he was to dictate an arrest order, it had to arrive in London in time to be executed before Pinochet got away. Garzón had to decide within a very few minutes what he was going to do, and without the benefit of consultations with anyone else involved in the case—Judge García-Castellón had already left the office.
Neither court case had as yet reached a formal indictment, although sufficient evidence had been gathered and it was within the judge’s discretion to act. But this was no ordinary criminal case. Judge Garzón was asserting jurisdiction over Pinochet on the grounds that Pinochet’s alleged crimes were against humanity as a whole, not just against the societies where the crimes were committed. Pinochet had been a head of state—a status that confers certain protections under international law. He was not a citizen of Spain. His alleged crimes had taken place neither in Britain nor in Spain.
A decision to order Pinochet’s arrest was clearly consistent with Garzón’s own prior decisions in the case. It would be a decision, however, that would be subjected to worldwide scrutiny of the kind few judges experience in their lifetime. To justify his actions, Garzón had to rely on legal foundations that floated in the nebula of unused and barely defined areas on international law. It would set new precedents of vast impact. If successful. A wrong decision would expose him to ridicule, even put his career at risk. Caution would dictate ignoring the late-arriving fax and letting fate take its course over the weekend.
Instead, Garzón looked at his watch again, opened the safe where the case files were kept, and sat down to write 720 words that were about to change history. In a world of legal documents often running hundreds of pages, Garzón’s arrest warrant was stark and showed the roughness of a hurried draft:
Writ by which the unconditional provisional arrest of Augusto Pinochet is decreed and an international order for his capture is issued.
Facts: Proceedings so far have shown that in Chile from September of 1973, and similarly in the Republic of Argentina after 1976, a series of events and criminal activities occurred under the mantel of the most furious repression against the citizens and residents of those countries. These actions are carried out using plans and goals pre-established by the structures of power and which have as their object the physical elimination, disappearance, kidnapping of thousands of persons, having previously been subject to generalized torture, according to the “Rettig Report.”
In the international arena, there is evidence of coordination which would receive the name “Operation Condor,” in which several different countries participate, among them Chile and Argentina, and which has the purpose of coordinating repression among the countries.
In this sense, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, at the time Chief of the Armed Forces and of the Chilean state, carried out criminal activities in coordination with the military authorities of Argentina . . . , giving orders for the physical elimination of persons, torture and kidnapping and disappearance of others from Chile and of different nationalities and in various countries through the actions of the Secret Service (DINA) and within the aforementioned “Plan Condor.”
General charges weren’t enough. Garzón knew he had to include concrete cases. He quickly extracted details from Garcés’s March 1998 complaint on Condor. There were at least seventy-nine cases of Condor crimes, he stated in the warrant, and named one prominent victim, Edgardo Enríquez Espinosa, who disappeared April 10, 1976. It was a name Pinochet was sure to recognize. Enríquez had been the top leader of Chile’s most radical revolutionary group, MIR. His capture in Argentina in April 1976 was the culmination of Condor operations in Paraguay, France, Argentina, and Chile. In his haste, Garzón mistakenly wrote that Enríquez had been kidnapped in Chile and
Neither court case had as yet reached a formal indictment, although sufficient evidence had been gathered and it was within the judge’s discretion to act. But this was no ordinary criminal case. Judge Garzón was asserting jurisdiction over Pinochet on the grounds that Pinochet’s alleged crimes were against humanity as a whole, not just against the societies where the crimes were committed. Pinochet had been a head of state—a status that confers certain protections under international law. He was not a citizen of Spain. His alleged crimes had taken place neither in Britain nor in Spain.
A decision to order Pinochet’s arrest was clearly consistent with Garzón’s own prior decisions in the case. It would be a decision, however, that would be subjected to worldwide scrutiny of the kind few judges experience in their lifetime. To justify his actions, Garzón had to rely on legal foundations that floated in the nebula of unused and barely defined areas on international law. It would set new precedents of vast impact. If successful. A wrong decision would expose him to ridicule, even put his career at risk. Caution would dictate ignoring the late-arriving fax and letting fate take its course over the weekend.
Instead, Garzón looked at his watch again, opened the safe where the case files were kept, and sat down to write 720 words that were about to change history. In a world of legal documents often running hundreds of pages, Garzón’s arrest warrant was stark and showed the roughness of a hurried draft:
Writ by which the unconditional provisional arrest of Augusto Pinochet is decreed and an international order for his capture is issued.
Facts: Proceedings so far have shown that in Chile from September of 1973, and similarly in the Republic of Argentina after 1976, a series of events and criminal activities occurred under the mantel of the most furious repression against the citizens and residents of those countries. These actions are carried out using plans and goals pre-established by the structures of power and which have as their object the physical elimination, disappearance, kidnapping of thousands of persons, having previously been subject to generalized torture, according to the “Rettig Report.”
In the international arena, there is evidence of coordination which would receive the name “Operation Condor,” in which several different countries participate, among them Chile and Argentina, and which has the purpose of coordinating repression among the countries.
In this sense, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, at the time Chief of the Armed Forces and of the Chilean state, carried out criminal activities in coordination with the military authorities of Argentina . . . , giving orders for the physical elimination of persons, torture and kidnapping and disappearance of others from Chile and of different nationalities and in various countries through the actions of the Secret Service (DINA) and within the aforementioned “Plan Condor.”
General charges weren’t enough. Garzón knew he had to include concrete cases. He quickly extracted details from Garcés’s March 1998 complaint on Condor. There were at least seventy-nine cases of Condor crimes, he stated in the warrant, and named one prominent victim, Edgardo Enríquez Espinosa, who disappeared April 10, 1976. It was a name Pinochet was sure to recognize. Enríquez had been the top leader of Chile’s most radical revolutionary group, MIR. His capture in Argentina in April 1976 was the culmination of Condor operations in Paraguay, France, Argentina, and Chile. In his haste, Garzón mistakenly wrote that Enríquez had been kidnapped in Chile and
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