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Authors: Kevin R. C. Gutzman
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teaching is self-contradictory: insofar as he says that
the federal government is national and sovereign, it is inconsistent both
with what he says about the states' role in the new Union and with what
leading figures in the ratification debate, such as Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney of South Carolina, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, George Nicholas of Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and William Cushing of Massachusetts, taught.
In Federalist 31, Hamilton says, "The State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty." In number
32, he concedes that the states, after the ratification of the Constitution,
will "retain [the taxing] authority in the most absolute and unqualified
sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to
abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of
power unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution." Under
the new constitution, he adds, the state governments would retain "all
the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not by
that act exclusively delegated to the United States."
A Book You're Not
Supposed to Read
New Views of the Constitution of the United
States by John Taylor of Caroline, edited and
introduced by Kevin R. C. Gutzman; Leesburg, VA: Alethes Press, 2007.
In number 33, interestingly, Hamilton wrote that the final paragraph
of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitutiongiving the government of the United States
power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the ... Powers vested by the constitu-
tion"-was merely a "tautology or
redundancy." It did not imply that the federal government had any greater powers
than those specifically stated.
How, then, did Hamilton imagine the
Congress and the state legislatures cooperating in areas in which their
jurisdiction overlapped-as it did in regard to taxation? In Federalist 34
he cites the Roman Republic, in which two separate legislative bodies
each possessed the power to annul the acts of the other. Just as we have
become accustomed, in other words, to the necessity of the federal House
and Senate cooperating before either of them can enact its will, so Hamilton said that in the federal system, the state and federal legislatures would each be able to act in its own sphere irrespective of the acts of the
other.
Hamilton hits upon this solution again in number 36: "As neither the
federal nor state governments, in the objects of taxation, can control the
other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in reciprocal forbearance." The Congress and the state legislatures will each have a
sphere, and within that sphere, each will act as it sees fit. John Taylor, on
this point, agreed with Hamilton, writing that the federal and state legislatures "are co-ordinate, co-equal, and independent, neither being controllable by the other." One could deduce from this, then, that sovereignty
did not lie in either the state governments or the federal government, but
in the people of the several states-though Hamilton missed this logical
implication.
The thinking behind Hamilton's statements that the federal government and the state governments were each to have some sovereignty can
be explained by his preference for the British model of government. In Britain, then as now, Parliament, not the
people, was sovereign. As Sir William
Blackstone had explained in 1765, final
authority in all matters lay in Parliament.
For Hamilton, final authority lay with the
federal government in some issues and with
the state governments in others. He never
seems to have understood the theoretical
change worked by the American Revolution,
which substituted popular sovereignty (authority in the people) for governmental sovereignty (authority in the government). This helps to
account, also, for the divergence between what he said in The Federalist
and what other Federalists
the federal government is national and sovereign, it is inconsistent both
with what he says about the states' role in the new Union and with what
leading figures in the ratification debate, such as Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney of South Carolina, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, George Nicholas of Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and William Cushing of Massachusetts, taught.
In Federalist 31, Hamilton says, "The State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty." In number
32, he concedes that the states, after the ratification of the Constitution,
will "retain [the taxing] authority in the most absolute and unqualified
sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to
abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of
power unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution." Under
the new constitution, he adds, the state governments would retain "all
the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not by
that act exclusively delegated to the United States."
A Book You're Not
Supposed to Read
New Views of the Constitution of the United
States by John Taylor of Caroline, edited and
introduced by Kevin R. C. Gutzman; Leesburg, VA: Alethes Press, 2007.
In number 33, interestingly, Hamilton wrote that the final paragraph
of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitutiongiving the government of the United States
power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the ... Powers vested by the constitu-
tion"-was merely a "tautology or
redundancy." It did not imply that the federal government had any greater powers
than those specifically stated.
How, then, did Hamilton imagine the
Congress and the state legislatures cooperating in areas in which their
jurisdiction overlapped-as it did in regard to taxation? In Federalist 34
he cites the Roman Republic, in which two separate legislative bodies
each possessed the power to annul the acts of the other. Just as we have
become accustomed, in other words, to the necessity of the federal House
and Senate cooperating before either of them can enact its will, so Hamilton said that in the federal system, the state and federal legislatures would each be able to act in its own sphere irrespective of the acts of the
other.
Hamilton hits upon this solution again in number 36: "As neither the
federal nor state governments, in the objects of taxation, can control the
other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in reciprocal forbearance." The Congress and the state legislatures will each have a
sphere, and within that sphere, each will act as it sees fit. John Taylor, on
this point, agreed with Hamilton, writing that the federal and state legislatures "are co-ordinate, co-equal, and independent, neither being controllable by the other." One could deduce from this, then, that sovereignty
did not lie in either the state governments or the federal government, but
in the people of the several states-though Hamilton missed this logical
implication.
The thinking behind Hamilton's statements that the federal government and the state governments were each to have some sovereignty can
be explained by his preference for the British model of government. In Britain, then as now, Parliament, not the
people, was sovereign. As Sir William
Blackstone had explained in 1765, final
authority in all matters lay in Parliament.
For Hamilton, final authority lay with the
federal government in some issues and with
the state governments in others. He never
seems to have understood the theoretical
change worked by the American Revolution,
which substituted popular sovereignty (authority in the people) for governmental sovereignty (authority in the government). This helps to
account, also, for the divergence between what he said in The Federalist
and what other Federalists
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