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Authors: Yuri Pines
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established by non-Chinese ethnic groups in northwestern China in the late fourth and early fifth centuries:
There is even something pathetic in the eagerness with which the vari-
ous non-Chinese groups would offer their allegiance [to succeeding
local potentates] always in the hope that at last a leader had appeared
who would bring unity and a measure of stability. 47
In this atmosphere, reunification became an inevitable outcome of the period of disunion. As the multistate order was considered neither sustainable nor legitimate, separatist tactics were doomed, and indeed were never pursued. Each of the players knew well that “the great forces of All-under-Heaven after prolonged division must unify.”
LIMITS OF ALL-UNDER-HEAVEN
Up to this point I have been employing primarily Chinese traditional terminology, speaking of the unity not of “China” (a modern term, of course), but of “All-under-Heaven.” It is time now to ascertain which areas belonged to this “subcelestial” realm. Should the unification involve only the lands of China proper (i.e., roughly the territory under the control of Qin, sometimes referred to as “Nine Provinces,” jiu zhou ), 48 or those of Greater China, as formed under the Han and (briefly) Tang dynasties; or was the referent the entire known world? To reformulate the question politically: in which parts of the known world would the emperors tolerate the autonomy or outright independence of local potentates, and where would they consider such independence to impugn the emperor’s legitimacy? Changing answers to these questions determined to a great extent the empire’s foreign policy.
When discussing the intellectuals of the Warring States period, I emphasized several times their perceived universalism; and this claim may have irritated some readers. After all, it is often presumed that the Chinese were chauvinistic and “culturalistic,” if not outright nationalistic; that they despised outside peoples as “barbarians”; and that their view of the world was exclusive rather than inclusive. 49 These suppositions, however, even if applicable to certain thinkers and intellectual currents during the imperial age, are largely invalid for the formative age of China’s intellectual and political tradition, the Warring States period. Although most contemporaneous texts treat alien tribesmen as morally and culturally impaired, they invariably share an optimistic view about their ultimate mutability. If—and when—the aliens of the four quarters were incorporated into the realm ruled by the sage monarch, their backward customs would be modified and they would join the civilized world. This
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all-inclusiveness became a touchstone of the sage’s rule; hence legendary sage rulers of the past were either hailed for having attained the submission of all “from within the Four Seas” or criticized for having failed to do so. In any case, the extension of the sage’s rule to the entirety of humankind was understood as a normative state of affairs. 50
The optimism of the intellectuals of the Warring States period with regard to the ultimate attainability of truly universal unification derived not only from their idealism but from their good historical and limited geographical knowledge. With regard to the first, thinkers might have been aware of the relatively easy absorption of alien ethnic groups who lived on the fringes of or within the Zhou world during the Springs-andAutumns period. By the Warring States period, these groups—for example, the Rong and the Di, some of whom had repeatedly challenged the Zhou polities in the past—almost disappear from historical accounts, which suggests their overall amalgamation within the Zhou cultural oikoumenê . It was reasonable, therefore, to expect that similar processes would in due time encompass other neighboring tribes.
In addition, the universality of Chinese thinkers’ outlook may also have derived from their limited
There is even something pathetic in the eagerness with which the vari-
ous non-Chinese groups would offer their allegiance [to succeeding
local potentates] always in the hope that at last a leader had appeared
who would bring unity and a measure of stability. 47
In this atmosphere, reunification became an inevitable outcome of the period of disunion. As the multistate order was considered neither sustainable nor legitimate, separatist tactics were doomed, and indeed were never pursued. Each of the players knew well that “the great forces of All-under-Heaven after prolonged division must unify.”
LIMITS OF ALL-UNDER-HEAVEN
Up to this point I have been employing primarily Chinese traditional terminology, speaking of the unity not of “China” (a modern term, of course), but of “All-under-Heaven.” It is time now to ascertain which areas belonged to this “subcelestial” realm. Should the unification involve only the lands of China proper (i.e., roughly the territory under the control of Qin, sometimes referred to as “Nine Provinces,” jiu zhou ), 48 or those of Greater China, as formed under the Han and (briefly) Tang dynasties; or was the referent the entire known world? To reformulate the question politically: in which parts of the known world would the emperors tolerate the autonomy or outright independence of local potentates, and where would they consider such independence to impugn the emperor’s legitimacy? Changing answers to these questions determined to a great extent the empire’s foreign policy.
When discussing the intellectuals of the Warring States period, I emphasized several times their perceived universalism; and this claim may have irritated some readers. After all, it is often presumed that the Chinese were chauvinistic and “culturalistic,” if not outright nationalistic; that they despised outside peoples as “barbarians”; and that their view of the world was exclusive rather than inclusive. 49 These suppositions, however, even if applicable to certain thinkers and intellectual currents during the imperial age, are largely invalid for the formative age of China’s intellectual and political tradition, the Warring States period. Although most contemporaneous texts treat alien tribesmen as morally and culturally impaired, they invariably share an optimistic view about their ultimate mutability. If—and when—the aliens of the four quarters were incorporated into the realm ruled by the sage monarch, their backward customs would be modified and they would join the civilized world. This
-32-
all-inclusiveness became a touchstone of the sage’s rule; hence legendary sage rulers of the past were either hailed for having attained the submission of all “from within the Four Seas” or criticized for having failed to do so. In any case, the extension of the sage’s rule to the entirety of humankind was understood as a normative state of affairs. 50
The optimism of the intellectuals of the Warring States period with regard to the ultimate attainability of truly universal unification derived not only from their idealism but from their good historical and limited geographical knowledge. With regard to the first, thinkers might have been aware of the relatively easy absorption of alien ethnic groups who lived on the fringes of or within the Zhou world during the Springs-andAutumns period. By the Warring States period, these groups—for example, the Rong and the Di, some of whom had repeatedly challenged the Zhou polities in the past—almost disappear from historical accounts, which suggests their overall amalgamation within the Zhou cultural oikoumenê . It was reasonable, therefore, to expect that similar processes would in due time encompass other neighboring tribes.
In addition, the universality of Chinese thinkers’ outlook may also have derived from their limited
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