two perjury counts (Footnote 9, probably at p. 319 and mistakenly omitted). While Krogh was indicted for perjury, he pleaded to a single felony count of violating Dr. Fielding’s civil rights.
• Says that Colson would have been indicted for his involvement with the Plumbers (p. 592), but later indicates (correctly) that Colson really was indicted in that case (p. 642). There is a further error regarding Colson’s plea, which was to having violated Ellsberg’s civil rights and not to obstruction of justice, as Dean claims (p. 644).
• Says that Ehrlichman was indicted for perjury for his testimony before the Ervin Committee (p. 634), but this is not true, as later shown in indictment summary (p. 642).
• There is a significantly mixed message on the background and meaning of the Smoking Gun tape, which is dismissed as totally misunderstood in the book’s beginning (pp. 55–56), yet described in great and damming detail toward the book’s end (pp. 548–582 and 645). It is not just that there is no coordination between these startlingly different descriptions of the same conversation, they appear to have been drafted by different people altogether.
• There are equal conflicts and inconsistencies regarding Nixon’s reactions to Dean’s disclosure of Hunt’s blackmail demands, which were discussed above.
• Dean claims (wrongly) to have hired Charles Shaffer, his criminal defense counsel on April 8. (p. 388). Earlier he said it was on or about March 28 (p. 359), which appears to be the better date. Regardless, Shaffer’s first meeting with the prosecutors on Dean’s behalf occurred on April 2.
• There is a very strange sentence about Nixon’s demand that there be no cover-up as being its cause, which makes little sense:
Had Richard Nixon not encouraged his aides to collect political intelligence by any means fair or foul, or insisted from the moment of the arrests that there must be no cover-up, neither would have taken place. (p. 619)
III. Summary Observations
• Many of Dean’s disclosures are already “old news” because of Nixon’s own reconstruction of this period in his Memoirs . Nixon and his researchers had access to many of these same tapes, but could not quote them directly under National Archives’ strictures. Regardless, the president’s 1978 admissions of what he knew and when he knew it are not all that dramatically different from Dean’s supposedly “new” discoveries some thirty-five years later.
• Dean’s tape excerpts of what the president may have been told do not prove what he “knew”:
What comes through loud and clear in Dean’s book is that President Nixon was assured of any number of contradictory versions of what had happened, throughout the unfolding of the Watergate scandal. As in many cases, the earliest reports were incomplete and misleading. In addition, as the scandal grew, everyone appears to have been less than forthright about their own particular actions.
Busy or distracted people do not always remember what they have been told. Anyone who has been married is no doubt familiar with the accusation from one’s spouse, “But I told you that last week!” when they have absolutely no memory of such a statement.
• It’s only human, but what Dean suggests is that each of the president’s aides consistently understated or diminished his own role as the scandal progressed. In essence, Dean’s book is a continuation of this same process—of his own personal exculpation and disavowal.
• Another theme that seems consistent throughout Dean’s book is the president’s never-ending requests for some sort of written report. It is important to remember that the Nixon White House ran on paper, precisely because President Nixon vastly preferred to work from (and think about) written presentations. The National Security Council produced National
• Says that Colson would have been indicted for his involvement with the Plumbers (p. 592), but later indicates (correctly) that Colson really was indicted in that case (p. 642). There is a further error regarding Colson’s plea, which was to having violated Ellsberg’s civil rights and not to obstruction of justice, as Dean claims (p. 644).
• Says that Ehrlichman was indicted for perjury for his testimony before the Ervin Committee (p. 634), but this is not true, as later shown in indictment summary (p. 642).
• There is a significantly mixed message on the background and meaning of the Smoking Gun tape, which is dismissed as totally misunderstood in the book’s beginning (pp. 55–56), yet described in great and damming detail toward the book’s end (pp. 548–582 and 645). It is not just that there is no coordination between these startlingly different descriptions of the same conversation, they appear to have been drafted by different people altogether.
• There are equal conflicts and inconsistencies regarding Nixon’s reactions to Dean’s disclosure of Hunt’s blackmail demands, which were discussed above.
• Dean claims (wrongly) to have hired Charles Shaffer, his criminal defense counsel on April 8. (p. 388). Earlier he said it was on or about March 28 (p. 359), which appears to be the better date. Regardless, Shaffer’s first meeting with the prosecutors on Dean’s behalf occurred on April 2.
• There is a very strange sentence about Nixon’s demand that there be no cover-up as being its cause, which makes little sense:
Had Richard Nixon not encouraged his aides to collect political intelligence by any means fair or foul, or insisted from the moment of the arrests that there must be no cover-up, neither would have taken place. (p. 619)
III. Summary Observations
• Many of Dean’s disclosures are already “old news” because of Nixon’s own reconstruction of this period in his Memoirs . Nixon and his researchers had access to many of these same tapes, but could not quote them directly under National Archives’ strictures. Regardless, the president’s 1978 admissions of what he knew and when he knew it are not all that dramatically different from Dean’s supposedly “new” discoveries some thirty-five years later.
• Dean’s tape excerpts of what the president may have been told do not prove what he “knew”:
What comes through loud and clear in Dean’s book is that President Nixon was assured of any number of contradictory versions of what had happened, throughout the unfolding of the Watergate scandal. As in many cases, the earliest reports were incomplete and misleading. In addition, as the scandal grew, everyone appears to have been less than forthright about their own particular actions.
Busy or distracted people do not always remember what they have been told. Anyone who has been married is no doubt familiar with the accusation from one’s spouse, “But I told you that last week!” when they have absolutely no memory of such a statement.
• It’s only human, but what Dean suggests is that each of the president’s aides consistently understated or diminished his own role as the scandal progressed. In essence, Dean’s book is a continuation of this same process—of his own personal exculpation and disavowal.
• Another theme that seems consistent throughout Dean’s book is the president’s never-ending requests for some sort of written report. It is important to remember that the Nixon White House ran on paper, precisely because President Nixon vastly preferred to work from (and think about) written presentations. The National Security Council produced National
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