Read Online The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal by David E. Hoffman - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: David E. Hoffman
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remain, but Carter demanded a clean break. Carter at first chose Theodore Sorensen, the Kennedy speechwriter and a Democratic lawyer, to lead the CIA, but Sorensen withdrew when it was disclosed he had once been a conscientious objector and opposition to the nomination mounted in Congress.
At the time, Turner had become a four-star admiral and was serving as commander in chief of Allied forces in southern Europe. When Turner first got the call to come to Washington, he hoped he was being considered for a military appointment as chief of naval operations or vice-chief. At the White House, Carter greeted Turner warmly in his private office, then asked him to head the CIA. 4 Turner was not ready for this and protested that he might be better in a military position. But Turner quickly grasped that Carter had made up his mind. In fact, it was Turner’s military career and reputation for discipline and integrity that appealed to the new president, who had promised to turn a new leaf at the CIA. Turner took the CIA job, but “I walked out in a real daze.” 5
In the early months in office, Turner and Carter were both fascinated by stunning advances in technology, such as the revolutionary KH-11 satellite that transmitted electronic images directly to the ground, rather than using the cumbersome previous method, in which film canisters were ejected from a satellite and captured by airplanes on descent. The KH-11 images could be seen in real time instead of days or weeks later. By coincidence, the first images were received at the CIA just hours before Carter was inaugurated president. The next day, Carter was shown the photographs in the White House Situation Room. “It was a marvelous system,” Turner later recalled, “much like a TV in space that sent back pictures almost instantly.” 6 Turner saw the technical side of intelligence collection as the wave of the future. He wanted intelligence that could be delivered when it was needed.
As CIA director, Turner took home draft National Intelligence Estimates on weekends and marked them up with red pencil. The estimates are the highest product of “finished” intelligence that the CIA provides to decision makers in government, reflecting the results of espionage as well as analysis, and they are usually created and polished by dozens of officials before being disseminated. It was unheard of for a director to take them home and personally edit them. Separately, Turner displayed an independent streak in his thinking about the world and a fondness for analysis of it. He strongly questioned the U.S. military’s gloomy estimates of the expanding Soviet military threat. This deeply irritated the Pentagon, but Turner insisted that aspects of American strength were far superior and should be taken into account. He wanted a genuine balance sheet, not just a catalog of the latest Soviet threats. 7
However, Turner was singularly unprepared for the risky world of running spies. Espionage meant persuading people to betray their country and to steal secrets. Unlike most other agencies in the U.S. government, the CIA’s purpose was to violate the laws of other countries. In the clandestine service, the people who engaged in this practice believed they served a noble cause. Turner never understood them, and they saw him as distant and aloof. Robert Gates, who served for a while as Turner’s executive assistant, recalled that “the cultural and philosophical gap between Turner and the clandestine service was simply too wide to be bridged.” 8 Turner said he wanted the CIA to have a higher ethical standard and efficient structure, like a corporation. But people in the clandestine service were put off by his preaching and moralism. Their work was often dirty and ruthless. They also resented how one of Turner’s coterie of assistants, Robert “Rusty” Williams, went poking into private lives, asking about affairs and divorces, which were common in the high-stress world of operations. 9
At the time, Turner had become a four-star admiral and was serving as commander in chief of Allied forces in southern Europe. When Turner first got the call to come to Washington, he hoped he was being considered for a military appointment as chief of naval operations or vice-chief. At the White House, Carter greeted Turner warmly in his private office, then asked him to head the CIA. 4 Turner was not ready for this and protested that he might be better in a military position. But Turner quickly grasped that Carter had made up his mind. In fact, it was Turner’s military career and reputation for discipline and integrity that appealed to the new president, who had promised to turn a new leaf at the CIA. Turner took the CIA job, but “I walked out in a real daze.” 5
In the early months in office, Turner and Carter were both fascinated by stunning advances in technology, such as the revolutionary KH-11 satellite that transmitted electronic images directly to the ground, rather than using the cumbersome previous method, in which film canisters were ejected from a satellite and captured by airplanes on descent. The KH-11 images could be seen in real time instead of days or weeks later. By coincidence, the first images were received at the CIA just hours before Carter was inaugurated president. The next day, Carter was shown the photographs in the White House Situation Room. “It was a marvelous system,” Turner later recalled, “much like a TV in space that sent back pictures almost instantly.” 6 Turner saw the technical side of intelligence collection as the wave of the future. He wanted intelligence that could be delivered when it was needed.
As CIA director, Turner took home draft National Intelligence Estimates on weekends and marked them up with red pencil. The estimates are the highest product of “finished” intelligence that the CIA provides to decision makers in government, reflecting the results of espionage as well as analysis, and they are usually created and polished by dozens of officials before being disseminated. It was unheard of for a director to take them home and personally edit them. Separately, Turner displayed an independent streak in his thinking about the world and a fondness for analysis of it. He strongly questioned the U.S. military’s gloomy estimates of the expanding Soviet military threat. This deeply irritated the Pentagon, but Turner insisted that aspects of American strength were far superior and should be taken into account. He wanted a genuine balance sheet, not just a catalog of the latest Soviet threats. 7
However, Turner was singularly unprepared for the risky world of running spies. Espionage meant persuading people to betray their country and to steal secrets. Unlike most other agencies in the U.S. government, the CIA’s purpose was to violate the laws of other countries. In the clandestine service, the people who engaged in this practice believed they served a noble cause. Turner never understood them, and they saw him as distant and aloof. Robert Gates, who served for a while as Turner’s executive assistant, recalled that “the cultural and philosophical gap between Turner and the clandestine service was simply too wide to be bridged.” 8 Turner said he wanted the CIA to have a higher ethical standard and efficient structure, like a corporation. But people in the clandestine service were put off by his preaching and moralism. Their work was often dirty and ruthless. They also resented how one of Turner’s coterie of assistants, Robert “Rusty” Williams, went poking into private lives, asking about affairs and divorces, which were common in the high-stress world of operations. 9
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