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Authors: Brian Fagan
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behind flood defenses.
Hurricane Katrina was only a Category 1 Atlantic hurricane as it crossed southern Florida. 9 It strengthened dramatically in the Gulf of Mexico before making landfall in southeastern Louisiana as a Category 3 on August 29, with sustained winds of 195 kilometers an hour. The storm lost hurricane strength only about 240 kilometers inland, near Meridian, Mississippi. Between 200 and 250 millimeters of rain fell in Louisiana as the hurricane swept inland. The sea surge was far more damaging than the wind and rain. The height was at least eight meters, inundating the parishes surrounding Lake Pontchartrain. When combined with levee breaches, the damage was catastrophic, with significant loss of life, quite apart from the devastation of coastal wetlands.
By August 31, 80 percent of New Orleans was underwater, in places 4.6 meters deep. A citywide evacuation order came into effect, at first voluntary, then mandatory, the first such evacuation in the city’s history, despite the ever-present threat of flood. By the time the hurricane came ashore, over a million people had fled New Orleans and its immediatesuburbs. Nevertheless, over a hundred thousand remained, especially the elderly and poor. An estimated twenty thousand took refuge at the Louisiana Superdome, officially designated as a “place of last resort,” and designed to withstand very strong winds indeed. Flooding stranded many residents, many of them on rooftops or trapped in attics. There were bodies floating in the eastern streets; water was undrinkable; power outages were widespread.
The official death toll was nearly fifteen hundred people. As search-and-rescue operations intensified, looting and violence became epidemic through much of the city. Residents simply took food and other essentials from unstaffed grocery stories; armed robberies were commonplace. The authorities imposed a curfew, and then declared a state of emergency as sixty-five hundred National Guardsmen arrived to help restore order.
With flooding and chaos in the city, evacuation seemed a logical strategy. For years, coastal evacuation policies had assumed that most people could afford to leave their houses when ordered to do so and would be able to evacuate in their vehicles. The evacuees would seek shelter with relatives or stay in hotels or motels at higher elevations inland. Katrina proved the planners wrong. More than a quarter of New Orleans residents had no access to an automobile. They lived from one pay period to the next and had no surplus funds for evacuation or other emergencies. This was why many residents sought refuge at the Superdome and convention center. Hurricanes come ashore in this area relatively rarely, which means that generational memories fade quickly. Many people, who had forgotten the experience of Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969), preferred to stay and ride out the storm. Those who stayed were predominantly less educated, poor, and earning lower incomes. These were the people most affected by the disaster.
Most evacuees stayed within three hundred kilometers of New Orleans, but others dispersed all over the country, as far as California, Chicago, and New York. Orleans Parish had a population of 455,188 before the hurricane, and only 343,829 afterward, a drop of 24.5 percent. 10 The hardest-hit parish, St. Bernard near Lake Pontchartrain, lost 45.6 percent of its people to out-migration. Over 250,000 Katrinamigrants went to Houston. How many have returned is a matter of debate, for reliable statistics are hard to develop or come by. Many have chosen to relocate permanently.
One cannot entirely blame them, given the controversy and factionalism surrounding the recovery effort. One reformist faction wanted to use the storm as an excuse to remake New Orleans in a more efficient, modern form, including a replacement for the old public school system. Such a restoration would have required enormous sums of money from outside. New Orleans
Hurricane Katrina was only a Category 1 Atlantic hurricane as it crossed southern Florida. 9 It strengthened dramatically in the Gulf of Mexico before making landfall in southeastern Louisiana as a Category 3 on August 29, with sustained winds of 195 kilometers an hour. The storm lost hurricane strength only about 240 kilometers inland, near Meridian, Mississippi. Between 200 and 250 millimeters of rain fell in Louisiana as the hurricane swept inland. The sea surge was far more damaging than the wind and rain. The height was at least eight meters, inundating the parishes surrounding Lake Pontchartrain. When combined with levee breaches, the damage was catastrophic, with significant loss of life, quite apart from the devastation of coastal wetlands.
By August 31, 80 percent of New Orleans was underwater, in places 4.6 meters deep. A citywide evacuation order came into effect, at first voluntary, then mandatory, the first such evacuation in the city’s history, despite the ever-present threat of flood. By the time the hurricane came ashore, over a million people had fled New Orleans and its immediatesuburbs. Nevertheless, over a hundred thousand remained, especially the elderly and poor. An estimated twenty thousand took refuge at the Louisiana Superdome, officially designated as a “place of last resort,” and designed to withstand very strong winds indeed. Flooding stranded many residents, many of them on rooftops or trapped in attics. There were bodies floating in the eastern streets; water was undrinkable; power outages were widespread.
The official death toll was nearly fifteen hundred people. As search-and-rescue operations intensified, looting and violence became epidemic through much of the city. Residents simply took food and other essentials from unstaffed grocery stories; armed robberies were commonplace. The authorities imposed a curfew, and then declared a state of emergency as sixty-five hundred National Guardsmen arrived to help restore order.
With flooding and chaos in the city, evacuation seemed a logical strategy. For years, coastal evacuation policies had assumed that most people could afford to leave their houses when ordered to do so and would be able to evacuate in their vehicles. The evacuees would seek shelter with relatives or stay in hotels or motels at higher elevations inland. Katrina proved the planners wrong. More than a quarter of New Orleans residents had no access to an automobile. They lived from one pay period to the next and had no surplus funds for evacuation or other emergencies. This was why many residents sought refuge at the Superdome and convention center. Hurricanes come ashore in this area relatively rarely, which means that generational memories fade quickly. Many people, who had forgotten the experience of Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969), preferred to stay and ride out the storm. Those who stayed were predominantly less educated, poor, and earning lower incomes. These were the people most affected by the disaster.
Most evacuees stayed within three hundred kilometers of New Orleans, but others dispersed all over the country, as far as California, Chicago, and New York. Orleans Parish had a population of 455,188 before the hurricane, and only 343,829 afterward, a drop of 24.5 percent. 10 The hardest-hit parish, St. Bernard near Lake Pontchartrain, lost 45.6 percent of its people to out-migration. Over 250,000 Katrinamigrants went to Houston. How many have returned is a matter of debate, for reliable statistics are hard to develop or come by. Many have chosen to relocate permanently.
One cannot entirely blame them, given the controversy and factionalism surrounding the recovery effort. One reformist faction wanted to use the storm as an excuse to remake New Orleans in a more efficient, modern form, including a replacement for the old public school system. Such a restoration would have required enormous sums of money from outside. New Orleans
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