Read Online Southern Storm by Noah Andre Trudeau - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Noah Andre Trudeau
Ads: Link
critically important Union strong point at Allatoona Pass. The effort failed, but it was a near thing.
Hood’s movement forced Sherman to dance to the Confederate tune. He began transferring some of his troops into defensive positions along the rail line while directing any newly arriving units to concentrate at Chattanooga and Nashville. Sherman also sent one of his most capable officers, Major General George H. Thomas, to take charge in Tennessee. Then, leaving one corps to garrison Atlanta, Sherman set off after Hood. Even as his men began their wearisome tramp back along roads they had already traversed triumphantly in the opposite direction, Sherman was pondering what he’d rather be doing.
In a message sent to Grant on October 1, Sherman wondered aloud that if Hood quit his railroad wrecking and marched his army northward, “why will it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has,…and for me to destroy Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah and Charleston, breaking [rail]roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain on the defensive.” His thinking now madean important leap forward—he no longer required a secure supply base waiting at the end of the campaign.
Hood and Sherman: September–November 1864
As Sherman pushed his forces northward along the railroad, repairing it as he went, Hood remained nimbly out of reach. Up to this time the Confederate officer had operated solely with a cavalry force under Major General Joseph Wheeler, but Sherman could foresee the day when the formidable Forrest would be added to the current campaign. As each day of pursuit proved fruitless, Sherman became increasingly convinced that playing Hood’s game accomplished nothing. “It will be a physical impossibility to protect the [rail]roads, now that Hood, Forrest and Wheeler,…are turned loose…. I propose we break up the railroad [we currently control] from Chattanooga [to Atlanta] and strike out with wagons for Milledgeville, Millen and Savannah,” Sherman wired Grant on October 9. “Until we can repopulate Georgia, itis useless to occupy it, but the utter destruction of its [rail]roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the [rail]roads we lose 1,000 men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march, and make Georgia howl.”
Sherman was counting on the special relationship he enjoyed with Grant to enable him to promote his plan. As he later put it, “We were as brothers—I the older man in years, but he higher in rank. We both believed in our heart of hearts that the success of the Union cause was not only necessary to the then generation of Americans, but to all future generations.” On a more informal occasion, Sherman added of Grant, “He stood by me when I was crazy and I stood by him when he was drunk; and now, sir, we stand by each other always.”
Grant’s grand strategy had been predicated on destroying the enemy’s armies. Sherman knew this and understood that it required careful and patient argument for his friend to accept the concept of turning his most powerful western armies against infrastructure rather than armed forces. (“This may not be war but rather statesmanship,” he suggested to Grant.) Hearing no response from Grant to his October 9 message, Sherman made additional points with a follow-up sent two days later. “Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me,” Sherman argued, hoping to assuage Grant’s principal concern. “Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive, instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25 percent.”
Crossing Sherman’s note in telegraphic transit was one from Grant that spoke both to his professional concerns and his personal regard for Sherman’s particular brilliance. “If there is any way of getting at Hood’s army, I would prefer
Hood’s movement forced Sherman to dance to the Confederate tune. He began transferring some of his troops into defensive positions along the rail line while directing any newly arriving units to concentrate at Chattanooga and Nashville. Sherman also sent one of his most capable officers, Major General George H. Thomas, to take charge in Tennessee. Then, leaving one corps to garrison Atlanta, Sherman set off after Hood. Even as his men began their wearisome tramp back along roads they had already traversed triumphantly in the opposite direction, Sherman was pondering what he’d rather be doing.
In a message sent to Grant on October 1, Sherman wondered aloud that if Hood quit his railroad wrecking and marched his army northward, “why will it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has,…and for me to destroy Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah and Charleston, breaking [rail]roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain on the defensive.” His thinking now madean important leap forward—he no longer required a secure supply base waiting at the end of the campaign.
Hood and Sherman: September–November 1864
As Sherman pushed his forces northward along the railroad, repairing it as he went, Hood remained nimbly out of reach. Up to this time the Confederate officer had operated solely with a cavalry force under Major General Joseph Wheeler, but Sherman could foresee the day when the formidable Forrest would be added to the current campaign. As each day of pursuit proved fruitless, Sherman became increasingly convinced that playing Hood’s game accomplished nothing. “It will be a physical impossibility to protect the [rail]roads, now that Hood, Forrest and Wheeler,…are turned loose…. I propose we break up the railroad [we currently control] from Chattanooga [to Atlanta] and strike out with wagons for Milledgeville, Millen and Savannah,” Sherman wired Grant on October 9. “Until we can repopulate Georgia, itis useless to occupy it, but the utter destruction of its [rail]roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the [rail]roads we lose 1,000 men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march, and make Georgia howl.”
Sherman was counting on the special relationship he enjoyed with Grant to enable him to promote his plan. As he later put it, “We were as brothers—I the older man in years, but he higher in rank. We both believed in our heart of hearts that the success of the Union cause was not only necessary to the then generation of Americans, but to all future generations.” On a more informal occasion, Sherman added of Grant, “He stood by me when I was crazy and I stood by him when he was drunk; and now, sir, we stand by each other always.”
Grant’s grand strategy had been predicated on destroying the enemy’s armies. Sherman knew this and understood that it required careful and patient argument for his friend to accept the concept of turning his most powerful western armies against infrastructure rather than armed forces. (“This may not be war but rather statesmanship,” he suggested to Grant.) Hearing no response from Grant to his October 9 message, Sherman made additional points with a follow-up sent two days later. “Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me,” Sherman argued, hoping to assuage Grant’s principal concern. “Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive, instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25 percent.”
Crossing Sherman’s note in telegraphic transit was one from Grant that spoke both to his professional concerns and his personal regard for Sherman’s particular brilliance. “If there is any way of getting at Hood’s army, I would prefer
Similar Books
