaders around the world, and I know Kevin was doing that night and day.
Hank Paulson also backed Ruddâs call on the G20.
We were reviewing the G20 and I told him I thought history would remember him kindly, that he was taking the right stance there.
History may be kind but contemporary Australian politics are not. At home there was limited acknowledgement of Ruddâs efforts in ensuring Australiaâs place in the international response to the global financial crisis (GFC).
In late September 2009, at a Leadersâ Summit in Pittsburgh, the G20 was designated the âpremier forum for international economic cooperationâ.
Â
By October 2008, as Ken Henry had predicted months earlier, the flow of foreign capital into Australia was drying up. Henry said that when the International Monetary Fund released its
World Economic Outlook
, the forecast was sobering.
It was saying that there was going to be a recession in the developed world and there was nothing that could be done about it. On top of that, the Australian financial system could not borrow from offshoreâthatâs toxic, absolutely toxic.
Swanâs deputy chief of staff, Jim Chalmers, could see that the effects of the crisis were starting to hit home.
People easily forget now just how scared the Australian population was during the global financial crisis. There was a lot of anger. People had been to the ATM and discovered for the first time that they could only take out a maximum of a thousand dollars cash in a twenty-four hour period.
Less than a week after the first significant discussion about introducing a fiscal stimulus package, a run on the banks seemed like a real possibility.
On Friday 10 October, after major losses on the Australian share market, the Prime Minister convened an urgent weekend meeting in Canberra. Rudd allowed cameras into the Cabinet room to film part of the proceedings.
We knew we had to communicate to the country at large that we had a substantial problem which was going to require drastic action, and youâve got to actually bring the public with you.
Julia Gillard and Finance Minister Lindsay Tanner attended the meeting; Swan joined in by phone from Washington. It was the first public outing of that small group of ministers that came to be known as the Gang of Four.
Henry explained why they made the policy decisions that shaped the governmentâs response to the GFC.
It simply wouldâve been impossible to get everybody in the right place at the right time, and it wouldâve proved an overwhelming distraction.
That weekend, there were people in the room who understood the harsh reality of unemployment. Henry had been an adviser to the Hawke and Keating governments.
Anybody who is an adviser, who lived through the recession of the early 1990s, could not help but have this seared on their brains and their hearts. Hundreds of thousands of people out of work,families destroyed as a consequence, a very large proportion of those aged over fifty-five who lost their jobs never worked again a day in their lives. It has a tragic human impact. Itâs really the worst economic catastrophe that can affect a country.
The Rudd government had inherited a Budget surplus of almost $20 billion. Now he and his senior ministers were considering a stimulus package that could push the Budget into deficit. Henry said it required political courage.
When you design a fiscal stimulus package you have to accept that there will be, in the jargon, leakage. Thereâll be money spent on imports, all of that kind of stuff will happen. Youâve got to have the courage for it. Youâre going to be pilloriedâand by the way, this was very much discussed before this decision was taken on that
Hank Paulson also backed Ruddâs call on the G20.
We were reviewing the G20 and I told him I thought history would remember him kindly, that he was taking the right stance there.
History may be kind but contemporary Australian politics are not. At home there was limited acknowledgement of Ruddâs efforts in ensuring Australiaâs place in the international response to the global financial crisis (GFC).
In late September 2009, at a Leadersâ Summit in Pittsburgh, the G20 was designated the âpremier forum for international economic cooperationâ.
Â
By October 2008, as Ken Henry had predicted months earlier, the flow of foreign capital into Australia was drying up. Henry said that when the International Monetary Fund released its
World Economic Outlook
, the forecast was sobering.
It was saying that there was going to be a recession in the developed world and there was nothing that could be done about it. On top of that, the Australian financial system could not borrow from offshoreâthatâs toxic, absolutely toxic.
Swanâs deputy chief of staff, Jim Chalmers, could see that the effects of the crisis were starting to hit home.
People easily forget now just how scared the Australian population was during the global financial crisis. There was a lot of anger. People had been to the ATM and discovered for the first time that they could only take out a maximum of a thousand dollars cash in a twenty-four hour period.
Less than a week after the first significant discussion about introducing a fiscal stimulus package, a run on the banks seemed like a real possibility.
On Friday 10 October, after major losses on the Australian share market, the Prime Minister convened an urgent weekend meeting in Canberra. Rudd allowed cameras into the Cabinet room to film part of the proceedings.
We knew we had to communicate to the country at large that we had a substantial problem which was going to require drastic action, and youâve got to actually bring the public with you.
Julia Gillard and Finance Minister Lindsay Tanner attended the meeting; Swan joined in by phone from Washington. It was the first public outing of that small group of ministers that came to be known as the Gang of Four.
Henry explained why they made the policy decisions that shaped the governmentâs response to the GFC.
It simply wouldâve been impossible to get everybody in the right place at the right time, and it wouldâve proved an overwhelming distraction.
That weekend, there were people in the room who understood the harsh reality of unemployment. Henry had been an adviser to the Hawke and Keating governments.
Anybody who is an adviser, who lived through the recession of the early 1990s, could not help but have this seared on their brains and their hearts. Hundreds of thousands of people out of work,families destroyed as a consequence, a very large proportion of those aged over fifty-five who lost their jobs never worked again a day in their lives. It has a tragic human impact. Itâs really the worst economic catastrophe that can affect a country.
The Rudd government had inherited a Budget surplus of almost $20 billion. Now he and his senior ministers were considering a stimulus package that could push the Budget into deficit. Henry said it required political courage.
When you design a fiscal stimulus package you have to accept that there will be, in the jargon, leakage. Thereâll be money spent on imports, all of that kind of stuff will happen. Youâve got to have the courage for it. Youâre going to be pilloriedâand by the way, this was very much discussed before this decision was taken on that
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