Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs) and National Security Study Memorandums (NSSMs); the Domestic Council produced a myriad of papers on domestic issues, and all presidential meetings and events were the subject of extensive reports submitted in advance. Unlike casual conversation, a written report has substance; it usually reflects a great deal of thought and consideration. It was Nixon’s habit to retreat to his hideaway office in the Old Executive Office Building most afternoons for study and reflection on important issues, almost always from written reports. It is no wonder that he kept asking for a written report on Watergate, but one was never produced in a timely fashion—and certainly never one produced by John Dean. It must have been exceptionally frustrating for the president.
• While not a principal focus of the book, many feel the real explanation for how the cover-up got so out of hand is what is characterized as Dean’s “strategy of containment” (p. 279). Much of the enduring conflict over Watergate comes from differing testimony as to what Dean was reporting to Haldeman and Ehrlichman as the scandal unfolded. It is quite likely that they simply did not realize that Dean’s efforts to “contain the problem” involved a whole series of overtly criminal acts. Dean later claimed that this was very clear from his oral reports; Haldeman and Ehrlichman claimed otherwise. Nothing in Dean’s book really resolves this core issue, because there is no documentary evidence and their conversations were not recorded.
• This vast difference in recollections is highlighted by Dean’s insistence that it was he who first leveled with the president, while Haldeman and Ehrlichman continued to keep the difficult facts to themselves. But Dean’s great claim to having done so is specifically and solely with regard to conveying the news regarding Hunt’s blackmail demands when he met with the president on March 21, 1973. Yet Dean had only learned of this demand two days before. He had been meeting or talking with the president virtually every day for almost a month. An equally valid argument on “who knew what” could be made that Haldeman and Ehrlichman did not level with the president because they, too, had been kept in the dark—by the one person working full time on containing the scandal: John Dean.
• It also is important to remember in this regard that many of the key accusations against Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman (which figured so prominently at the cover-up trial) were not capable of objective proof and were vigorously denied by others:
Magruder claimed that Mitchell had approved funding for the Liddy campaign intelligence plan at their March 30, 1972, meeting in Miami. Both other attendees, Mitchell and Fred LaRue (who was also a government witness) denied this—and Mitchell produced at trial some seven examples of where Magruder said it had been approved by people other than Mitchell.
Dean claimed that Ehrlichman ordered Hunt out of the country on June 19, 1972. Both other attendees, Ehrlichman and Colson (who was also a government witness) denied this.
Dean claimed that he had told Haldeman of Liddy’s plans following his February 4, 1972, meeting in Mitchell’s attorney general’s office. Haldeman didn’t recall this, but took Dean at his word. When no such meeting could be independently verified (by Haldeman’s extensive calendar or memories of his staff), Haldeman concluded the meeting had never occurred. When under oath in his law suit against St. Martin’s Press and confronted with these facts, Dean dissembled and said it might have been after the earlier Mitchell meeting. In this book, Dean provides a rather different explanation (see footnote 4 at p. 311).
Dean testified that when he debriefed Liddy on June 19, 1972, right after the burglary arrests, and asked about White House knowledge, Liddy had responded that Gordon
• While not a principal focus of the book, many feel the real explanation for how the cover-up got so out of hand is what is characterized as Dean’s “strategy of containment” (p. 279). Much of the enduring conflict over Watergate comes from differing testimony as to what Dean was reporting to Haldeman and Ehrlichman as the scandal unfolded. It is quite likely that they simply did not realize that Dean’s efforts to “contain the problem” involved a whole series of overtly criminal acts. Dean later claimed that this was very clear from his oral reports; Haldeman and Ehrlichman claimed otherwise. Nothing in Dean’s book really resolves this core issue, because there is no documentary evidence and their conversations were not recorded.
• This vast difference in recollections is highlighted by Dean’s insistence that it was he who first leveled with the president, while Haldeman and Ehrlichman continued to keep the difficult facts to themselves. But Dean’s great claim to having done so is specifically and solely with regard to conveying the news regarding Hunt’s blackmail demands when he met with the president on March 21, 1973. Yet Dean had only learned of this demand two days before. He had been meeting or talking with the president virtually every day for almost a month. An equally valid argument on “who knew what” could be made that Haldeman and Ehrlichman did not level with the president because they, too, had been kept in the dark—by the one person working full time on containing the scandal: John Dean.
• It also is important to remember in this regard that many of the key accusations against Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman (which figured so prominently at the cover-up trial) were not capable of objective proof and were vigorously denied by others:
Magruder claimed that Mitchell had approved funding for the Liddy campaign intelligence plan at their March 30, 1972, meeting in Miami. Both other attendees, Mitchell and Fred LaRue (who was also a government witness) denied this—and Mitchell produced at trial some seven examples of where Magruder said it had been approved by people other than Mitchell.
Dean claimed that Ehrlichman ordered Hunt out of the country on June 19, 1972. Both other attendees, Ehrlichman and Colson (who was also a government witness) denied this.
Dean claimed that he had told Haldeman of Liddy’s plans following his February 4, 1972, meeting in Mitchell’s attorney general’s office. Haldeman didn’t recall this, but took Dean at his word. When no such meeting could be independently verified (by Haldeman’s extensive calendar or memories of his staff), Haldeman concluded the meeting had never occurred. When under oath in his law suit against St. Martin’s Press and confronted with these facts, Dean dissembled and said it might have been after the earlier Mitchell meeting. In this book, Dean provides a rather different explanation (see footnote 4 at p. 311).
Dean testified that when he debriefed Liddy on June 19, 1972, right after the burglary arrests, and asked about White House knowledge, Liddy had responded that Gordon
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