good illustration of this trajectory. Among southern rulers, the weakest preferred the position of regional king, recognized by the northern emperor, which allowed many of them to attain relative stability for their states; while stronger leaders fluctuated between, on the one hand, adopting the imperial title and taking the inevitable aggressive stance toward their neighbors, and, on the other, temporarily recognizing the suzerainty of northern emperors. Of these regimes only the Southern Tang dynasty (937–975) under Li Jing (r. 943–961) became fully engaged in the competition to unify the realm, successfully annexing two of the neighboring principalities and planning northward expansion. Yet Li Jing’s fortunes were reversed after the north was reunified under energetic leaders of the Later Zhou dynasty (951
-30-
960). The second Zhou emperor not only succeeded in substantially reducing the Southern Tang territory but also forced Li Jing to relinquish the imperial title. When the Song dynasty succeeded the Later Zhou, it promptly renewed southern campaigns. These were surprisingly swift: aside from the Southern Tang, which resisted the Song armies for fifteen months, other kingdoms were annexed within a few months, difficult terrain and formidable armies notwithstanding. By 978, the last of the southern kings had voluntarily yielded his position, facilitating the bloodless annexation of his state of Wu-Yue (907–978). A century-long fragmentation was over. 45
The success of Song, just like that of most other unifying regimes before and after it, would never have been possible had most of the elites and the general populace of the vanquished states not accepted the annexation. When they did resist, military campaigns changed drastically. Thus it took the Song armies only two months to conquer the state of Later Shu (934–965) in Sichuan; but then widespread pillage and killings by the Song troops caused a massive rebellion, which took almost two years to quell. The Song founder, Zhao Kuangyin (927–976), learned the lesson; thenceforth he imposed strict discipline on his troops and rebellions never recurred. Evidently, inhabitants of southern states realized that swift surrender would be preferable to a protracted war of resistance that would deplete local resources and turn everyday life into a nightmare. Insofar as conquerors acted prudently, allowing the elites of the occupied states to join the ranks of national officialdom, and did not overburden the local population with unreasonable taxation, the acquiescence of the regional regime’s subjects could be taken for granted.
Another major factor that made reunification inevitable was the determination of northern leaders to pursue the course of full-scale integration of regional states into a newly unified empire. This determination was itself dictated by the realization that the preservation of autonomous loci of power would be detrimental both to future stability and to the overall legitimacy of the newly formed imperial regime. Hence, when approached by the Southern Tang envoy who pleaded for the retention of his state as Song’s faithful vassal, which would serve the Song as a son serves his father, Zhao Kuangyin pointedly remarked: “Would the so-called father and son maintain two separate households?” The question was demagogic (to be sure, separate familial households existed throughout Chinese history, even if never lauded); but the envoy understood the message: he “had nothing to offer in response and withdrew” 46
The pattern depicted above recurred with only minor variations throughout most of Chinese history. The inherent understanding that political fragmentation must inevitably be reversed encouraged fierce competition among the would-be unifiers. While chief contenders exhausted
-31-
themselves, minor players were warily watching, prepared to support the winner. Richard Mather summarizes these dynamics with regard to the minor states
-30-
960). The second Zhou emperor not only succeeded in substantially reducing the Southern Tang territory but also forced Li Jing to relinquish the imperial title. When the Song dynasty succeeded the Later Zhou, it promptly renewed southern campaigns. These were surprisingly swift: aside from the Southern Tang, which resisted the Song armies for fifteen months, other kingdoms were annexed within a few months, difficult terrain and formidable armies notwithstanding. By 978, the last of the southern kings had voluntarily yielded his position, facilitating the bloodless annexation of his state of Wu-Yue (907–978). A century-long fragmentation was over. 45
The success of Song, just like that of most other unifying regimes before and after it, would never have been possible had most of the elites and the general populace of the vanquished states not accepted the annexation. When they did resist, military campaigns changed drastically. Thus it took the Song armies only two months to conquer the state of Later Shu (934–965) in Sichuan; but then widespread pillage and killings by the Song troops caused a massive rebellion, which took almost two years to quell. The Song founder, Zhao Kuangyin (927–976), learned the lesson; thenceforth he imposed strict discipline on his troops and rebellions never recurred. Evidently, inhabitants of southern states realized that swift surrender would be preferable to a protracted war of resistance that would deplete local resources and turn everyday life into a nightmare. Insofar as conquerors acted prudently, allowing the elites of the occupied states to join the ranks of national officialdom, and did not overburden the local population with unreasonable taxation, the acquiescence of the regional regime’s subjects could be taken for granted.
Another major factor that made reunification inevitable was the determination of northern leaders to pursue the course of full-scale integration of regional states into a newly unified empire. This determination was itself dictated by the realization that the preservation of autonomous loci of power would be detrimental both to future stability and to the overall legitimacy of the newly formed imperial regime. Hence, when approached by the Southern Tang envoy who pleaded for the retention of his state as Song’s faithful vassal, which would serve the Song as a son serves his father, Zhao Kuangyin pointedly remarked: “Would the so-called father and son maintain two separate households?” The question was demagogic (to be sure, separate familial households existed throughout Chinese history, even if never lauded); but the envoy understood the message: he “had nothing to offer in response and withdrew” 46
The pattern depicted above recurred with only minor variations throughout most of Chinese history. The inherent understanding that political fragmentation must inevitably be reversed encouraged fierce competition among the would-be unifiers. While chief contenders exhausted
-31-
themselves, minor players were warily watching, prepared to support the winner. Richard Mather summarizes these dynamics with regard to the minor states
Similar Books
