Read Online Target: Rabaul by Bruce Gamble - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Bruce Gamble
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Paul B. Wurtsmith, who had led the fighter defense of Darwin in 1942. Normally he would have called his own shots at Port Moresby, but with Kenney on site, Wurtsmith had a three-star general to back his plays. How much input Kenney provided is unknown; but as an attack specialist, he probably left the interception decisions in Wurtsmith’s capable hands. Virtually every Allied fighter in northeast New Guinea was scrambled, with vectors to intercept the Japanese near Goodenough Island. It was the right call, given the circumstances, but shortly thereafter the radar signal was lost. At 0955 a different station issued an update: the enemy formation was now crossing the mountains near Kokoda, on a direct heading for Port Moresby.
The feint gave the Japanese an opportunity to cause serious damage at Jackson Field. Only eight P-38 Lightnings and a dozen outclassed P-39 Airacobras were available there—twenty fighters against well over a hundred attackers. Wurtsmith had no time to vector the main body of interceptors toward Port Moresby. Instead, they were instructed to head toward Lae, where the Japanese would probably land to refuel after the attack.
With all available fighters committed, Kenney could only step outside his headquarters and watch. He had a ringside seat as a melee among 150 aircraft unfolded overhead—an opportunity rarely afforded an air force commander.
They came into sight of my headquarters at 1023. Forty-five bombers in one beautifully flown mass formation … while above them were between 60 and70 fighters for protection. The altitude of the Jap show was between 18,000 and 20,000 feet. The P-38s, flying practically abreast, took on the leading bomber formation in a head-on pass and shot down 3 of them right away. The bombers broke formation, shed their bombs, and started a big left turn heading back toward Lae. The P-38s then knocked off 2 more of the second Jap bomber formation, which held together as it passed over Laloki airdrome, where it started bombing. The [bombers] then began to break, and, unloading bombs all the way across Ward’s and Three Mile, finally turned and followed the first outfit.
In the meantime the P-39s were tangled with so many Nip fighters that it was almost impossible to see who was who. Every once in a while a plane would burn and start spinning down, and I’d wonder who it was. In a few minutes, however, the show was over at Port Moresby, and we could [only] guess whether the gang on the other side of the range could catch the Nips on the way back.
Of the fighters initially vectored toward Goodenough Island, most were too low on fuel to intercept the Rabaul-bound Japanese, but enough interceptors were available to make the mission costly for the attackers. Forty-four American fighters harassed the Bettys making for the New Guinea coast, where two Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons also joined in. The Allied pilots claimed thirteen bombers and ten Zeros shot down, plus six bombers and one fighter as probable victories. Antiaircraft batteries at Port Moresby destroyed two—possibly four—additional bombers.
The losses in Air Group 751 had indeed been heavy, with six bombers shot down and a seventh wrecked at Lae during an emergency landing. Air Group 705 lost no bombers in the air, but a crash-landing destroyed one, and eleven others sustained combat damage. Contrary to the claims, only two Zeros were shot down, bringing total Japanese losses to ten aircraft.
The April 12 raid marked the 106th air attack on Port Moresby. It was the largest to date, yet caused fairly insignificant damage. Kenney could scarcely believe his luck. Embarrassed at being tricked by the initial feint toward Milne Bay, he was happily astonished that the Japanese had squandered their opportunity to smash Port Moresby. In his diary he called the enemy “fools,” but reserved most of his criticism for himself: “If we had just guessed better today, I would have had about 75 fighters take
The feint gave the Japanese an opportunity to cause serious damage at Jackson Field. Only eight P-38 Lightnings and a dozen outclassed P-39 Airacobras were available there—twenty fighters against well over a hundred attackers. Wurtsmith had no time to vector the main body of interceptors toward Port Moresby. Instead, they were instructed to head toward Lae, where the Japanese would probably land to refuel after the attack.
With all available fighters committed, Kenney could only step outside his headquarters and watch. He had a ringside seat as a melee among 150 aircraft unfolded overhead—an opportunity rarely afforded an air force commander.
They came into sight of my headquarters at 1023. Forty-five bombers in one beautifully flown mass formation … while above them were between 60 and70 fighters for protection. The altitude of the Jap show was between 18,000 and 20,000 feet. The P-38s, flying practically abreast, took on the leading bomber formation in a head-on pass and shot down 3 of them right away. The bombers broke formation, shed their bombs, and started a big left turn heading back toward Lae. The P-38s then knocked off 2 more of the second Jap bomber formation, which held together as it passed over Laloki airdrome, where it started bombing. The [bombers] then began to break, and, unloading bombs all the way across Ward’s and Three Mile, finally turned and followed the first outfit.
In the meantime the P-39s were tangled with so many Nip fighters that it was almost impossible to see who was who. Every once in a while a plane would burn and start spinning down, and I’d wonder who it was. In a few minutes, however, the show was over at Port Moresby, and we could [only] guess whether the gang on the other side of the range could catch the Nips on the way back.
Of the fighters initially vectored toward Goodenough Island, most were too low on fuel to intercept the Rabaul-bound Japanese, but enough interceptors were available to make the mission costly for the attackers. Forty-four American fighters harassed the Bettys making for the New Guinea coast, where two Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons also joined in. The Allied pilots claimed thirteen bombers and ten Zeros shot down, plus six bombers and one fighter as probable victories. Antiaircraft batteries at Port Moresby destroyed two—possibly four—additional bombers.
The losses in Air Group 751 had indeed been heavy, with six bombers shot down and a seventh wrecked at Lae during an emergency landing. Air Group 705 lost no bombers in the air, but a crash-landing destroyed one, and eleven others sustained combat damage. Contrary to the claims, only two Zeros were shot down, bringing total Japanese losses to ten aircraft.
The April 12 raid marked the 106th air attack on Port Moresby. It was the largest to date, yet caused fairly insignificant damage. Kenney could scarcely believe his luck. Embarrassed at being tricked by the initial feint toward Milne Bay, he was happily astonished that the Japanese had squandered their opportunity to smash Port Moresby. In his diary he called the enemy “fools,” but reserved most of his criticism for himself: “If we had just guessed better today, I would have had about 75 fighters take
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