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Authors: Tobias Moskowitz
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it and converted, the game’s outcome would effectively be sealed. However, if the Patriots went for it and failed, they would give the Colts the ball inside their 30-yard line. So going for it would either end the game or—worst-case scenario—give the ball back to Manning and the Colts’ offense 35 to 40 yards closer than punting the ball would. If the Colts scored a touchdown quickly from that shorter distance, there might still be time for the Patriots to kick a game-winning field goal. There were other factors as well. The Patriots’ defense was visibly exhausted, and, thanks to injuries, two starters were missing from New England’s defensive secondary, another factor militating against punting. Watching the game at home in Arkansas, Kevin Kelley shouted at his television, hoping Belichick would have the “guts” (his word) to forsake punting.
Beyond gut intuition, the analytics also supported going for it. Crunching the numbers, the average NFL team converts on fourth and two about 60 percent of the time. If successful, the Patriots would almost assuredly win the game. If they failed and the Colts took over on the Pats’ 30-yard line with two minutes left and down by six points, the Patriots were still 67 percent likely to win the game. In other words, the Colts had only a one in three chance of actually scoring a touchdown from the Patriots’ 30, soit was hardly as if the Patriots were conceding a touchdown if the fourth-down attempt failed. Alternatively, punting the ball would put the Colts at roughly their own 30, which gave the Patriots about a 79 percent chance of winning. There was, then, only a 12 percent difference in the probability of winning the game if the Patriots failed on fourth down versus if they punted the ball. And if they converted (which was 60 percent likely), the game would effectively be over. Adding everything up, going for it gave the Patriots an 81 percent chance to win the game versus a 72 percent chance if they punted. * Even tweaking these numbers by using different assumptions, you’d be hard-pressed to favor punting. At best, you could say it was a close call between punting and going for it; at worst, going for it dominated.
NFL fans probably will recall what happened next. Belichick ordered his offense to stay on the field. “We thought we could win the game on that play,” he said afterward. New England’s quarterback,Tom Brady, had thrown for nearly 400 yards that evening but couldn’t pick up the crucial 72 inches on fourth down. He zipped a quick pass toKevin Faulk. Like a man smushing out a cigarette in an ashtray, Colts safetyMelvin Bullitt ground Faulk into the turf a few feet shy of the line.
By then, the fates had already written the script. As condemnation of Belichick’s “cowboy tactic” and “needless gamble” was beginning to crackle in the broadcast booth and on the blogosphere, the Colts marched methodically, inevitably, to the endzone. With seconds to play, Indianapolis scored a touchdown on a one-yard pass to win the game 35–34.
Belichick may have been the most highly regarded coach in the NFL and may have made what was, statistically anyway, the correct call, but out came the knives. The reviews from the salon were brutal:
“You have to punt the ball in that situation. As much as you may respect Peyton Manning and his ability, as much as you may doubt your defense, you have to play the percentages and punt the ball.… You have got to play the percentages and punt the ball.” –NBC analyst Tony Dungy, the Colts’ former coach
“It was a really bad coaching decision by Coach Belichick. I have all the respect in the world for him, but he has to punt the ball. The message you send in the locker room is, ‘I have no confidence in my young guys on defense.’ ” –former Patriots safety and current NBC analyst Rodney Harrison
“Ghastly.… Too smart for his own good this time. The sin of hubris.”–Boston
Globe
columnistDan
Beyond gut intuition, the analytics also supported going for it. Crunching the numbers, the average NFL team converts on fourth and two about 60 percent of the time. If successful, the Patriots would almost assuredly win the game. If they failed and the Colts took over on the Pats’ 30-yard line with two minutes left and down by six points, the Patriots were still 67 percent likely to win the game. In other words, the Colts had only a one in three chance of actually scoring a touchdown from the Patriots’ 30, soit was hardly as if the Patriots were conceding a touchdown if the fourth-down attempt failed. Alternatively, punting the ball would put the Colts at roughly their own 30, which gave the Patriots about a 79 percent chance of winning. There was, then, only a 12 percent difference in the probability of winning the game if the Patriots failed on fourth down versus if they punted the ball. And if they converted (which was 60 percent likely), the game would effectively be over. Adding everything up, going for it gave the Patriots an 81 percent chance to win the game versus a 72 percent chance if they punted. * Even tweaking these numbers by using different assumptions, you’d be hard-pressed to favor punting. At best, you could say it was a close call between punting and going for it; at worst, going for it dominated.
NFL fans probably will recall what happened next. Belichick ordered his offense to stay on the field. “We thought we could win the game on that play,” he said afterward. New England’s quarterback,Tom Brady, had thrown for nearly 400 yards that evening but couldn’t pick up the crucial 72 inches on fourth down. He zipped a quick pass toKevin Faulk. Like a man smushing out a cigarette in an ashtray, Colts safetyMelvin Bullitt ground Faulk into the turf a few feet shy of the line.
By then, the fates had already written the script. As condemnation of Belichick’s “cowboy tactic” and “needless gamble” was beginning to crackle in the broadcast booth and on the blogosphere, the Colts marched methodically, inevitably, to the endzone. With seconds to play, Indianapolis scored a touchdown on a one-yard pass to win the game 35–34.
Belichick may have been the most highly regarded coach in the NFL and may have made what was, statistically anyway, the correct call, but out came the knives. The reviews from the salon were brutal:
“You have to punt the ball in that situation. As much as you may respect Peyton Manning and his ability, as much as you may doubt your defense, you have to play the percentages and punt the ball.… You have got to play the percentages and punt the ball.” –NBC analyst Tony Dungy, the Colts’ former coach
“It was a really bad coaching decision by Coach Belichick. I have all the respect in the world for him, but he has to punt the ball. The message you send in the locker room is, ‘I have no confidence in my young guys on defense.’ ” –former Patriots safety and current NBC analyst Rodney Harrison
“Ghastly.… Too smart for his own good this time. The sin of hubris.”–Boston
Globe
columnistDan
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