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Authors: Noah Andre Trudeau
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that, but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you at Savannah. Your movements therefore, will be independent of mine.” The more Grant thought about matters, the more willing he was to be convinced by Sherman’s plan. But Grant answered to a boss in Washington who was not as quick to embrace such a shift in strategy. On October 12 Grant was advised that President Lincoln “feels much solicitude in respect to General Sherman’s proposed movement and hopes that it will be maturely considered…. [A] misstep by General Sherman might be fatal to his army.” Lincoln’s implication was clear; amistake by Sherman might be fatal to the administration’s reelection hopes.
Grant addressed this concern the next day, sending his message to Lincoln’s chief of staff, Major General Henry W. Halleck, knowing that the president would see every word. “On mature reflection,” Grant began, “I believe Sherman’s proposition is the best that can be adopted.” After pointing out the impossibility of keeping an Atlanta garrison supplied, he observed that by leaving a barren waste in his wake, Sherman would create a buffer zone to impede any enemy pursuit. Properly reinforced, Thomas could hold Tennessee, and even then Sherman would retain enough strength to defeat Hood if he turned on him. “Such an army as Sherman has (and with such a commander) is hard to corner or capture,” Grant concluded.
Even as this exchange was occurring, Hood and Sherman continued their slow dance in northwest Georgia. As they marched, Sherman’s men foraged extensively, prompting complaints from the affected civilians. “Your friends have broken our railroads, which supplied us bountifully,” Sherman replied, applying his rules of war, “and you cannot suppose our soldiers will suffer when there is abundance within reach.” With Sherman pressing him from the south, Hood veered to the west; by October 15 he had halted at Gaylesville, just on the Alabama side of the Georgia border. Up to now he had closely followed the script he had crafted with Jefferson Davis; although his opponent had not left himself open to any damaging blows, Hood’s men had certainly filled Sherman’s life with vexations. The question Hood now considered was whether or not his accomplishments (and more like them) were enough.
It was the same day that Hood arrived at Gaylesville that Sherman received the authorization he had been seeking. The message, dated two days earlier, came from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who acknowledged that Grant had decided to let Sherman carry out his plan. “You may count on the co-operation of this Department to the full extent of the power of the Government,” the war secretary promised. Sherman had now acquired all the approvals he needed to set out on his march through Georgia. The only problem was Hood, who still posed a threat to Union interests in northern Georgia. If Hood would commit himself to a movement into Tennessee, then Sherman could retrace his steps to Atlanta without censure. Otherwise it would lookas if he was backing away from Hood’s challenge. Sherman let some of his anxiety show in a message to a subordinate commander written on October 16. “I want the first positive fact that Hood contemplates an invasion of Tennessee; invite him to do so,” Sherman instructed. “Send him a free pass in.”
Hood finally obliged Sherman on October 17 by marching his men farther west, away from the threatened Union supply line. That same day, Sherman, monitoring events from the Georgia border to be sure that Hood’s column was receding, started to get affairs in order for what he was now calling his “grand movement into Georgia.” Orders went out to the various Union commands to begin culling out “the most indifferent wagons and worthless mules and horses,…the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, surplus servants, tents, chairs, cots, and the furniture that
Grant addressed this concern the next day, sending his message to Lincoln’s chief of staff, Major General Henry W. Halleck, knowing that the president would see every word. “On mature reflection,” Grant began, “I believe Sherman’s proposition is the best that can be adopted.” After pointing out the impossibility of keeping an Atlanta garrison supplied, he observed that by leaving a barren waste in his wake, Sherman would create a buffer zone to impede any enemy pursuit. Properly reinforced, Thomas could hold Tennessee, and even then Sherman would retain enough strength to defeat Hood if he turned on him. “Such an army as Sherman has (and with such a commander) is hard to corner or capture,” Grant concluded.
Even as this exchange was occurring, Hood and Sherman continued their slow dance in northwest Georgia. As they marched, Sherman’s men foraged extensively, prompting complaints from the affected civilians. “Your friends have broken our railroads, which supplied us bountifully,” Sherman replied, applying his rules of war, “and you cannot suppose our soldiers will suffer when there is abundance within reach.” With Sherman pressing him from the south, Hood veered to the west; by October 15 he had halted at Gaylesville, just on the Alabama side of the Georgia border. Up to now he had closely followed the script he had crafted with Jefferson Davis; although his opponent had not left himself open to any damaging blows, Hood’s men had certainly filled Sherman’s life with vexations. The question Hood now considered was whether or not his accomplishments (and more like them) were enough.
It was the same day that Hood arrived at Gaylesville that Sherman received the authorization he had been seeking. The message, dated two days earlier, came from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who acknowledged that Grant had decided to let Sherman carry out his plan. “You may count on the co-operation of this Department to the full extent of the power of the Government,” the war secretary promised. Sherman had now acquired all the approvals he needed to set out on his march through Georgia. The only problem was Hood, who still posed a threat to Union interests in northern Georgia. If Hood would commit himself to a movement into Tennessee, then Sherman could retrace his steps to Atlanta without censure. Otherwise it would lookas if he was backing away from Hood’s challenge. Sherman let some of his anxiety show in a message to a subordinate commander written on October 16. “I want the first positive fact that Hood contemplates an invasion of Tennessee; invite him to do so,” Sherman instructed. “Send him a free pass in.”
Hood finally obliged Sherman on October 17 by marching his men farther west, away from the threatened Union supply line. That same day, Sherman, monitoring events from the Georgia border to be sure that Hood’s column was receding, started to get affairs in order for what he was now calling his “grand movement into Georgia.” Orders went out to the various Union commands to begin culling out “the most indifferent wagons and worthless mules and horses,…the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, surplus servants, tents, chairs, cots, and the furniture that
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