an ability to read minds which they deploy in all sorts of novel circumstances provides a simple, unified explanation of the results of all of these experiments. In order to explain their behavior without this hypothesis, we have to assume that these apes have learned a whole bunch of varied associations that it is unlikely that they had any opportunity to learn. Thus, if someone wants to deny that apes are mindreaders, she quickly starts to look like a conspiracy theorist who keeps having to make her theory more and more convoluted in order to account for the available data. (I said more about the irrationality of believing in conspiracy theories in my chapter in Philip K. Dick and Philosophy .) In other words, this is a case where Occamâs Razor trumps Lloyd Morganâs canon.
They are Sneaky, but Are They Sneaky Enough?
While it looks as if real apes are mindreaders, it also looks as if their mindreading capabilities are somewhat limited compared with the mindreading capabilities of humans. In particular, the scientific evidence suggests that apes are not able to attribute false beliefs to others. And if they cannot attribute false beliefs to others, then they cannot intend others to acquire false beliefs.
Hare, Call, and Tomasello devised a variation on their food competition experiment. In this variation, there were two opaque barriers rather than one, and there was one piece of food rather than two. At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter placed the food behind one of the two barriers so that it was only visible to the subordinate chimp. Then the chimps were released (with the subordinate given a slight head start).
The primatologists ran three versions of this experiment. In the first ( informed ) version, although the dominant chimp could not see the food once it was behind the barrier, he was allowed to see where the food was placed (and the subordinate chimp saw that he saw this). In the second ( uninformed ) version, the dominant chimp was not allowed to see where the food was placed (and the subordinate chimp saw that he did not seethis). In the third ( misinformed ) version, the dominant chimp was allowed to see where the food was placed, but then his view was blocked and the food was moved behind the other barrier (and the subordinate chimp saw what he did and did not see).
When the chimps were released, the subordinate was more likely to go for the food if the dominant chimp did not know where the food was located. However, if the subordinate had been able to attribute false beliefs to the dominant chimp, he should have been even more likely to go for the food when the dominant chimp incorrectly thought that food was in one place when it was really in another place. (If the subordinate were able to understand that the dominant chimp was misinformed and not just uninformed, he would have been sure that the dominant chimp would head off in the wrong direction.) But the experimenters found that the subordinate chimp performed the same in both the uninformed and misinformed versions of the experiment. Unlike even very young human children, apes consistently fail to pass such false belief tests .
Thereâs clearly a difference between deceiving someone and merely withholding information from someone. As Dr. Milo explains to Zira (after she unwisely reveals her ability to speak to Dr. Dixon), âThere is a time for truth, and a time, not for lies, but for silence.â And it looks like real apes can only intentionally withhold information in order to keep others in the dark about something. Unlike General Thade, they cannot intend others to acquire false beliefs. And so, real apes may not be sneaky enough to be people. 1
________
1 I would like to thank Kristin Andrews, Tony Doyle, John Huss, James Mahon, Kay Mathiesen, Bill Taylor, and Dan Zelinski for helpful suggestions on this chapter.
4
Scienceâs Crazy Dogma
B ERNARD E. R OLLIN WITH J OHN H USS
I n 1968, the year that
They are Sneaky, but Are They Sneaky Enough?
While it looks as if real apes are mindreaders, it also looks as if their mindreading capabilities are somewhat limited compared with the mindreading capabilities of humans. In particular, the scientific evidence suggests that apes are not able to attribute false beliefs to others. And if they cannot attribute false beliefs to others, then they cannot intend others to acquire false beliefs.
Hare, Call, and Tomasello devised a variation on their food competition experiment. In this variation, there were two opaque barriers rather than one, and there was one piece of food rather than two. At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter placed the food behind one of the two barriers so that it was only visible to the subordinate chimp. Then the chimps were released (with the subordinate given a slight head start).
The primatologists ran three versions of this experiment. In the first ( informed ) version, although the dominant chimp could not see the food once it was behind the barrier, he was allowed to see where the food was placed (and the subordinate chimp saw that he saw this). In the second ( uninformed ) version, the dominant chimp was not allowed to see where the food was placed (and the subordinate chimp saw that he did not seethis). In the third ( misinformed ) version, the dominant chimp was allowed to see where the food was placed, but then his view was blocked and the food was moved behind the other barrier (and the subordinate chimp saw what he did and did not see).
When the chimps were released, the subordinate was more likely to go for the food if the dominant chimp did not know where the food was located. However, if the subordinate had been able to attribute false beliefs to the dominant chimp, he should have been even more likely to go for the food when the dominant chimp incorrectly thought that food was in one place when it was really in another place. (If the subordinate were able to understand that the dominant chimp was misinformed and not just uninformed, he would have been sure that the dominant chimp would head off in the wrong direction.) But the experimenters found that the subordinate chimp performed the same in both the uninformed and misinformed versions of the experiment. Unlike even very young human children, apes consistently fail to pass such false belief tests .
Thereâs clearly a difference between deceiving someone and merely withholding information from someone. As Dr. Milo explains to Zira (after she unwisely reveals her ability to speak to Dr. Dixon), âThere is a time for truth, and a time, not for lies, but for silence.â And it looks like real apes can only intentionally withhold information in order to keep others in the dark about something. Unlike General Thade, they cannot intend others to acquire false beliefs. And so, real apes may not be sneaky enough to be people. 1
________
1 I would like to thank Kristin Andrews, Tony Doyle, John Huss, James Mahon, Kay Mathiesen, Bill Taylor, and Dan Zelinski for helpful suggestions on this chapter.
4
Scienceâs Crazy Dogma
B ERNARD E. R OLLIN WITH J OHN H USS
I n 1968, the year that
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